Narrative:

I was working the final control position at the richmond TRACON, that is now a part of the james river sector of potomac TRACON. I received the handoff on flight squadron #1, a flight of 2 F16 aircraft, on an approximately northerly heading. At this time I was moderately busy while we were in a transition of going from a north operation to a south operation. The flight requested to be split into 2 separate flts, so as to fly individual ILS approachs to runway 16. I then asked the flight leader 'flight squadron #1, which aircraft would like to go first,' and he responded that they would like to go in order. So as I had been trained, I gave flight squadron #2 a squawk code and told him to squawk stand by. I then told the flight squadron #1 flight to turn to a heading of 340 degrees. At this time apparently only flight squadron #1 took the turn while the second in the flight (flight squadron #2) stayed on his original heading without having been radar idented. I then told 'flight squadron #1 only' to turn left heading 270 degrees and for flight squadron #2 to squawk normal with the intention of making radar contact with the separate flts. This is how I was trained to split a military flight. However, since flight squadron #2 had broken formation with his flight, he was not where I had expected him to be. Once I observed where the beacon code was, flight squadron #2 had already passed within 1 mi and 400 ft of air carrier X, a DC9. Air carrier X was an aircraft I had taken a handoff from tappa sector heading approximately 340 degrees at 4000 ft, but still not yet on my frequency. Flight squadron #2 split from his flight leader prior to being instructed. The procedure I used to split the flight is the same one that is commonly used at this facility as well as the way I was trained. As of jan/thu/03, a month after the incident, I have been instructed by my supervisors to continue to split F16's in the same manner even though I have been charged with an operational error. I have been told by my superiors at richmond that I did everything per the 7110.65, however, the eastern regional headquarters' classification of this incident as an operational error contradicts 7110.65 procedures, ric procedures, and my training as a controller. This most importantly causes a safety issue now, because there has been no specific guidance on how to control such practices. As of now, we are told to do things status quo.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER BEING SPLIT UP, FLT OF 2 F16'S NEAR THE RIC VOR BROKE FORMATION BEFORE BEING INSTRUCTED BY THE CTLR CAUSING A CONFLICT WITH A MIL C9.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE FINAL CTL POS AT THE RICHMOND TRACON, THAT IS NOW A PART OF THE JAMES RIVER SECTOR OF POTOMAC TRACON. I RECEIVED THE HDOF ON FLT SQUADRON #1, A FLT OF 2 F16 ACFT, ON AN APPROX NORTHERLY HDG. AT THIS TIME I WAS MODERATELY BUSY WHILE WE WERE IN A TRANSITION OF GOING FROM A N OP TO A S OP. THE FLT REQUESTED TO BE SPLIT INTO 2 SEPARATE FLTS, SO AS TO FLY INDIVIDUAL ILS APCHS TO RWY 16. I THEN ASKED THE FLT LEADER 'FLT SQUADRON #1, WHICH ACFT WOULD LIKE TO GO FIRST,' AND HE RESPONDED THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO GO IN ORDER. SO AS I HAD BEEN TRAINED, I GAVE FLT SQUADRON #2 A SQUAWK CODE AND TOLD HIM TO SQUAWK STAND BY. I THEN TOLD THE FLT SQUADRON #1 FLT TO TURN TO A HDG OF 340 DEGS. AT THIS TIME APPARENTLY ONLY FLT SQUADRON #1 TOOK THE TURN WHILE THE SECOND IN THE FLT (FLT SQUADRON #2) STAYED ON HIS ORIGINAL HDG WITHOUT HAVING BEEN RADAR IDENTED. I THEN TOLD 'FLT SQUADRON #1 ONLY' TO TURN L HDG 270 DEGS AND FOR FLT SQUADRON #2 TO SQUAWK NORMAL WITH THE INTENTION OF MAKING RADAR CONTACT WITH THE SEPARATE FLTS. THIS IS HOW I WAS TRAINED TO SPLIT A MIL FLT. HOWEVER, SINCE FLT SQUADRON #2 HAD BROKEN FORMATION WITH HIS FLT, HE WAS NOT WHERE I HAD EXPECTED HIM TO BE. ONCE I OBSERVED WHERE THE BEACON CODE WAS, FLT SQUADRON #2 HAD ALREADY PASSED WITHIN 1 MI AND 400 FT OF ACR X, A DC9. ACR X WAS AN ACFT I HAD TAKEN A HDOF FROM TAPPA SECTOR HDG APPROX 340 DEGS AT 4000 FT, BUT STILL NOT YET ON MY FREQ. FLT SQUADRON #2 SPLIT FROM HIS FLT LEADER PRIOR TO BEING INSTRUCTED. THE PROC I USED TO SPLIT THE FLT IS THE SAME ONE THAT IS COMMONLY USED AT THIS FACILITY AS WELL AS THE WAY I WAS TRAINED. AS OF JAN/THU/03, A MONTH AFTER THE INCIDENT, I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY MY SUPVRS TO CONTINUE TO SPLIT F16'S IN THE SAME MANNER EVEN THOUGH I HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH AN OPERROR. I HAVE BEEN TOLD BY MY SUPERIORS AT RICHMOND THAT I DID EVERYTHING PER THE 7110.65, HOWEVER, THE EASTERN REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS' CLASSIFICATION OF THIS INCIDENT AS AN OPERROR CONTRADICTS 7110.65 PROCS, RIC PROCS, AND MY TRAINING AS A CTLR. THIS MOST IMPORTANTLY CAUSES A SAFETY ISSUE NOW, BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN NO SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON HOW TO CTL SUCH PRACTICES. AS OF NOW, WE ARE TOLD TO DO THINGS STATUS QUO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.