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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 570832 |
Time | |
Date | 200212 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : rno.airport |
State Reference | NV |
Altitude | msl single value : 2000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : rno.tracon |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | climbout : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | departure sid : mustang |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 9500 flight time type : 1200 |
ASRS Report | 570832 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : clearance non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Long day, short turn in rno. I copied the clearance -- somewhat confusing clearance -- rno to sfo. The departure SID and the arrival overlap. Departed on mustang departure instead of the reno departure. Rushing to get the airplane ready, inattn to details, job security distrs were all contributing factors. Had I waited for the first officer to return from his walk around, and copied the clearance with him (our SOP) we would have departed on the right procedure. As it turned out, no real deviation occurred, since we checked in with rno departure -- we figured out the departure was wrong by having a different 'climb to' altitude. The initial ground track for both departures are the same. Most significant distraction and contributing factor was the complicated engine failure procedures -- we spent 3 times more energy and time briefing the engine failure on departure procedures than we did briefing the departure.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 FLT CREW RUSHED TO MAKE DEP TIME, BRIEF WRONG DEP PROC, WHICH WAS DETECTED BY THE FLT CREW ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH RNO DEP.
Narrative: LONG DAY, SHORT TURN IN RNO. I COPIED THE CLRNC -- SOMEWHAT CONFUSING CLRNC -- RNO TO SFO. THE DEP SID AND THE ARR OVERLAP. DEPARTED ON MUSTANG DEP INSTEAD OF THE RENO DEP. RUSHING TO GET THE AIRPLANE READY, INATTN TO DETAILS, JOB SECURITY DISTRS WERE ALL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. HAD I WAITED FOR THE FO TO RETURN FROM HIS WALK AROUND, AND COPIED THE CLRNC WITH HIM (OUR SOP) WE WOULD HAVE DEPARTED ON THE R PROC. AS IT TURNED OUT, NO REAL DEV OCCURRED, SINCE WE CHKED IN WITH RNO DEP -- WE FIGURED OUT THE DEP WAS WRONG BY HAVING A DIFFERENT 'CLB TO' ALT. THE INITIAL GND TRACK FOR BOTH DEPS ARE THE SAME. MOST SIGNIFICANT DISTR AND CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE COMPLICATED ENG FAILURE PROCS -- WE SPENT 3 TIMES MORE ENERGY AND TIME BRIEFING THE ENG FAILURE ON DEP PROCS THAN WE DID BRIEFING THE DEP.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.