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Attributes | |
ACN | 573885 |
Time | |
Date | 200302 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : dab.airport |
State Reference | FL |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | M-20 Series Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : cfi pilot : multi engine |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 5000 flight time type : 1000 |
ASRS Report | 573885 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | observation : passenger |
Events | |
Anomaly | excursion : taxiway non adherence : published procedure non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : returned to original clearance flight crew : became reoriented |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew faa : investigated Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Airport |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Narrative:
We had received our IFR clearance and taxi instructions. We were parked at an FBO. There was heavy traffic. Our taxi instructions had us go from the ramp area to runway 7R via west, hold short of runway 7L. Holding short of runway 7L, we received instructions to cross runway 7L and continue to runway 7R. Upon reaching the sign for taxiway south, we turned right. This was, in fact, taxiway W2, which was in a bad state of repair. We stopped immediately and notified the ground controller. The ground controller asked if we could turn around. We said that we would have to shut down and manually turn the aircraft around. The controller instructed us to do so and to contact her when we were ready to continue. We shut down, pushed the aircraft around and re-started without incident. We notified ground control and were given our clearance to continue taxi to runway 7R. Upon reaching runway 7R, we did a normal run-up, requested and received our IFR takeoff clearance. In flight, we were queried by ATC as to our point of origin, the number of souls on board, and destination of the aircraft (all available on our IFR flight plan). We provided the information and asked the purpose of the questions. Our reply was that it was directed by the ATC supervisor. Upon our arrival at our destination (lal), we were told to contact daytona ATC. The call to ATC was just to confirm the information that we provided over the radio. Within a few mins, we were approached by a police officer that was looking for our aircraft due to an alnot. He stated that ATC lost contact with our aircraft. We did not feel that this was possible, since we were in direct contact with ATC at all times. He next stated that because we shut down our aircraft while taxiing, we violated security procedures at dab. We were not aware of any such procedures at dab and were in contact with ATC at all times. Other than turning at the wrong taxiway (the signage was prior to the correct taxiway), we adhered to our ground and flight clrncs. There were 2 qualified pilots on board. We had our taxi diagram out and had discussed the route we were assigned as well as the additional taxiway at W2. We were both in agreement that the sign identing taxiway south was posted beyond the taxiway (incorrect -- the taxiway sign was posted just prior to the stated taxiway). This incident could have been prevented by removing the painted taxi stripe for taxiway W2 as the taxiway is not in use. I do not understand why ATC needed the flight information that was available on the flight plan, nor do I understand why the police were involved in gathering this information. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter confirmed that the turn onto the incorrect taxiway was very close to the control tower and may have penetrated a security perimeter boundary. Some misunderstanding with regard to the alnot may also have taken place, ie, the security officer and or the reporter may have misunderstood or used the term incorrectly.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: DAD M021 DEP TAXIED VIA WRONG RTE REQUIRING ACFT SHUT DOWN TO TURN AROUND. AFTER DEP ATC ISSUES ALNOT.
Narrative: WE HAD RECEIVED OUR IFR CLRNC AND TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. WE WERE PARKED AT AN FBO. THERE WAS HVY TFC. OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS HAD US GO FROM THE RAMP AREA TO RWY 7R VIA W, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 7L. HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 7L, WE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO CROSS RWY 7L AND CONTINUE TO RWY 7R. UPON REACHING THE SIGN FOR TXWY S, WE TURNED R. THIS WAS, IN FACT, TXWY W2, WHICH WAS IN A BAD STATE OF REPAIR. WE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY AND NOTIFIED THE GND CTLR. THE GND CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD TURN AROUND. WE SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO SHUT DOWN AND MANUALLY TURN THE ACFT AROUND. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO DO SO AND TO CONTACT HER WHEN WE WERE READY TO CONTINUE. WE SHUT DOWN, PUSHED THE ACFT AROUND AND RE-STARTED WITHOUT INCIDENT. WE NOTIFIED GND CTL AND WERE GIVEN OUR CLRNC TO CONTINUE TAXI TO RWY 7R. UPON REACHING RWY 7R, WE DID A NORMAL RUN-UP, REQUESTED AND RECEIVED OUR IFR TKOF CLRNC. IN FLT, WE WERE QUERIED BY ATC AS TO OUR POINT OF ORIGIN, THE NUMBER OF SOULS ON BOARD, AND DEST OF THE ACFT (ALL AVAILABLE ON OUR IFR FLT PLAN). WE PROVIDED THE INFO AND ASKED THE PURPOSE OF THE QUESTIONS. OUR REPLY WAS THAT IT WAS DIRECTED BY THE ATC SUPVR. UPON OUR ARR AT OUR DEST (LAL), WE WERE TOLD TO CONTACT DAYTONA ATC. THE CALL TO ATC WAS JUST TO CONFIRM THE INFO THAT WE PROVIDED OVER THE RADIO. WITHIN A FEW MINS, WE WERE APCHED BY A POLICE OFFICER THAT WAS LOOKING FOR OUR ACFT DUE TO AN ALNOT. HE STATED THAT ATC LOST CONTACT WITH OUR ACFT. WE DID NOT FEEL THAT THIS WAS POSSIBLE, SINCE WE WERE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH ATC AT ALL TIMES. HE NEXT STATED THAT BECAUSE WE SHUT DOWN OUR ACFT WHILE TAXIING, WE VIOLATED SECURITY PROCS AT DAB. WE WERE NOT AWARE OF ANY SUCH PROCS AT DAB AND WERE IN CONTACT WITH ATC AT ALL TIMES. OTHER THAN TURNING AT THE WRONG TXWY (THE SIGNAGE WAS PRIOR TO THE CORRECT TXWY), WE ADHERED TO OUR GND AND FLT CLRNCS. THERE WERE 2 QUALIFIED PLTS ON BOARD. WE HAD OUR TAXI DIAGRAM OUT AND HAD DISCUSSED THE RTE WE WERE ASSIGNED AS WELL AS THE ADDITIONAL TXWY AT W2. WE WERE BOTH IN AGREEMENT THAT THE SIGN IDENTING TXWY S WAS POSTED BEYOND THE TXWY (INCORRECT -- THE TXWY SIGN WAS POSTED JUST PRIOR TO THE STATED TXWY). THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY REMOVING THE PAINTED TAXI STRIPE FOR TXWY W2 AS THE TXWY IS NOT IN USE. I DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY ATC NEEDED THE FLT INFO THAT WAS AVAILABLE ON THE FLT PLAN, NOR DO I UNDERSTAND WHY THE POLICE WERE INVOLVED IN GATHERING THIS INFO. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR CONFIRMED THAT THE TURN ONTO THE INCORRECT TXWY WAS VERY CLOSE TO THE CTL TWR AND MAY HAVE PENETRATED A SECURITY PERIMETER BOUNDARY. SOME MISUNDERSTANDING WITH REGARD TO THE ALNOT MAY ALSO HAVE TAKEN PLACE, IE, THE SECURITY OFFICER AND OR THE RPTR MAY HAVE MISUNDERSTOOD OR USED THE TERM INCORRECTLY.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.