Narrative:

Aircraft accumulated some structural ice on approach to ZZZ. During the first officer's walk around, he noticed structural ice was present and notified me accordingly. I then notified the customer service agent (csa) handling us that I was requesting deice on the ramp. It was snowing slightly on and off, but there was no accumulation. The csa then came to me and said there were approximately 6 connecting passenger that had landed and trying to get to our flight. I contacted the station coordinator to coordinate the deice and hold time for the connecting passenger. We agreed to pull the jetway back, deice and then bring the jetway back to board the remaining passenger. The deicing coordinator indicating he was applying type 1 fluid, and I acknowledged him. As the jetway was being brought into place, a medical emergency was occurring onboard. The flight attendants approached the flight deck with news of a 12 yr old boy seated, was having emotional outbursts (anxiety/panic attack as described to the flight crew). Against the flight attendant's recommendation, another passenger gave the boy a prescription drug. The drug was said to be a 5 milligram valium, and the boy's mother allowed it. Mr Y was brought out to the jetway to get some fresh air, and that is where I first talked to him to help calm him down. Both csa's were also present. Giving the child a prescription drug concerned me and per the request of the flight attendants, med link was contacted. ACARS was unable to get through, so I called dispatch via cell phone and was connected to a physician. Med link connected me to dr X, where I then briefed him. After several questions, such as, duration of the flight, he recommended the boy be removed from the flight. The doctor also indicated that if, in fact, valium was given, that was acceptable and not a concern. I proceeded to have the mother, daughter, and son, and mr Y removed per the physician's recommendation. During this time, I was in contact with the station coordinator. The mother was very concerned about the station coordinator's plan of rerouting the family through ZZZ and then ZZZ1 to provide them with shorter leg segments. Then, I was informed that the husband and father had recently passed away. I thought that stress was a major contributor to the situation. I talked to mr Y once again, and felt that he would be able to make the flight and that it would be the best course of action for the entire family. The station coordinator agreed with my decision. We reboarded the family and continued to depart for ZZZ1. Flight was now nearly an hour late. During the confusion, it was not clear if type iv fluid was applied, and I have to assume it was. The aircraft was configured properly for deicing and the elevator was cycled 5 times after the fluid application. I also neglected to get an en route MEL for the B737-700. During the climb out, chicago center requested an expedited climb and we stayed below 270 KTS, but I did not notice if we remained below 270 KTS throughout the entire climb and during the transition phase. No abnormal flight characteristics were observed. In summary, there were numerous conversations between myself and dispatch for passenger loading and fuel requirements and the station coordinator regarding the med emergency and holding times and during the confusion, I failed to ensure clear and concise communication regarding the deicing evolution and to follow through with the applicable MEL procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE AFTER DEICING WITH NO DEFERRED ITEM OR SPD RESTR PLACARD. CREW DISTR BY PAX OUTBURST.

Narrative: ACFT ACCUMULATED SOME STRUCTURAL ICE ON APCH TO ZZZ. DURING THE FO'S WALK AROUND, HE NOTICED STRUCTURAL ICE WAS PRESENT AND NOTIFIED ME ACCORDINGLY. I THEN NOTIFIED THE CUSTOMER SVC AGENT (CSA) HANDLING US THAT I WAS REQUESTING DEICE ON THE RAMP. IT WAS SNOWING SLIGHTLY ON AND OFF, BUT THERE WAS NO ACCUMULATION. THE CSA THEN CAME TO ME AND SAID THERE WERE APPROX 6 CONNECTING PAX THAT HAD LANDED AND TRYING TO GET TO OUR FLT. I CONTACTED THE STATION COORDINATOR TO COORDINATE THE DEICE AND HOLD TIME FOR THE CONNECTING PAX. WE AGREED TO PULL THE JETWAY BACK, DEICE AND THEN BRING THE JETWAY BACK TO BOARD THE REMAINING PAX. THE DEICING COORDINATOR INDICATING HE WAS APPLYING TYPE 1 FLUID, AND I ACKNOWLEDGED HIM. AS THE JETWAY WAS BEING BROUGHT INTO PLACE, A MEDICAL EMER WAS OCCURRING ONBOARD. THE FLT ATTENDANTS APCHED THE FLT DECK WITH NEWS OF A 12 YR OLD BOY SEATED, WAS HAVING EMOTIONAL OUTBURSTS (ANXIETY/PANIC ATTACK AS DESCRIBED TO THE FLC). AGAINST THE FLT ATTENDANT'S RECOMMENDATION, ANOTHER PAX GAVE THE BOY A PRESCRIPTION DRUG. THE DRUG WAS SAID TO BE A 5 MILLIGRAM VALIUM, AND THE BOY'S MOTHER ALLOWED IT. MR Y WAS BROUGHT OUT TO THE JETWAY TO GET SOME FRESH AIR, AND THAT IS WHERE I FIRST TALKED TO HIM TO HELP CALM HIM DOWN. BOTH CSA'S WERE ALSO PRESENT. GIVING THE CHILD A PRESCRIPTION DRUG CONCERNED ME AND PER THE REQUEST OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS, MED LINK WAS CONTACTED. ACARS WAS UNABLE TO GET THROUGH, SO I CALLED DISPATCH VIA CELL PHONE AND WAS CONNECTED TO A PHYSICIAN. MED LINK CONNECTED ME TO DR X, WHERE I THEN BRIEFED HIM. AFTER SEVERAL QUESTIONS, SUCH AS, DURATION OF THE FLT, HE RECOMMENDED THE BOY BE REMOVED FROM THE FLT. THE DOCTOR ALSO INDICATED THAT IF, IN FACT, VALIUM WAS GIVEN, THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE AND NOT A CONCERN. I PROCEEDED TO HAVE THE MOTHER, DAUGHTER, AND SON, AND MR Y REMOVED PER THE PHYSICIAN'S RECOMMENDATION. DURING THIS TIME, I WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE STATION COORDINATOR. THE MOTHER WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE STATION COORDINATOR'S PLAN OF REROUTING THE FAMILY THROUGH ZZZ AND THEN ZZZ1 TO PROVIDE THEM WITH SHORTER LEG SEGMENTS. THEN, I WAS INFORMED THAT THE HUSBAND AND FATHER HAD RECENTLY PASSED AWAY. I THOUGHT THAT STRESS WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE SIT. I TALKED TO MR Y ONCE AGAIN, AND FELT THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE THE FLT AND THAT IT WOULD BE THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOR THE ENTIRE FAMILY. THE STATION COORDINATOR AGREED WITH MY DECISION. WE REBOARDED THE FAMILY AND CONTINUED TO DEPART FOR ZZZ1. FLT WAS NOW NEARLY AN HR LATE. DURING THE CONFUSION, IT WAS NOT CLR IF TYPE IV FLUID WAS APPLIED, AND I HAVE TO ASSUME IT WAS. THE ACFT WAS CONFIGURED PROPERLY FOR DEICING AND THE ELEVATOR WAS CYCLED 5 TIMES AFTER THE FLUID APPLICATION. I ALSO NEGLECTED TO GET AN ENRTE MEL FOR THE B737-700. DURING THE CLBOUT, CHICAGO CTR REQUESTED AN EXPEDITED CLB AND WE STAYED BELOW 270 KTS, BUT I DID NOT NOTICE IF WE REMAINED BELOW 270 KTS THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE CLB AND DURING THE TRANSITION PHASE. NO ABNORMAL FLT CHARACTERISTICS WERE OBSERVED. IN SUMMARY, THERE WERE NUMEROUS CONVERSATIONS BTWN MYSELF AND DISPATCH FOR PAX LOADING AND FUEL REQUIREMENTS AND THE STATION COORDINATOR REGARDING THE MED EMER AND HOLDING TIMES AND DURING THE CONFUSION, I FAILED TO ENSURE CLR AND CONCISE COM REGARDING THE DEICING EVOLUTION AND TO FOLLOW THROUGH WITH THE APPLICABLE MEL PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.