Narrative:

WX was rain showers in the area with light turbulence. It was the captain's leg. After taking off on hou runway 12R, we turned left to 350 degrees and leveled at 4000 ft. We were both discussing the radar display. The captain had briefed flight attendants to keep their seats prior to pushback. Soon after we leveled at 4000 ft, departure control instructed us to climb to 5000 ft. The captain pushed the power up, and we started to climb. The turbulence got worse, and the captain dinged the flight attendants to make sure they were still in their seats. As soon as we started climb, I called '1000 ft to go,' and I got concerned the captain was going to get task saturated with the WX radar, climbing briskly for 1000 ft and talking with the flight attendants. I made numerous loud call altitude callouts and hand signals for us to level at 5000 ft. We also had company traffic off the nose and descending soon got a 'traffic, traffic' alert. The captain then started his level off and announced he would overshoot about 150 ft. We ballooned slightly above that to about 5200 ft, and then he corrected to 5000 ft. I got a glimpse of company traffic overhead about 1100 ft above us. Departure then switched us to another frequency and made no mention of our deviation. The captain and I had discussed managing cockpit resources in some detail at the gate just prior to this incident with an FAA examiner, who had observed us on a flight we had just flown. I feel we had some differences of opinion about how capts and first officer's work together. Much of this seems to stem from the almost 'my leg, I'll do it all' mentality that started when we were a small airline and the day of 10 min turns. I think there is a better way of doing business by spreading the workload, especially when sits demand multiple tasks to be accomplished in a short period of time. I would have felt more comfortable if he had given me the aircraft when he talked to the flight attendants or if he had told me to talk to the flight attendants. We again spoke about this subject hours later at cruise, when we had some free time. The captain still seems to feel he wants to be involved in all the details and is more comfortable doing that and flying the aircraft. This is a tough issue for our company address. The captain's thinking is fairly common among those I fly with. I do think we need to try to come up with a better way to manage our cockpits, since so much now depends on the captain's personality, but it will be a very tough sell.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MULTITASKING, 'I CAN DO IT ALL' CAPT OVERSHOOTS ALT ASSIGNMENT WHILE ATTEMPTING TO COORD WITH CABIN ATTENDANTS IN TURB.

Narrative: WX WAS RAIN SHOWERS IN THE AREA WITH LIGHT TURB. IT WAS THE CAPT'S LEG. AFTER TAKING OFF ON HOU RWY 12R, WE TURNED L TO 350 DEGS AND LEVELED AT 4000 FT. WE WERE BOTH DISCUSSING THE RADAR DISPLAY. THE CAPT HAD BRIEFED FLT ATTENDANTS TO KEEP THEIR SEATS PRIOR TO PUSHBACK. SOON AFTER WE LEVELED AT 4000 FT, DEP CTL INSTRUCTED US TO CLB TO 5000 FT. THE CAPT PUSHED THE PWR UP, AND WE STARTED TO CLB. THE TURB GOT WORSE, AND THE CAPT DINGED THE FLT ATTENDANTS TO MAKE SURE THEY WERE STILL IN THEIR SEATS. AS SOON AS WE STARTED CLB, I CALLED '1000 FT TO GO,' AND I GOT CONCERNED THE CAPT WAS GOING TO GET TASK SATURATED WITH THE WX RADAR, CLBING BRISKLY FOR 1000 FT AND TALKING WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS. I MADE NUMEROUS LOUD CALL ALT CALLOUTS AND HAND SIGNALS FOR US TO LEVEL AT 5000 FT. WE ALSO HAD COMPANY TFC OFF THE NOSE AND DSNDING SOON GOT A 'TFC, TFC' ALERT. THE CAPT THEN STARTED HIS LEVEL OFF AND ANNOUNCED HE WOULD OVERSHOOT ABOUT 150 FT. WE BALLOONED SLIGHTLY ABOVE THAT TO ABOUT 5200 FT, AND THEN HE CORRECTED TO 5000 FT. I GOT A GLIMPSE OF COMPANY TFC OVERHEAD ABOUT 1100 FT ABOVE US. DEP THEN SWITCHED US TO ANOTHER FREQ AND MADE NO MENTION OF OUR DEV. THE CAPT AND I HAD DISCUSSED MANAGING COCKPIT RESOURCES IN SOME DETAIL AT THE GATE JUST PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT WITH AN FAA EXAMINER, WHO HAD OBSERVED US ON A FLT WE HAD JUST FLOWN. I FEEL WE HAD SOME DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ABOUT HOW CAPTS AND FO'S WORK TOGETHER. MUCH OF THIS SEEMS TO STEM FROM THE ALMOST 'MY LEG, I'LL DO IT ALL' MENTALITY THAT STARTED WHEN WE WERE A SMALL AIRLINE AND THE DAY OF 10 MIN TURNS. I THINK THERE IS A BETTER WAY OF DOING BUSINESS BY SPREADING THE WORKLOAD, ESPECIALLY WHEN SITS DEMAND MULTIPLE TASKS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. I WOULD HAVE FELT MORE COMFORTABLE IF HE HAD GIVEN ME THE ACFT WHEN HE TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS OR IF HE HAD TOLD ME TO TALK TO THE FLT ATTENDANTS. WE AGAIN SPOKE ABOUT THIS SUBJECT HRS LATER AT CRUISE, WHEN WE HAD SOME FREE TIME. THE CAPT STILL SEEMS TO FEEL HE WANTS TO BE INVOLVED IN ALL THE DETAILS AND IS MORE COMFORTABLE DOING THAT AND FLYING THE ACFT. THIS IS A TOUGH ISSUE FOR OUR COMPANY ADDRESS. THE CAPT'S THINKING IS FAIRLY COMMON AMONG THOSE I FLY WITH. I DO THINK WE NEED TO TRY TO COME UP WITH A BETTER WAY TO MANAGE OUR COCKPITS, SINCE SO MUCH NOW DEPENDS ON THE CAPT'S PERSONALITY, BUT IT WILL BE A VERY TOUGH SELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.