Narrative:

Aircraft on an instrument flight plan, single pilot, from afj on route to oxc at FL230. We were in and out of clouds in snow and ice. When the situation began, we were on top. I noticed that the artificial horizon and flight director command bars were starting to go awry and could not be controled either in GPS or heading mode. I also noticed that the radar receiver (radar 2000) was no longer operating -- it kept reporting a stabilizer off/antenna inoperative message. The M4D autoplt continued to hold the aircraft in straight and level flight. I then received instructions from ZNY to descend to FL180. As I dialed in the descent, I realized that the autoplt would not allow the aircraft to descend at more than 100 FPM. I then received instructions to turn to a different heading during the descent, and ATC asked that we continue the descent to 15000 ft. The controller asked that we increase our rate of descent to 1500 FPM. I told the controller that we were having problems with the flight director and couldn't descend at anything like 1500 FPM, and we were also having problems with maintaining directional control. This controller was anything but helpful. He demanded that we increase our rates of pitch and bank. We again told him we were having flight director problems. He said 'well I'm going to give you a number to call, because you can't turn more than 5 degrees nor descend more than 200 FPM.' I told him to do whatever he chose to do, but the aircraft was having serious pitch and bank problems, and I insisted, as captain, on making small inputs. He then stopped blustering, provided no help, and finally switched us to ZBW. From that point on, all controllers were extremely helpful. At FL190, I disconnected the autoplt and hand flew the aircraft, partial panel using the garmin 530 moving map, the vsi, airspeed indicator, and the copilot's airspeed indicator. I continued to use very small inputs as we descended through cloud layers, snow, and light rime icing. All controllers continued to provide me with confirmations of turn directions and descent speeds. We broke out below the deck at 4700 ft west of oxc. The new york approach controller vectored us to the IAF for the ILS runway 36 at oxc, and landing was without incident. Our avionics people tell us the problem was caused by the catastrophic loss of the vertical gyro, which controled the pilot's airspeed indicator/flight director as well as the rdr 2000 inputs. This is the type of problem that we prepare for on a regular basis at my training school. However, when the need to fly partial panel at night in IMC occurs, it's a bit more compelling. What became very clear is that you need to have a post-it note or some other easily applied covering to blank out the ai. You need to do it immediately. Our scan is so ingrained, you just can't trust yourself not to look if you don't cover the instrument. Time and again, I caught myself wanting to trust the faulty flight director. If I had done so, things could have turned out differently. As for the nyc controller, he is the worst I've ever encountered. I'm frustrated that I didn't get his code number or ask him to save the tapes in anticipation of filing a complaint against him, but I found myself quite occupied at the time. In fact, this is the only time I've ever encountered or listened to a controller, who was anything but helpful when faced with a potential emergency situation. The lesson here is -- never let a controller brow beat you into taking action that you know to be dangerous or unsafe. Lastly, there can be no doubt of the importance of continued simulator training, whether at my training school or some other similar training facility.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA31T PLT EXPERIENCED MULTIPLE EQUIP PROBS NEAR DNY VOR, CREATING GRIEF FOR THE ZNY CTLR.

Narrative: ACFT ON AN INST FLT PLAN, SINGLE PLT, FROM AFJ ON RTE TO OXC AT FL230. WE WERE IN AND OUT OF CLOUDS IN SNOW AND ICE. WHEN THE SIT BEGAN, WE WERE ON TOP. I NOTICED THAT THE ARTIFICIAL HORIZON AND FLT DIRECTOR COMMAND BARS WERE STARTING TO GO AWRY AND COULD NOT BE CTLED EITHER IN GPS OR HDG MODE. I ALSO NOTICED THAT THE RADAR RECEIVER (RADAR 2000) WAS NO LONGER OPERATING -- IT KEPT RPTING A STABILIZER OFF/ANTENNA INOP MESSAGE. THE M4D AUTOPLT CONTINUED TO HOLD THE ACFT IN STRAIGHT AND LEVEL FLT. I THEN RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM ZNY TO DSND TO FL180. AS I DIALED IN THE DSCNT, I REALIZED THAT THE AUTOPLT WOULD NOT ALLOW THE ACFT TO DSND AT MORE THAN 100 FPM. I THEN RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN TO A DIFFERENT HDG DURING THE DSCNT, AND ATC ASKED THAT WE CONTINUE THE DSCNT TO 15000 FT. THE CTLR ASKED THAT WE INCREASE OUR RATE OF DSCNT TO 1500 FPM. I TOLD THE CTLR THAT WE WERE HAVING PROBS WITH THE FLT DIRECTOR AND COULDN'T DSND AT ANYTHING LIKE 1500 FPM, AND WE WERE ALSO HAVING PROBS WITH MAINTAINING DIRECTIONAL CTL. THIS CTLR WAS ANYTHING BUT HELPFUL. HE DEMANDED THAT WE INCREASE OUR RATES OF PITCH AND BANK. WE AGAIN TOLD HIM WE WERE HAVING FLT DIRECTOR PROBS. HE SAID 'WELL I'M GOING TO GIVE YOU A NUMBER TO CALL, BECAUSE YOU CAN'T TURN MORE THAN 5 DEGS NOR DSND MORE THAN 200 FPM.' I TOLD HIM TO DO WHATEVER HE CHOSE TO DO, BUT THE ACFT WAS HAVING SERIOUS PITCH AND BANK PROBS, AND I INSISTED, AS CAPT, ON MAKING SMALL INPUTS. HE THEN STOPPED BLUSTERING, PROVIDED NO HELP, AND FINALLY SWITCHED US TO ZBW. FROM THAT POINT ON, ALL CTLRS WERE EXTREMELY HELPFUL. AT FL190, I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND HAND FLEW THE ACFT, PARTIAL PANEL USING THE GARMIN 530 MOVING MAP, THE VSI, AIRSPD INDICATOR, AND THE COPLT'S AIRSPD INDICATOR. I CONTINUED TO USE VERY SMALL INPUTS AS WE DSNDED THROUGH CLOUD LAYERS, SNOW, AND LIGHT RIME ICING. ALL CTLRS CONTINUED TO PROVIDE ME WITH CONFIRMATIONS OF TURN DIRECTIONS AND DSCNT SPDS. WE BROKE OUT BELOW THE DECK AT 4700 FT W OF OXC. THE NEW YORK APCH CTLR VECTORED US TO THE IAF FOR THE ILS RWY 36 AT OXC, AND LNDG WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. OUR AVIONICS PEOPLE TELL US THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY THE CATASTROPHIC LOSS OF THE VERT GYRO, WHICH CTLED THE PLT'S AIRSPD INDICATOR/FLT DIRECTOR AS WELL AS THE RDR 2000 INPUTS. THIS IS THE TYPE OF PROB THAT WE PREPARE FOR ON A REGULAR BASIS AT MY TRAINING SCHOOL. HOWEVER, WHEN THE NEED TO FLY PARTIAL PANEL AT NIGHT IN IMC OCCURS, IT'S A BIT MORE COMPELLING. WHAT BECAME VERY CLR IS THAT YOU NEED TO HAVE A POST-IT NOTE OR SOME OTHER EASILY APPLIED COVERING TO BLANK OUT THE AI. YOU NEED TO DO IT IMMEDIATELY. OUR SCAN IS SO INGRAINED, YOU JUST CAN'T TRUST YOURSELF NOT TO LOOK IF YOU DON'T COVER THE INST. TIME AND AGAIN, I CAUGHT MYSELF WANTING TO TRUST THE FAULTY FLT DIRECTOR. IF I HAD DONE SO, THINGS COULD HAVE TURNED OUT DIFFERENTLY. AS FOR THE NYC CTLR, HE IS THE WORST I'VE EVER ENCOUNTERED. I'M FRUSTRATED THAT I DIDN'T GET HIS CODE NUMBER OR ASK HIM TO SAVE THE TAPES IN ANTICIPATION OF FILING A COMPLAINT AGAINST HIM, BUT I FOUND MYSELF QUITE OCCUPIED AT THE TIME. IN FACT, THIS IS THE ONLY TIME I'VE EVER ENCOUNTERED OR LISTENED TO A CTLR, WHO WAS ANYTHING BUT HELPFUL WHEN FACED WITH A POTENTIAL EMER SIT. THE LESSON HERE IS -- NEVER LET A CTLR BROW BEAT YOU INTO TAKING ACTION THAT YOU KNOW TO BE DANGEROUS OR UNSAFE. LASTLY, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTINUED SIMULATOR TRAINING, WHETHER AT MY TRAINING SCHOOL OR SOME OTHER SIMILAR TRAINING FACILITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.