Narrative:

During the approach phase into ZZZ, us, we xferred the bleed air supply for the packs from engine to the APU as company procedure demands it. During this time besides some unessential cockpit conversation below 10000 ft, nothing out of the ordinary was noted by the captain or me. After the landing touchdown, we exited the runway. During this time we noticed a burning smell, which we first associated with brake wear. I started to call company operations for gate information, that's when we noticed smoke coming from the air conditioning vents. I informed company/ground operations that we immediately needed a gate, since we had smoke in the cockpit. I was informed that no gate was available. I stressed that we would have to get the passenger off the plane immediately, and if we didn't have a gate, we would have to evacuate/evacuation on the taxiway. Operations replied that they had nowhere to put us. At this point, I noticed that the captain had donned his oxygen mask and asked me to do the same. I hesitated, since at this point I was still able to breathe, and it is easier to communication without the mask. At this point, I elected to shut off both packs (without using a checklist). The smoke immediately stopped, and the captain, at this point, removed his oxygen mask as well. The captain then called ground operations himself and was unsuccessful to get a gate describing operations again -- the options of either deplaning at the gate or evacing on an active taxiway. We then informed ground that we might have to evacuate/evacuation, and we needed a safe spot to do that. They instructed us to continue taxiing on taxiway B over to the ramp area. During the taxi, the captain and I discussed if we should go ahead with the evacuate/evacuation, since the smoke was disappearing, and we checked the cabin, which had no indication of smoke. I emphasized that we didn't know what caused the smoke and something in the aft equipment bay got hot enough that it developed smoke, and we had no indication if it was still burning or not. We, at this point, decided to go ahead with the evacuate/evacuation. The aircraft was parked in the holding area adjacent to runway 26 threshold. We initiated the evacuate/evacuation by me reading the emergency procedure checklist, and the captain responding. The evacuate/evacuation proceeded without any further incident. No person was injured. At a later point in time, we reviewed our company procedures and realized that there is an emergency checklist that specifically referenced aircraft pack smoke (in-flight), and that it calls for no evacuate/evacuation or precautionary landing. If we would have referenced that checklist on the ground, we would have elected not to evacuate/evacuation the aircraft. The factors that attributed to this decision are poor xrefing in the air conditioning smoke checklist in the air section, all other smoke emergencys are under fire. No checklists are xrefed. Also, training did not provide me with the ability to differentiate between different types of smoke and their sources and causes. Additionally, it was brought to my attention during a sim check ride in a different aircraft, that it was company policy that if any indication of a fire is or was present, the aircraft will be evacuate/evacuationed. This policy, I was unable to find in writing in any of our company manuals.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING TAXI IN, FLC OF CARJ NOTED SMOKE IN THE CABIN. AFTER COMMUNICATING WITH COMPANY OPS AND ATC GND CTL, CREW ELECTED TO EVAC AS PRECAUTION, ALTHOUGH SMOKE DISSIPATED AFTER SHUTDOWN OF AIR CONDITIONING SYS.

Narrative: DURING THE APCH PHASE INTO ZZZ, US, WE XFERRED THE BLEED AIR SUPPLY FOR THE PACKS FROM ENG TO THE APU AS COMPANY PROC DEMANDS IT. DURING THIS TIME BESIDES SOME UNESSENTIAL COCKPIT CONVERSATION BELOW 10000 FT, NOTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY WAS NOTED BY THE CAPT OR ME. AFTER THE LNDG TOUCHDOWN, WE EXITED THE RWY. DURING THIS TIME WE NOTICED A BURNING SMELL, WHICH WE FIRST ASSOCIATED WITH BRAKE WEAR. I STARTED TO CALL COMPANY OPS FOR GATE INFO, THAT'S WHEN WE NOTICED SMOKE COMING FROM THE AIR CONDITIONING VENTS. I INFORMED COMPANY/GND OPS THAT WE IMMEDIATELY NEEDED A GATE, SINCE WE HAD SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. I WAS INFORMED THAT NO GATE WAS AVAILABLE. I STRESSED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO GET THE PAX OFF THE PLANE IMMEDIATELY, AND IF WE DIDN'T HAVE A GATE, WE WOULD HAVE TO EVAC ON THE TXWY. OPS REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NOWHERE TO PUT US. AT THIS POINT, I NOTICED THAT THE CAPT HAD DONNED HIS OXYGEN MASK AND ASKED ME TO DO THE SAME. I HESITATED, SINCE AT THIS POINT I WAS STILL ABLE TO BREATHE, AND IT IS EASIER TO COM WITHOUT THE MASK. AT THIS POINT, I ELECTED TO SHUT OFF BOTH PACKS (WITHOUT USING A CHKLIST). THE SMOKE IMMEDIATELY STOPPED, AND THE CAPT, AT THIS POINT, REMOVED HIS OXYGEN MASK AS WELL. THE CAPT THEN CALLED GND OPS HIMSELF AND WAS UNSUCCESSFUL TO GET A GATE DESCRIBING OPS AGAIN -- THE OPTIONS OF EITHER DEPLANING AT THE GATE OR EVACING ON AN ACTIVE TXWY. WE THEN INFORMED GND THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO EVAC, AND WE NEEDED A SAFE SPOT TO DO THAT. THEY INSTRUCTED US TO CONTINUE TAXIING ON TXWY B OVER TO THE RAMP AREA. DURING THE TAXI, THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED IF WE SHOULD GO AHEAD WITH THE EVAC, SINCE THE SMOKE WAS DISAPPEARING, AND WE CHKED THE CABIN, WHICH HAD NO INDICATION OF SMOKE. I EMPHASIZED THAT WE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT CAUSED THE SMOKE AND SOMETHING IN THE AFT EQUIP BAY GOT HOT ENOUGH THAT IT DEVELOPED SMOKE, AND WE HAD NO INDICATION IF IT WAS STILL BURNING OR NOT. WE, AT THIS POINT, DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE EVAC. THE ACFT WAS PARKED IN THE HOLDING AREA ADJACENT TO RWY 26 THRESHOLD. WE INITIATED THE EVAC BY ME READING THE EMER PROC CHKLIST, AND THE CAPT RESPONDING. THE EVAC PROCEEDED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INCIDENT. NO PERSON WAS INJURED. AT A LATER POINT IN TIME, WE REVIEWED OUR COMPANY PROCS AND REALIZED THAT THERE IS AN EMER CHKLIST THAT SPECIFICALLY REFED ACFT PACK SMOKE (INFLT), AND THAT IT CALLS FOR NO EVAC OR PRECAUTIONARY LNDG. IF WE WOULD HAVE REFED THAT CHKLIST ON THE GND, WE WOULD HAVE ELECTED NOT TO EVAC THE ACFT. THE FACTORS THAT ATTRIBUTED TO THIS DECISION ARE POOR XREFING IN THE AIR CONDITIONING SMOKE CHKLIST IN THE AIR SECTION, ALL OTHER SMOKE EMERS ARE UNDER FIRE. NO CHKLISTS ARE XREFED. ALSO, TRAINING DID NOT PROVIDE ME WITH THE ABILITY TO DIFFERENTIATE BTWN DIFFERENT TYPES OF SMOKE AND THEIR SOURCES AND CAUSES. ADDITIONALLY, IT WAS BROUGHT TO MY ATTN DURING A SIM CHK RIDE IN A DIFFERENT ACFT, THAT IT WAS COMPANY POLICY THAT IF ANY INDICATION OF A FIRE IS OR WAS PRESENT, THE ACFT WILL BE EVACED. THIS POLICY, I WAS UNABLE TO FIND IN WRITING IN ANY OF OUR COMPANY MANUALS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.