Narrative:

This report is about a maximum crew duty day problem. Situation: holding #2 for takeoff. Receive message to return to gate, because the captain (me) is over duty day. This was in error, and we tried to clarify the problem, but communications were very poor, and we could not get a clear response from operations/scheduling. Facts: crew reported at XD20. We felt we had plenty of time to continue a 1 hour 53 min duration flight. As it turns out, the first officer had been on short call beginning at XA00. This legally puts him on duty at XA00, even though he was sleeping just as I was. We had both been notified at approximately XA40 and told to report at XD20 for a XD50 deadhead. By the time we actually took off that afternoon, it was XM50. This added to the 1 hour 53 min scheduled time en route, would put us in ZZZ at XO43, 13 mins late. We did not understand that we were not allowed to use increased speed and shorter than schedule taxi time to calculate a better arrival. As we pulled into position to takeoff, our FMS (with winds programmed in and normal speeds) gave us a XO29 arrival time. I felt we could easily squeeze 5 more mins out of that by flying .83 mi instead of .795. This, however, didn't work, because headwinds were higher than forecast, unexpected turbulence, and an earlier than normal slow down approaching ZZZ slowed us down. We actually arrived at XM51, 25 mins late for the first officer. Contributing factors: 1) erroneous directive to return to gate. At the time of message, we had 17 mins to legally takeoff. This resulted in further delays, which resulted in us being late. 2) misunderstanding on my part with letter of the regulation. Using scheduled times versus actual. 3) lack of logic in crew duty regulation. Here 2 people called within 30 mins of one another in the middle of the night while sleeping have crew duty days that are 3 hours and 20 mins different. That fact really didn't make sense to us. Both of us were called at about XA40, and the captain's rest (a regular line holder picking up a trip) started at XD20. And the first officer (a short call reserve sleeping normally in the middle of the night, also) started his duty at XA00. 4) confusion and general lack of logic in the legal particulars of the regulation led to a safe, but not by the letter of the law flight. 5) in the absence of good solid facts at the time, I made a decision that I thought made sense to me. That is what I thought a captain was supposed to do when presented with a problem. Make a logical decision based on the facts at hand. Corrective action: to me, it appears we should revisit the crew rest problem and apply common sense somehow into the regulation. Supplemental information from acn 569092: this event concerns crew duty limitations for part 121 carriers. I am a first officer for a part 121 air carrier. My crew duty day began with 'short call' at XA00. At XA35, I was called for a trip reporting at XO20. The first part of the trip was a deadhead and then a 2 hour situation around. Actual duties began at XH00. The first leg ended at approximately XJ45. The next (and last) leg was to depart at XL00, but on arrival had been delayed until XL45. After boarding the passenger, we were informed that our 'wheels up' time was now XH45. At this time, it did not occur to me that the XA45 'wheels up' time and the 1 hour and 53 min flight time would put me over the 16 hour duty day when the taxi time at destination was added. At XM00, we were told our new 'wheels up' time was XM25. At XM15, sitting #3 for takeoff, we received an ACARS message, which said the captain would run out of duty day if we took off. After an ACARS and radio discussion, it was established that it was me who was approaching the duty day limit, but if we departed immediately, we would beat the 16 hour limit. This discussion and a runway change, which caused us to taxi to the other end of the runway made us take off 25 mins after we would have (XM50 versus XM25). After takeoff, en route airspeed was increased and several altitudes were used to try to reduce en route time. Also en route, the captain retrieved two company letters, which covered the recent FAA ruling. In this letter it requires the 'block in' time to be no more than 15 hours and 30 mins from the beginning of the duty day. It became apparent we would not arrive in time to make this restr. Our actual 'block in' time was XO55. Although less than 16 hours, it was beyond the 15 hour and 30 mins set by the new ruling on 14 crash fire rescue equipment 121.471(B). When the ACARS message was received advising that we were approaching crew duty limits, it came as a surprise due to the 7 hours from beginning my duty day to actually beginning work (XA00-XJ00). In the future, when called on short call, I will be more cognizant of the limits of the duty day. Also, I now realize that the final 'block in' time must be 15 hours and 30 mins from the beginning of the duty day, not 16 hours.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: INTERP OF CREW DUTY REGS FOR A MIXED SCHEDULED AND RESERVE CREW, WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO FINISH THEIR MISSION LEADS TO A POSSIBLE NON COMPLIANCE WITH FAR 121.471.

Narrative: THIS RPT IS ABOUT A MAX CREW DUTY DAY PROB. SIT: HOLDING #2 FOR TKOF. RECEIVE MESSAGE TO RETURN TO GATE, BECAUSE THE CAPT (ME) IS OVER DUTY DAY. THIS WAS IN ERROR, AND WE TRIED TO CLARIFY THE PROB, BUT COMS WERE VERY POOR, AND WE COULD NOT GET A CLR RESPONSE FROM OPS/SCHEDULING. FACTS: CREW RPTED AT XD20. WE FELT WE HAD PLENTY OF TIME TO CONTINUE A 1 HR 53 MIN DURATION FLT. AS IT TURNS OUT, THE FO HAD BEEN ON SHORT CALL BEGINNING AT XA00. THIS LEGALLY PUTS HIM ON DUTY AT XA00, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS SLEEPING JUST AS I WAS. WE HAD BOTH BEEN NOTIFIED AT APPROX XA40 AND TOLD TO RPT AT XD20 FOR A XD50 DEADHEAD. BY THE TIME WE ACTUALLY TOOK OFF THAT AFTERNOON, IT WAS XM50. THIS ADDED TO THE 1 HR 53 MIN SCHEDULED TIME ENRTE, WOULD PUT US IN ZZZ AT XO43, 13 MINS LATE. WE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT WE WERE NOT ALLOWED TO USE INCREASED SPD AND SHORTER THAN SCHEDULE TAXI TIME TO CALCULATE A BETTER ARR. AS WE PULLED INTO POS TO TKOF, OUR FMS (WITH WINDS PROGRAMMED IN AND NORMAL SPDS) GAVE US A XO29 ARR TIME. I FELT WE COULD EASILY SQUEEZE 5 MORE MINS OUT OF THAT BY FLYING .83 MI INSTEAD OF .795. THIS, HOWEVER, DIDN'T WORK, BECAUSE HEADWINDS WERE HIGHER THAN FORECAST, UNEXPECTED TURB, AND AN EARLIER THAN NORMAL SLOW DOWN APCHING ZZZ SLOWED US DOWN. WE ACTUALLY ARRIVED AT XM51, 25 MINS LATE FOR THE FO. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) ERRONEOUS DIRECTIVE TO RETURN TO GATE. AT THE TIME OF MESSAGE, WE HAD 17 MINS TO LEGALLY TKOF. THIS RESULTED IN FURTHER DELAYS, WHICH RESULTED IN US BEING LATE. 2) MISUNDERSTANDING ON MY PART WITH LETTER OF THE REG. USING SCHEDULED TIMES VERSUS ACTUAL. 3) LACK OF LOGIC IN CREW DUTY REG. HERE 2 PEOPLE CALLED WITHIN 30 MINS OF ONE ANOTHER IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT WHILE SLEEPING HAVE CREW DUTY DAYS THAT ARE 3 HRS AND 20 MINS DIFFERENT. THAT FACT REALLY DIDN'T MAKE SENSE TO US. BOTH OF US WERE CALLED AT ABOUT XA40, AND THE CAPT'S REST (A REGULAR LINE HOLDER PICKING UP A TRIP) STARTED AT XD20. AND THE FO (A SHORT CALL RESERVE SLEEPING NORMALLY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT, ALSO) STARTED HIS DUTY AT XA00. 4) CONFUSION AND GENERAL LACK OF LOGIC IN THE LEGAL PARTICULARS OF THE REG LED TO A SAFE, BUT NOT BY THE LETTER OF THE LAW FLT. 5) IN THE ABSENCE OF GOOD SOLID FACTS AT THE TIME, I MADE A DECISION THAT I THOUGHT MADE SENSE TO ME. THAT IS WHAT I THOUGHT A CAPT WAS SUPPOSED TO DO WHEN PRESENTED WITH A PROB. MAKE A LOGICAL DECISION BASED ON THE FACTS AT HAND. CORRECTIVE ACTION: TO ME, IT APPEARS WE SHOULD REVISIT THE CREW REST PROB AND APPLY COMMON SENSE SOMEHOW INTO THE REG. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 569092: THIS EVENT CONCERNS CREW DUTY LIMITATIONS FOR PART 121 CARRIERS. I AM A FO FOR A PART 121 ACR. MY CREW DUTY DAY BEGAN WITH 'SHORT CALL' AT XA00. AT XA35, I WAS CALLED FOR A TRIP RPTING AT XO20. THE FIRST PART OF THE TRIP WAS A DEADHEAD AND THEN A 2 HR SIT AROUND. ACTUAL DUTIES BEGAN AT XH00. THE FIRST LEG ENDED AT APPROX XJ45. THE NEXT (AND LAST) LEG WAS TO DEPART AT XL00, BUT ON ARR HAD BEEN DELAYED UNTIL XL45. AFTER BOARDING THE PAX, WE WERE INFORMED THAT OUR 'WHEELS UP' TIME WAS NOW XH45. AT THIS TIME, IT DID NOT OCCUR TO ME THAT THE XA45 'WHEELS UP' TIME AND THE 1 HR AND 53 MIN FLT TIME WOULD PUT ME OVER THE 16 HR DUTY DAY WHEN THE TAXI TIME AT DEST WAS ADDED. AT XM00, WE WERE TOLD OUR NEW 'WHEELS UP' TIME WAS XM25. AT XM15, SITTING #3 FOR TKOF, WE RECEIVED AN ACARS MESSAGE, WHICH SAID THE CAPT WOULD RUN OUT OF DUTY DAY IF WE TOOK OFF. AFTER AN ACARS AND RADIO DISCUSSION, IT WAS ESTABLISHED THAT IT WAS ME WHO WAS APCHING THE DUTY DAY LIMIT, BUT IF WE DEPARTED IMMEDIATELY, WE WOULD BEAT THE 16 HR LIMIT. THIS DISCUSSION AND A RWY CHANGE, WHICH CAUSED US TO TAXI TO THE OTHER END OF THE RWY MADE US TAKE OFF 25 MINS AFTER WE WOULD HAVE (XM50 VERSUS XM25). AFTER TKOF, ENRTE AIRSPD WAS INCREASED AND SEVERAL ALTS WERE USED TO TRY TO REDUCE ENRTE TIME. ALSO ENRTE, THE CAPT RETRIEVED TWO COMPANY LETTERS, WHICH COVERED THE RECENT FAA RULING. IN THIS LETTER IT REQUIRES THE 'BLOCK IN' TIME TO BE NO MORE THAN 15 HRS AND 30 MINS FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE DUTY DAY. IT BECAME APPARENT WE WOULD NOT ARRIVE IN TIME TO MAKE THIS RESTR. OUR ACTUAL 'BLOCK IN' TIME WAS XO55. ALTHOUGH LESS THAN 16 HRS, IT WAS BEYOND THE 15 HR AND 30 MINS SET BY THE NEW RULING ON 14 CFR 121.471(B). WHEN THE ACARS MESSAGE WAS RECEIVED ADVISING THAT WE WERE APCHING CREW DUTY LIMITS, IT CAME AS A SURPRISE DUE TO THE 7 HRS FROM BEGINNING MY DUTY DAY TO ACTUALLY BEGINNING WORK (XA00-XJ00). IN THE FUTURE, WHEN CALLED ON SHORT CALL, I WILL BE MORE COGNIZANT OF THE LIMITS OF THE DUTY DAY. ALSO, I NOW REALIZE THAT THE FINAL 'BLOCK IN' TIME MUST BE 15 HRS AND 30 MINS FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE DUTY DAY, NOT 16 HRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.