Narrative:

I made the approach and landing on runway 36 and exited at taxiway south. I recall receiving clearance from the tower to taxi to the gate and remain on tower frequency. No on-ground company call is required at oma. As we approached runway 32L (sbound on taxiway F) I scanned down runway 32L to confirm no traffic and was aware that the first officer was completing his after landing flow. At this time the tower instructed us to hold short of runway 32L. Our speed was about 15 KTS and I applied the brakes, but it was apparent that we would stop beyond the edge of the runway. Perhaps realizing this, the tower then instructed us to cross without delay and taxi to the gate. We had no further communication with tower. I believe the first officer was 'heads down' just prior to receipt of the hold short instruction as we reached the edge of runway 32L. I obviously did not hear the original hold short instruction and I recall no hold short readback to the tower upon receipt of our taxi instructions. Approaching any runway intersection while taxiing, I normally verbally state 'clear to cross,' 'hold short,' and/or 'clear left,' etc, to confirm our instructions. I failed to do that in this instance. At the gate, the first officer stated that he recalled the tower's original taxi instructions included the instruction to hold short of runway 32L. Following our arrival at the gate, an aircraft landed on runway 32L which I assume was on a 2 or 3 mi final when we crossed that runway. Cockpit discipline and adherence to proper communication procedures would have prevented this event. We were scheduled for 3 more legs that night. It seemed that I was developing a head cold and because of this and my lack of sleep following a very short 9 hour overnight, I contacted scheduling and requested that I be replaced on the next leg.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 FLT CREW IS IN DISAGREEMENT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY WERE ISSUED A HOLD SHORT CLRNC AFTER THE ACFT WAS GOING TOO FAST TO HOLD SHORT.

Narrative: I MADE THE APCH AND LNDG ON RWY 36 AND EXITED AT TXWY S. I RECALL RECEIVING CLRNC FROM THE TWR TO TAXI TO THE GATE AND REMAIN ON TWR FREQ. NO ON-GND COMPANY CALL IS REQUIRED AT OMA. AS WE APCHED RWY 32L (SBOUND ON TXWY F) I SCANNED DOWN RWY 32L TO CONFIRM NO TFC AND WAS AWARE THAT THE FO WAS COMPLETING HIS AFTER LNDG FLOW. AT THIS TIME THE TWR INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32L. OUR SPD WAS ABOUT 15 KTS AND I APPLIED THE BRAKES, BUT IT WAS APPARENT THAT WE WOULD STOP BEYOND THE EDGE OF THE RWY. PERHAPS REALIZING THIS, THE TWR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS WITHOUT DELAY AND TAXI TO THE GATE. WE HAD NO FURTHER COM WITH TWR. I BELIEVE THE FO WAS 'HEADS DOWN' JUST PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION AS WE REACHED THE EDGE OF RWY 32L. I OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HEAR THE ORIGINAL HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION AND I RECALL NO HOLD SHORT READBACK TO THE TWR UPON RECEIPT OF OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. APCHING ANY RWY INTXN WHILE TAXIING, I NORMALLY VERBALLY STATE 'CLR TO CROSS,' 'HOLD SHORT,' AND/OR 'CLR L,' ETC, TO CONFIRM OUR INSTRUCTIONS. I FAILED TO DO THAT IN THIS INSTANCE. AT THE GATE, THE FO STATED THAT HE RECALLED THE TWR'S ORIGINAL TAXI INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED THE INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32L. FOLLOWING OUR ARR AT THE GATE, AN ACFT LANDED ON RWY 32L WHICH I ASSUME WAS ON A 2 OR 3 MI FINAL WHEN WE CROSSED THAT RWY. COCKPIT DISCIPLINE AND ADHERENCE TO PROPER COM PROCS WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS EVENT. WE WERE SCHEDULED FOR 3 MORE LEGS THAT NIGHT. IT SEEMED THAT I WAS DEVELOPING A HEAD COLD AND BECAUSE OF THIS AND MY LACK OF SLEEP FOLLOWING A VERY SHORT 9 HR OVERNIGHT, I CONTACTED SCHEDULING AND REQUESTED THAT I BE REPLACED ON THE NEXT LEG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.