Narrative:

We waited for the aircraft to be taxied from the hangar to the gate by maintenance. The first officer said he did not observe any contamination on the aircraft during his walk around. He did mention some contamination around the main gear and suggested I use the brakes while taxiing to warm up the brakes and melt off the snow. Since the rest of the aircraft appeared free of contaminants, my interpretation was that this snow would have been a result of taxiing the aircraft in snow or slush. Checklists, pushback and engine start was normal. The before takeoff checklist was performed normally while taxiing to runway 04R in dtw on kilo taxiway. (The first officer said later that the controls felt as they generally do when the wind is blowing from behind the aircraft. I believe the winds were from 310 at 15.) we used flaps 18, but due to reports of windshear we elected to use maximum power for takeoff. I started the takeoff normally by advancing the power levers and pushing the toga buttons. When the first officer called '80 KTS,' I took my hand off the tiller and placed it on the control column and called 'my column' which is standard procedure. Almost immediately the nose of the aircraft began to rise while still at a speed below V1 and vr. I tried to push forward on the control column to counteract it, but the nose continued to rise. The first officer saw I had trouble holding the nose down and tried to help me push forward on the control column. Sensing that the aircraft was uncontrollable, I elected to retard the power levers to flight idle to abort the takeoff. The nose gear hit the runway quite hard and we slowed down and exited the runway. After clearing the runway, I noted the elevator trim at approximately 3.5 which is within the normal range. I am not sure, but I don't think the main gear was off the ground during the takeoff. (Later information from the flight data recorder shows the mains on the ground and an aircraft pitch of 15 degrees nose up altitude. It also indicated the elevator surface may have been jammed.) since we have servo tabs for the elevator and aileron flight controls, it appears the pre-takeoff flight control check may not be completely revealing of all problems. Additionally, if that check is performed while taxiing downwind, the controls are harder to move, which may further mask a potential problem. During post flight the first officer and I did not see any ice or snow on the aircraft, but we did see water running down the side of the fuselage and re-freezing. A picture taken by maintenance later in the day showed ice in an aileron hinge which was visible from the ground and may be from a similar situation. Ice in a location not visible from the ground that had thawed and reformed as ice in the aileron hinge area, but was not there during the preflight. Other pictures showed a considerable amount of ice on the leading edge of the elevator which cannot be seen during a regular preflight inspection. It is my belief this ice caused the elevator to be jammed in the maximum up position which is a normal position for that control surface while parked on the ground. That position also leaves a large recessed area between the horizontal stabilizer trailing edge and the leading edge of the elevator, where snow, ice or any other substance can accumulate and jam the system. We are working with the company to help them understand what caused this problem and hopefully allow them to change current procedures or develop new procedures for detecting and removing contaminants as well as changing the flight controls check, or at least allow everyone to understand its limitations. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the captain reported the incident to his flight manager. The company is instituting a cherry picker inspection of the aircraft stabilizer and elevator for ice. The captain thinks this inspection is fine, but would like to see a positive control check at some airspeed where the elevator response can be positively checked, both nose up and nose down. The captain reports getting a valid check while taxiing, downwind and for takeoff is impossible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AVRO 146, RJ-85A CREW HAD THE ELEVATOR JAM FULL NOSE UP ON TKOF ROLL.

Narrative: WE WAITED FOR THE ACFT TO BE TAXIED FROM THE HANGAR TO THE GATE BY MAINT. THE FO SAID HE DID NOT OBSERVE ANY CONTAMINATION ON THE ACFT DURING HIS WALK AROUND. HE DID MENTION SOME CONTAMINATION AROUND THE MAIN GEAR AND SUGGESTED I USE THE BRAKES WHILE TAXIING TO WARM UP THE BRAKES AND MELT OFF THE SNOW. SINCE THE REST OF THE ACFT APPEARED FREE OF CONTAMINANTS, MY INTERPRETATION WAS THAT THIS SNOW WOULD HAVE BEEN A RESULT OF TAXIING THE ACFT IN SNOW OR SLUSH. CHKLISTS, PUSHBACK AND ENG START WAS NORMAL. THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST WAS PERFORMED NORMALLY WHILE TAXIING TO RWY 04R IN DTW ON KILO TXWY. (THE FO SAID LATER THAT THE CONTROLS FELT AS THEY GENERALLY DO WHEN THE WIND IS BLOWING FROM BEHIND THE ACFT. I BELIEVE THE WINDS WERE FROM 310 AT 15.) WE USED FLAPS 18, BUT DUE TO REPORTS OF WINDSHEAR WE ELECTED TO USE MAX POWER FOR TKOF. I STARTED THE TKOF NORMALLY BY ADVANCING THE POWER LEVERS AND PUSHING THE TOGA BUTTONS. WHEN THE FO CALLED '80 KTS,' I TOOK MY HAND OFF THE TILLER AND PLACED IT ON THE CTL COLUMN AND CALLED 'MY COLUMN' WHICH IS STANDARD PROC. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY THE NOSE OF THE ACFT BEGAN TO RISE WHILE STILL AT A SPEED BELOW V1 AND VR. I TRIED TO PUSH FORWARD ON THE CTL COLUMN TO COUNTERACT IT, BUT THE NOSE CONTINUED TO RISE. THE FO SAW I HAD TROUBLE HOLDING THE NOSE DOWN AND TRIED TO HELP ME PUSH FORWARD ON THE CTL COLUMN. SENSING THAT THE ACFT WAS UNCONTROLLABLE, I ELECTED TO RETARD THE POWER LEVERS TO FLT IDLE TO ABORT THE TKOF. THE NOSE GEAR HIT THE RWY QUITE HARD AND WE SLOWED DOWN AND EXITED THE RWY. AFTER CLEARING THE RWY, I NOTED THE ELEVATOR TRIM AT APPROX 3.5 WHICH IS WITHIN THE NORMAL RANGE. I AM NOT SURE, BUT I DON'T THINK THE MAIN GEAR WAS OFF THE GND DURING THE TKOF. (LATER INFO FROM THE FLT DATA RECORDER SHOWS THE MAINS ON THE GND AND AN ACFT PITCH OF 15 DEGS NOSE UP ALT. IT ALSO INDICATED THE ELEVATOR SURFACE MAY HAVE BEEN JAMMED.) SINCE WE HAVE SERVO TABS FOR THE ELEVATOR AND AILERON FLT CTLS, IT APPEARS THE PRE-TKOF FLT CTL CHECK MAY NOT BE COMPLETELY REVEALING OF ALL PROBS. ADDITIONALLY, IF THAT CHECK IS PERFORMED WHILE TAXIING DOWNWIND, THE CTLS ARE HARDER TO MOVE, WHICH MAY FURTHER MASK A POTENTIAL PROB. DURING POST FLT THE FO AND I DID NOT SEE ANY ICE OR SNOW ON THE ACFT, BUT WE DID SEE WATER RUNNING DOWN THE SIDE OF THE FUSELAGE AND RE-FREEZING. A PICTURE TAKEN BY MAINT LATER IN THE DAY SHOWED ICE IN AN AILERON HINGE WHICH WAS VISIBLE FROM THE GND AND MAY BE FROM A SIMILAR SIT. ICE IN A LOCATION NOT VISIBLE FROM THE GND THAT HAD THAWED AND REFORMED AS ICE IN THE AILERON HINGE AREA, BUT WAS NOT THERE DURING THE PREFLT. OTHER PICTURES SHOWED A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF ICE ON THE LEADING EDGE OF THE ELEVATOR WHICH CANNOT BE SEEN DURING A REGULAR PREFLT INSPECTION. IT IS MY BELIEF THIS ICE CAUSED THE ELEVATOR TO BE JAMMED IN THE MAX UP POSITION WHICH IS A NORMAL POSITION FOR THAT CTL SURFACE WHILE PARKED ON THE GND. THAT POSITION ALSO LEAVES A LARGE RECESSED AREA BTWN THE HORIZONTAL STABILIZER TRAILING EDGE AND THE LEADING EDGE OF THE ELEVATOR, WHERE SNOW, ICE OR ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE CAN ACCUMULATE AND JAM THE SYS. WE ARE WORKING WITH THE COMPANY TO HELP THEM UNDERSTAND WHAT CAUSED THIS PROB AND HOPEFULLY ALLOW THEM TO CHANGE CURRENT PROCS OR DEVELOP NEW PROCS FOR DETECTING AND REMOVING CONTAMINANTS AS WELL AS CHANGING THE FLT CTLS CHECK, OR AT LEAST ALLOW EVERYONE TO UNDERSTAND ITS LIMITATIONS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT RPTED THE INCIDENT TO HIS FLT MGR. THE COMPANY IS INSTITUTING A CHERRY PICKER INSPECTION OF THE ACFT STAB AND ELEVATOR FOR ICE. THE CAPT THINKS THIS INSPECTION IS FINE, BUT WOULD LIKE TO SEE A POSITIVE CTL CHK AT SOME AIRSPEED WHERE THE ELEVATOR RESPONSE CAN BE POSITIVELY CHECKED, BOTH NOSE UP AND NOSE DOWN. THE CAPT RPTS GETTING A VALID CHK WHILE TAXIING, DOWNWIND AND FOR TKOF IS IMPOSSIBLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.