Narrative:

We left ZZZ, took off and were unable to raise landing gear. Used the gear lever latch release to raise gear and continued to sat. During climb, when retracting flaps, received warning horn and the automatic pressurization did not work. All of these are indicative of a failure of these system to shift from ground to flight mode. We pulled out the DC8 operations manual and followed procedure for a failure of the ground shift mechanism. This required several items to be done, as well as a couple of items done on landing. During arrival at sat, reviewed procedures and followed them during the landing. After touchdown, started getting vibrations throughout the aircraft which became increasingly severe during deceleration. Aircraft shuddered and bounced severely until it stopped with 750 ft of runway remaining. At that point, we were unable to steer the aft and advised tower we were disabled, remaining on the runway for 20-25 mins until airport operations and our maintenance people could arrive. When they got there, they found our nose gear steering assembly torque links were disconnected. 1 nose tire sidewall was covered with melted rubber from sliding sideways during rollout. It appears that after pushback, the ground crew did not connect the nose gear scissors assembly properly. The spring-loaded pins which are supposed to snap into holes on one arm of the scissors were not put in place. They were probably close, which allowed the scissors to stay in position and gave us steering authority/authorized when taxiing out of ZZZ, but on rotation, as the nose strut extended, the scissors came apart. This gave us the ground shift failure indication, but no indication that the scissors were disconnected. We did not know this until landing. The abnormal procedure does not discuss an actual separation of the scissors. In the discussion of the ground shift failure, it ctrs around linkage failures, but not a disconnect of the scissors. These are 2 entirely separate items and I'm sure no one ever considered the scissors would disconnect. Consequently there is no mention of possible directional control problems or vibrations on landing associated with the nose gear not aligning with the aircraft. I'm in the process of drafting a recommended change to the abnormal procedure to mention these things.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC8-63 CREW RPTED THE NOSEWHEEL SCISSORS DISCONNECTED AT THE DEP STATION. ON LNDG THE ACFT BECAME UNCTLABLE AND DAMAGED THE NOSEWHEEL TIRES.

Narrative: WE LEFT ZZZ, TOOK OFF AND WERE UNABLE TO RAISE LNDG GEAR. USED THE GEAR LEVER LATCH RELEASE TO RAISE GEAR AND CONTINUED TO SAT. DURING CLB, WHEN RETRACTING FLAPS, RECEIVED WARNING HORN AND THE AUTO PRESSURIZATION DID NOT WORK. ALL OF THESE ARE INDICATIVE OF A FAILURE OF THESE SYS TO SHIFT FROM GND TO FLT MODE. WE PULLED OUT THE DC8 OPS MANUAL AND FOLLOWED PROC FOR A FAILURE OF THE GND SHIFT MECHANISM. THIS REQUIRED SEVERAL ITEMS TO BE DONE, AS WELL AS A COUPLE OF ITEMS DONE ON LNDG. DURING ARR AT SAT, REVIEWED PROCS AND FOLLOWED THEM DURING THE LNDG. AFTER TOUCHDOWN, STARTED GETTING VIBRATIONS THROUGHOUT THE ACFT WHICH BECAME INCREASINGLY SEVERE DURING DECELERATION. ACFT SHUDDERED AND BOUNCED SEVERELY UNTIL IT STOPPED WITH 750 FT OF RWY REMAINING. AT THAT POINT, WE WERE UNABLE TO STEER THE AFT AND ADVISED TWR WE WERE DISABLED, REMAINING ON THE RWY FOR 20-25 MINS UNTIL ARPT OPS AND OUR MAINT PEOPLE COULD ARRIVE. WHEN THEY GOT THERE, THEY FOUND OUR NOSE GEAR STEERING ASSEMBLY TORQUE LINKS WERE DISCONNECTED. 1 NOSE TIRE SIDEWALL WAS COVERED WITH MELTED RUBBER FROM SLIDING SIDEWAYS DURING ROLLOUT. IT APPEARS THAT AFTER PUSHBACK, THE GND CREW DID NOT CONNECT THE NOSE GEAR SCISSORS ASSEMBLY PROPERLY. THE SPRING-LOADED PINS WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO SNAP INTO HOLES ON ONE ARM OF THE SCISSORS WERE NOT PUT IN PLACE. THEY WERE PROBABLY CLOSE, WHICH ALLOWED THE SCISSORS TO STAY IN POS AND GAVE US STEERING AUTH WHEN TAXIING OUT OF ZZZ, BUT ON ROTATION, AS THE NOSE STRUT EXTENDED, THE SCISSORS CAME APART. THIS GAVE US THE GND SHIFT FAILURE INDICATION, BUT NO INDICATION THAT THE SCISSORS WERE DISCONNECTED. WE DID NOT KNOW THIS UNTIL LNDG. THE ABNORMAL PROC DOES NOT DISCUSS AN ACTUAL SEPARATION OF THE SCISSORS. IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE GND SHIFT FAILURE, IT CTRS AROUND LINKAGE FAILURES, BUT NOT A DISCONNECT OF THE SCISSORS. THESE ARE 2 ENTIRELY SEPARATE ITEMS AND I'M SURE NO ONE EVER CONSIDERED THE SCISSORS WOULD DISCONNECT. CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS NO MENTION OF POSSIBLE DIRECTIONAL CTL PROBS OR VIBRATIONS ON LNDG ASSOCIATED WITH THE NOSE GEAR NOT ALIGNING WITH THE ACFT. I'M IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING A RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO THE ABNORMAL PROC TO MENTION THESE THINGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.