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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 570152 |
Time | |
Date | 200301 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sgt.airport |
State Reference | AR |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : charter |
Make Model Name | Citation II S2/Bravo |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : charter |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : atp pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 94 flight time total : 3214 flight time type : 1153 |
ASRS Report | 570152 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : charter |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | controller military : 8 flight time last 90 days : 141 flight time total : 7110 flight time type : 120 |
ASRS Report | 570332 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground critical ground encounters other non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airport Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Sgt recently opened a taxiway all the way to the end of runway 36. The taxiway enters exactly at the end of runway at a 90 degree angle. Previously, the taxiway entered the runway at a point 2/3 of the distance to the end and you had to back-taxi the last 1/3 of the distance for takeoff. It is still depicted this way on the charts. While positioned at the hold short line, I could see the yellow boxes for the reils at the very edge of the runway. From my angle, I could also see that they were no factor as the wing would easily clear them. At my angle, I did not see the lamp assemblies on the piece of conduit mounted well above the box. While taxiing onto the runway for takeoff and looking to ensure I was clear (no aircraft on final approach) for takeoff, I became aware of the lamp on top of the yellow box immediately prior to the wingtip impacting it. Note: the angle at the time of impact was then such that I was looking at a round light rather than the thin edge presented at the angle I originally viewed it from the hold short line. I believe analysis will review that I was on center of the taxi line or no more than 12-18 inches from it when the impact occurred. I believe this is a 'murphy' condition that has recently happened more than once at this location since the completion of the new taxiway to the end of runway 36. Had I not been so focused on the possibility of another aircraft on final approach at this high traffic volume uncontrolled field, I'm sure I would have seen the light assembly in time to avoid the impact. I immediately taxied off the runway and inspected the left wingtip. The static wick was gone and the navigation/anti-collision light lens was badly cracked. I knew the loss of 1 static wick is allowable under our MEL and I believed the lens to be safe to fly the short distance from sgt to lul. Unable to reach home base or our duty officer by phone, I made the decision to fly the aircraft. Upon arriving at lul, I found the lens broken into small pieces with most missing all parts to the navigation and anti-collision light were still secure and in place. In retrospect, after arriving at our destination and reviewing the appropriate FAA regulations, I find that I was in error to have flown the aircraft with any known damage, regardless of how minor I believed it to be. It will not happen again! I believe that the position of the REIL in reference to the taxiway centerline as it enters runway 36 to be a safety hazard that should be brought to the attention of the proper auths. There is insufficient clearance for large, low wing aircraft. I believe other aircraft have already impacted this REIL assembly and I believe more aircraft will most definitely impact it in the future. This incident brings to focus the requirement to continually review the FAA regulations and company operations and safety manuals so as to respond correctly while under pressure to complete the flight. Callback conversation with airports operations manager revealed the following information: airport operations manager is aware of an event when a citation jet had exited the taxiway as they turned onto the runway and clipped a REIL standard. Their investigation determined that the citation was 10 ft off centerline and so advised the company. The operations manager advised there was no further follow-up by the company concerning the incident.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C550 CLIPS REIL LIGHT WHEN TAXIING ONTO SGT RWY 36 CLAIMING A HAZARDOUS CONDITION.
Narrative: SGT RECENTLY OPENED A TXWY ALL THE WAY TO THE END OF RWY 36. THE TXWY ENTERS EXACTLY AT THE END OF RWY AT A 90 DEG ANGLE. PREVIOUSLY, THE TXWY ENTERED THE RWY AT A POINT 2/3 OF THE DISTANCE TO THE END AND YOU HAD TO BACK-TAXI THE LAST 1/3 OF THE DISTANCE FOR TKOF. IT IS STILL DEPICTED THIS WAY ON THE CHARTS. WHILE POSITIONED AT THE HOLD SHORT LINE, I COULD SEE THE YELLOW BOXES FOR THE REILS AT THE VERY EDGE OF THE RWY. FROM MY ANGLE, I COULD ALSO SEE THAT THEY WERE NO FACTOR AS THE WING WOULD EASILY CLR THEM. AT MY ANGLE, I DID NOT SEE THE LAMP ASSEMBLIES ON THE PIECE OF CONDUIT MOUNTED WELL ABOVE THE BOX. WHILE TAXIING ONTO THE RWY FOR TKOF AND LOOKING TO ENSURE I WAS CLR (NO ACFT ON FINAL APCH) FOR TKOF, I BECAME AWARE OF THE LAMP ON TOP OF THE YELLOW BOX IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE WINGTIP IMPACTING IT. NOTE: THE ANGLE AT THE TIME OF IMPACT WAS THEN SUCH THAT I WAS LOOKING AT A ROUND LIGHT RATHER THAN THE THIN EDGE PRESENTED AT THE ANGLE I ORIGINALLY VIEWED IT FROM THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I BELIEVE ANALYSIS WILL REVIEW THAT I WAS ON CTR OF THE TAXI LINE OR NO MORE THAN 12-18 INCHES FROM IT WHEN THE IMPACT OCCURRED. I BELIEVE THIS IS A 'MURPHY' CONDITION THAT HAS RECENTLY HAPPENED MORE THAN ONCE AT THIS LOCATION SINCE THE COMPLETION OF THE NEW TXWY TO THE END OF RWY 36. HAD I NOT BEEN SO FOCUSED ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER ACFT ON FINAL APCH AT THIS HIGH TFC VOLUME UNCTLED FIELD, I'M SURE I WOULD HAVE SEEN THE LIGHT ASSEMBLY IN TIME TO AVOID THE IMPACT. I IMMEDIATELY TAXIED OFF THE RWY AND INSPECTED THE L WINGTIP. THE STATIC WICK WAS GONE AND THE NAV/ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT LENS WAS BADLY CRACKED. I KNEW THE LOSS OF 1 STATIC WICK IS ALLOWABLE UNDER OUR MEL AND I BELIEVED THE LENS TO BE SAFE TO FLY THE SHORT DISTANCE FROM SGT TO LUL. UNABLE TO REACH HOME BASE OR OUR DUTY OFFICER BY PHONE, I MADE THE DECISION TO FLY THE ACFT. UPON ARRIVING AT LUL, I FOUND THE LENS BROKEN INTO SMALL PIECES WITH MOST MISSING ALL PARTS TO THE NAV AND ANTI-COLLISION LIGHT WERE STILL SECURE AND IN PLACE. IN RETROSPECT, AFTER ARRIVING AT OUR DEST AND REVIEWING THE APPROPRIATE FAA REGS, I FIND THAT I WAS IN ERROR TO HAVE FLOWN THE ACFT WITH ANY KNOWN DAMAGE, REGARDLESS OF HOW MINOR I BELIEVED IT TO BE. IT WILL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN! I BELIEVE THAT THE POS OF THE REIL IN REF TO THE TXWY CTRLINE AS IT ENTERS RWY 36 TO BE A SAFETY HAZARD THAT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTN OF THE PROPER AUTHS. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT CLRNC FOR LARGE, LOW WING ACFT. I BELIEVE OTHER ACFT HAVE ALREADY IMPACTED THIS REIL ASSEMBLY AND I BELIEVE MORE ACFT WILL MOST DEFINITELY IMPACT IT IN THE FUTURE. THIS INCIDENT BRINGS TO FOCUS THE REQUIREMENT TO CONTINUALLY REVIEW THE FAA REGS AND COMPANY OPS AND SAFETY MANUALS SO AS TO RESPOND CORRECTLY WHILE UNDER PRESSURE TO COMPLETE THE FLT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH ARPTS OPS MGR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: ARPT OPS MGR IS AWARE OF AN EVENT WHEN A CITATION JET HAD EXITED THE TXWY AS THEY TURNED ONTO THE RWY AND CLIPPED A REIL STANDARD. THEIR INVESTIGATION DETERMINED THAT THE CITATION WAS 10 FT OFF CTRLINE AND SO ADVISED THE COMPANY. THE OPS MGR ADVISED THERE WAS NO FURTHER FOLLOW-UP BY THE COMPANY CONCERNING THE INCIDENT.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.