Narrative:

Air carrier X, a heavy DC10 instructed to taxi to runway 31L via left 'a' and 'J.' aircraft exited the ramp at 'K' taxiway, passed 'a' and crossed the hold line of runway 31L. Number one runway 31L departure aircraft was cleared for takeoff from taxiway, instructed to cancel takeoff clearance and taxi into position and hold. Air carrier X had to back taxi onto runway 31L and exit on runway 4L. Many aircraft exiting K, kk encroach on runways 31L or runway 22R. Too many crossing runways. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter indicated that all surfaces are either concrete and/or asphalt. Taxiway/non-movement areas are sometimes difficult to distinguish from the tower. Reporter indicated that he assumed all the txwys were lighted, but that is was difficult to positively discern from the tower. He reported numerous lighting outages were frequently indicated on the lighting control panel and so common place that most controllers didn't even bother to report them to the port unless pilots complained. The reporter described the evasive action as the local controller having to cancel the takeoff clearance of a departing aircraft on runway 31L at the taxiway Y intersection. He indicated the turn by the taxiing aircraft was expedited but not evasive. Reporter added that many controllers were in the habit of clearing aircraft for takeoff while still taxiing east on J or south on Y, sometimes before the actual departure roll. The dc-10 was a foreign carrier, and was typically scheduled to operate at the airport several times per week. The reporter indicated open positions were normal for the time period. Local control, ground control, clearance delivery/FD and controller in charge were on duty. The aircraft was reported as a single taxiing aircraft. The reporter was doubtful that the signage was adequate but his opinion was based upon a controller's perspective, ie number of confusing incidents experienced by aircraft and vehicles operating on the airport control surfaces. Report indicated that this area (the numerous txwys northwest of the intersection of runways 31L and 4L) has always been confusing to operating aircraft/vehicles. He reported that frequently aircraft would attempt to 'short-cut' their taxi time in this area and not comply with the exact instructions issued by ATC, sometimes resulting in an incursion incident. The reporter indicated that he had witnessed a number of similar incidents in this subject area. He stated that they were 'pretty common.' he witnessed one such occurrence within the last several weeks.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: TAXIING DC-10 ENTERED ACTIVE RWY ENRTE TO DEP RUNWAY. TKOF CLRNC CANCELED FOR DEP ACFT.

Narrative: ACR X, A HEAVY DC10 INSTRUCTED TO TAXI TO RWY 31L VIA LEFT 'A' AND 'J.' ACFT EXITED THE RAMP AT 'K' TXWY, PASSED 'A' AND CROSSED THE HOLD LINE OF RWY 31L. NUMBER ONE RWY 31L DEP ACFT WAS CLRED FOR TAKEOFF FROM TXWY, INSTRUCTED TO CANCEL TAKEOFF CLRNC AND TAXI INTO POSITION AND HOLD. ACR X HAD TO BACK TAXI ONTO RWY 31L AND EXIT ON RWY 4L. MANY ACFT EXITING K, KK ENCROACH ON RWYS 31L OR RWY 22R. TOO MANY CROSSING RWYS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR INDICATED THAT ALL SURFACES ARE EITHER CONCRETE AND/OR ASPHALT. TXWY/NON-MOVEMENT AREAS ARE SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH FROM THE TWR. RPTR INDICATED THAT HE ASSUMED ALL THE TXWYS WERE LIGHTED, BUT THAT IS WAS DIFFICULT TO POSITIVELY DISCERN FROM THE TWR. HE RPTED NUMEROUS LIGHTING OUTAGES WERE FREQUENTLY INDICATED ON THE LIGHTING CTL PANEL AND SO COMMON PLACE THAT MOST CTLRS DIDN'T EVEN BOTHER TO RPT THEM TO THE PORT UNLESS PLTS COMPLAINED. THE RPTR DESCRIBED THE EVASIVE ACTION AS THE LCL CTLR HAVING TO CANCEL THE TAKEOFF CLRNC OF A DEPARTING ACFT ON RWY 31L AT THE TXWY Y INTERSECTION. HE INDICATED THE TURN BY THE TAXIING ACFT WAS EXPEDITED BUT NOT EVASIVE. RPTR ADDED THAT MANY CTLRS WERE IN THE HABIT OF CLRING ACFT FOR TAKEOFF WHILE STILL TAXIING E ON J OR S ON Y, SOMETIMES BEFORE THE ACTUAL DEP ROLL. THE DC-10 WAS A FOREIGN CARRIER, AND WAS TYPICALLY SCHEDULED TO OPERATE AT THE ARPT SEVERAL TIMES PER WEEK. THE RPTR INDICATED OPEN POSITIONS WERE NORMAL FOR THE TIME PERIOD. LC, GC, CD/FD AND CIC WERE ON DUTY. THE ACFT WAS RPTED AS A SINGLE TAXIING ACFT. THE RPTR WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THE SIGNAGE WAS ADEQUATE BUT HIS OPINION WAS BASED UPON A CTLR'S PERSPECTIVE, IE NUMBER OF CONFUSING INCIDENTS EXPERIENCED BY ACFT AND VEHICLES OPERATING ON THE ARPT CTL SURFACES. RPT INDICATED THAT THIS AREA (THE NUMEROUS TXWYS NW OF THE INTERSECTION OF RWYS 31L AND 4L) HAS ALWAYS BEEN CONFUSING TO OPERATING ACFT/VEHICLES. HE RPTED THAT FREQUENTLY ACFT WOULD ATTEMPT TO 'SHORT-CUT' THEIR TAXI TIME IN THIS AREA AND NOT COMPLY WITH THE EXACT INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY ATC, SOMETIMES RESULTING IN AN INCURSION INCIDENT. THE RPTR INDICATED THAT HE HAD WITNESSED A NUMBER OF SIMILAR INCIDENTS IN THIS SUBJECT AREA. HE STATED THAT THEY WERE 'PRETTY COMMON.' HE WITNESSED ONE SUCH OCCURRENCE WITHIN THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.