After landing B737 crew is instructed to hold short of runway 32 but inadvertently cross.

Attributes
ACN	573571
Time
Date	200302
Day	Fri
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : oma.airport
State Reference	NE
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	IMC
Weather Elements	Rain
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tower : mdw.tower
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : taxi
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 240 flight time total : 4100 flight time type : 2700
ASRS Report	573571
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Events
Anomaly	incursion : runway non adherence : clearance
Independent Detector	other controllera
Resolutory Action	controller : issued alert controller : issued new clearance flight crew : became reoriented
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

We had just completed the ILS to runway 36 and as we cleared the runway, we were given instructions to taxi via left turn on taxiway south, left on taxiway F and hold short of runway 32L. I read back the instructions and verified the taxi progress as the captain turned the aircraft onto taxiway south and then taxiway F. At that point, I was satisfied the captain understood our taxi instructions and would hold short of runway 32L. I began the flaps up/clean-up flow. Just as I was completing the flow, tower called and instructed us to hold short of runway 32L. I redirected my attention outside and verbally repeated 'hold short' to the captain. At that time we had already taxied over the hold short line and the nose of the aircraft was on the runway. Realizing we were already on the runway, the tower controller instructed us to clear the runway and contact ground control on the ramp side of runway 32L. We then taxied to the gate and shutdown. Several factors contributed to this event. I should have never assumed the captain understood all of our clearance. I believe the captain had heard the first part of the taxi clearance and either did not hear or just forgot to hold short of runway 32L. In addition, my attention was directed inside the aircraft at the wrong time. I should have maintained a scan outside the aircraft and verified we were going to hold short as instructed. I usually verbally repeat all taxi instructions to the captain. This time I did not and I can't explain why. Also, we were operating on 9 hours 50 mins of crew rest between our flts. I believe the captain was feeling fatigued, as evidenced by the fact he pulled himself from the trip following the next leg. In the future, I intend to maintain more of a scan outside the aircraft during critical times of taxiing. I shall pay more attention to designated hot spots on the 10-9 page. For each leg, I shall write down all taxi instructions, read back these instructions to ATC and then repeat these instructions once again to the captain and ensure I receive verbal confirmation.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER LNDG B737 CREW IS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32 BUT INADVERTENTLY CROSS.

Narrative: WE HAD JUST COMPLETED THE ILS TO RWY 36 AND AS WE CLRED THE RWY, WE WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS TO TAXI VIA L TURN ON TXWY S, L ON TXWY F AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32L. I READ BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS AND VERIFIED THE TAXI PROGRESS AS THE CAPT TURNED THE ACFT ONTO TXWY S AND THEN TXWY F. AT THAT POINT, I WAS SATISFIED THE CAPT UNDERSTOOD OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND WOULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32L. I BEGAN THE FLAPS UP/CLEAN-UP FLOW. JUST AS I WAS COMPLETING THE FLOW, TWR CALLED AND INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32L. I REDIRECTED MY ATTN OUTSIDE AND VERBALLY REPEATED 'HOLD SHORT' TO THE CAPT. AT THAT TIME WE HAD ALREADY TAXIED OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND THE NOSE OF THE ACFT WAS ON THE RWY. REALIZING WE WERE ALREADY ON THE RWY, THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO CLR THE RWY AND CONTACT GND CTL ON THE RAMP SIDE OF RWY 32L. WE THEN TAXIED TO THE GATE AND SHUTDOWN. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS EVENT. I SHOULD HAVE NEVER ASSUMED THE CAPT UNDERSTOOD ALL OF OUR CLRNC. I BELIEVE THE CAPT HAD HEARD THE FIRST PART OF THE TAXI CLRNC AND EITHER DID NOT HEAR OR JUST FORGOT TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32L. IN ADDITION, MY ATTN WAS DIRECTED INSIDE THE ACFT AT THE WRONG TIME. I SHOULD HAVE MAINTAINED A SCAN OUTSIDE THE ACFT AND VERIFIED WE WERE GOING TO HOLD SHORT AS INSTRUCTED. I USUALLY VERBALLY REPEAT ALL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CAPT. THIS TIME I DID NOT AND I CAN'T EXPLAIN WHY. ALSO, WE WERE OPERATING ON 9 HRS 50 MINS OF CREW REST BTWN OUR FLTS. I BELIEVE THE CAPT WAS FEELING FATIGUED, AS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT HE PULLED HIMSELF FROM THE TRIP FOLLOWING THE NEXT LEG. IN THE FUTURE, I INTEND TO MAINTAIN MORE OF A SCAN OUTSIDE THE ACFT DURING CRITICAL TIMES OF TAXIING. I SHALL PAY MORE ATTN TO DESIGNATED HOT SPOTS ON THE 10-9 PAGE. FOR EACH LEG, I SHALL WRITE DOWN ALL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, READ BACK THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO ATC AND THEN REPEAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS ONCE AGAIN TO THE CAPT AND ENSURE I RECEIVE VERBAL CONFIRMATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.