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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 560664 |
Time | |
Date | 200209 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : msp.airport |
State Reference | MN |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : cmi.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | DC-9 30 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 135 flight time total : 8700 flight time type : 8000 |
ASRS Report | 560664 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical ground encounters other other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | aircraft : evacuated flight crew : declared emergency other |
Consequence | other other other other Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Passenger Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance Company FAA |
Primary Problem | Aircraft |
Narrative:
While taxiing out for takeoff at msp, we had a right main gear collapse on a taxiway. The gear collapse really isn't the story here. The story here is about the captain and myself reacting to the situation in different ways, and the subsequent failure of crew coordination. After the collapse, the captain waffled on how to treat our situation. I believed the aircraft structure was compromised and so could cause a situation that would endanger us. Our initial reaction would have been to run a checklist in the crew manuals. There is no such checklist for a gear collapse, so we had to improvise. Since he and I viewed the situation in different perspectives, we almost immediately drifted apart as we analyzed and reacted to the problem. He didn't direct me or ask my opinion as we began to work on problems. As we dealt with the problem it became evident we weren't on the same page when I elected to shut down all power to the aircraft except the #1 comrdo and PA system. The captain was surprised by my actions, while I thought this was what he wanted. I assumed he was looking at the situation the same way I was. He gave me no guidance or orders that might have changed my mind. In the end, we got the passenger off through the main cabin door using portable stairs. There were no injuries. The aircraft sustained considerable damage due to the gear collapse. In these types of sits, air crews are called to act with no guidance from aircraft manuals. When no guidance exists, crews are on their own. I believe this situation points out what can happen when the captain's guidance is absent. Crew members, when lacking guidance, will begin to act on their own and perhaps against the captain's unstated wishes. CRM doctrine also places some responsibility on subordinate's shoulders. The captain should be advised of concerns during an emergency so a well thought out plan of action may be made.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: THE PIC AND FO FAIL TO AGREE ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE COLLAPSED R GEAR IN THEIR DC9-30 AT MSP, MN.
Narrative: WHILE TAXIING OUT FOR TKOF AT MSP, WE HAD A R MAIN GEAR COLLAPSE ON A TXWY. THE GEAR COLLAPSE REALLY ISN'T THE STORY HERE. THE STORY HERE IS ABOUT THE CAPT AND MYSELF REACTING TO THE SIT IN DIFFERENT WAYS, AND THE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF CREW COORD. AFTER THE COLLAPSE, THE CAPT WAFFLED ON HOW TO TREAT OUR SIT. I BELIEVED THE ACFT STRUCTURE WAS COMPROMISED AND SO COULD CAUSE A SIT THAT WOULD ENDANGER US. OUR INITIAL REACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO RUN A CHKLIST IN THE CREW MANUALS. THERE IS NO SUCH CHKLIST FOR A GEAR COLLAPSE, SO WE HAD TO IMPROVISE. SINCE HE AND I VIEWED THE SIT IN DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES, WE ALMOST IMMEDIATELY DRIFTED APART AS WE ANALYZED AND REACTED TO THE PROB. HE DIDN'T DIRECT ME OR ASK MY OPINION AS WE BEGAN TO WORK ON PROBS. AS WE DEALT WITH THE PROB IT BECAME EVIDENT WE WEREN'T ON THE SAME PAGE WHEN I ELECTED TO SHUT DOWN ALL PWR TO THE ACFT EXCEPT THE #1 COMRDO AND PA SYS. THE CAPT WAS SURPRISED BY MY ACTIONS, WHILE I THOUGHT THIS WAS WHAT HE WANTED. I ASSUMED HE WAS LOOKING AT THE SIT THE SAME WAY I WAS. HE GAVE ME NO GUIDANCE OR ORDERS THAT MIGHT HAVE CHANGED MY MIND. IN THE END, WE GOT THE PAX OFF THROUGH THE MAIN CABIN DOOR USING PORTABLE STAIRS. THERE WERE NO INJURIES. THE ACFT SUSTAINED CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE DUE TO THE GEAR COLLAPSE. IN THESE TYPES OF SITS, AIR CREWS ARE CALLED TO ACT WITH NO GUIDANCE FROM ACFT MANUALS. WHEN NO GUIDANCE EXISTS, CREWS ARE ON THEIR OWN. I BELIEVE THIS SIT POINTS OUT WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN THE CAPT'S GUIDANCE IS ABSENT. CREW MEMBERS, WHEN LACKING GUIDANCE, WILL BEGIN TO ACT ON THEIR OWN AND PERHAPS AGAINST THE CAPT'S UNSTATED WISHES. CRM DOCTRINE ALSO PLACES SOME RESPONSIBILITY ON SUBORDINATE'S SHOULDERS. THE CAPT SHOULD BE ADVISED OF CONCERNS DURING AN EMER SO A WELL THOUGHT OUT PLAN OF ACTION MAY BE MADE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.