Narrative:

We were cleared for takeoff on runway 31 at bna. I (captain) was flying the leg, and I commenced the takeoff roll. My first officer set the thrust levers and called '0 KTS.' just after his call, tower, in a very casual manner, stated 'company number, cancel your takeoff clearance.' here lies the reason for my report. There was a noted lack of urgency in tower's voice. It actually took a second or two to register that tower wanted me to reject the takeoff. I initiated the procedure at 100 KTS, and the rejected takeoff function worked flawlessly. We came to an abrupt stop on the centerline of runway 31 prior to the parallel taxiway for runway 2L. As we were stopping, an aircraft (an rj, I believe) rolled across our runway on runway 2L. My concern is the phraseology and the casual nature of tower's call. I would expect to hear the phrase 'cancel your takeoff clearance' when I am rolling past the hold short, or at the latest, just after pushing the throttles up. However, I believe that it would be helpful if tower would use 'abort,' 'reject,' or 'stop' when addressing an aircraft hurling down the runway near takeoff speed. This situation may very well have been a disaster, had we not rejected the takeoff, and in my opinion, tower should have been more direct in communicating the urgent need for me to stop my aircraft immediately. I suspect, and it is purely speculation, that tower did not want there to be a sense of urgency on the radio, knowing that there would be an investigation after they had made a potentially disastrous error in clearing us for takeoff after having cleared an aircraft to land on a crossing runway. In this situation, there needed to be a sense of urgency communicated to us. Had we hesitated much longer, we may well have stopped in that intersection rather than prior to it. Now, as for what I could have done better. After clearing the runway, I was thinking that only minimal brake cooling would be required, so I taxied toward runway 31 again. My first officer could not find the brake cooling page, so we were at runway 31 hold short before we arrived at the opc solution, recommending 24 mins of brake cooling. I elected to just stay at the hold short rather than taxi back to the gate. In so doing, I left the parking brake set rather than getting chocked and releasing the parking brake. In hindsight, it seems so obvious, but as I sat there that evening replaying the event in my mind, it never occurred to me that I needed to release the parking brake. A possible solution: make the note on the brake cooling page read, 'wait xx mins with the parking brake released (you knuckle head) prior to attempting another takeoff.' I will do better next time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BNA LCL CTLR CANCELS B737 RWY 31 TKOF CLRNC. COMING TO A STOP, THE B737 OBSERVES A CARJ LNDG RWY 2L ROLLING THROUGH THE INTXN AT RWY 31. CAPT BELIEVES AGGRESSIVE PHRASEOLOGY SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF ON RWY 31 AT BNA. I (CAPT) WAS FLYING THE LEG, AND I COMMENCED THE TKOF ROLL. MY FO SET THE THRUST LEVERS AND CALLED '0 KTS.' JUST AFTER HIS CALL, TWR, IN A VERY CASUAL MANNER, STATED 'COMPANY NUMBER, CANCEL YOUR TKOF CLRNC.' HERE LIES THE REASON FOR MY RPT. THERE WAS A NOTED LACK OF URGENCY IN TWR'S VOICE. IT ACTUALLY TOOK A SECOND OR TWO TO REGISTER THAT TWR WANTED ME TO REJECT THE TKOF. I INITIATED THE PROC AT 100 KTS, AND THE REJECTED TKOF FUNCTION WORKED FLAWLESSLY. WE CAME TO AN ABRUPT STOP ON THE CTRLINE OF RWY 31 PRIOR TO THE PARALLEL TXWY FOR RWY 2L. AS WE WERE STOPPING, AN ACFT (AN RJ, I BELIEVE) ROLLED ACROSS OUR RWY ON RWY 2L. MY CONCERN IS THE PHRASEOLOGY AND THE CASUAL NATURE OF TWR'S CALL. I WOULD EXPECT TO HEAR THE PHRASE 'CANCEL YOUR TKOF CLRNC' WHEN I AM ROLLING PAST THE HOLD SHORT, OR AT THE LATEST, JUST AFTER PUSHING THE THROTTLES UP. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF TWR WOULD USE 'ABORT,' 'REJECT,' OR 'STOP' WHEN ADDRESSING AN ACFT HURLING DOWN THE RWY NEAR TKOF SPD. THIS SIT MAY VERY WELL HAVE BEEN A DISASTER, HAD WE NOT REJECTED THE TKOF, AND IN MY OPINION, TWR SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE DIRECT IN COMMUNICATING THE URGENT NEED FOR ME TO STOP MY ACFT IMMEDIATELY. I SUSPECT, AND IT IS PURELY SPECULATION, THAT TWR DID NOT WANT THERE TO BE A SENSE OF URGENCY ON THE RADIO, KNOWING THAT THERE WOULD BE AN INVESTIGATION AFTER THEY HAD MADE A POTENTIALLY DISASTROUS ERROR IN CLRING US FOR TKOF AFTER HAVING CLRED AN ACFT TO LAND ON A XING RWY. IN THIS SIT, THERE NEEDED TO BE A SENSE OF URGENCY COMMUNICATED TO US. HAD WE HESITATED MUCH LONGER, WE MAY WELL HAVE STOPPED IN THAT INTXN RATHER THAN PRIOR TO IT. NOW, AS FOR WHAT I COULD HAVE DONE BETTER. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, I WAS THINKING THAT ONLY MINIMAL BRAKE COOLING WOULD BE REQUIRED, SO I TAXIED TOWARD RWY 31 AGAIN. MY FO COULD NOT FIND THE BRAKE COOLING PAGE, SO WE WERE AT RWY 31 HOLD SHORT BEFORE WE ARRIVED AT THE OPC SOLUTION, RECOMMENDING 24 MINS OF BRAKE COOLING. I ELECTED TO JUST STAY AT THE HOLD SHORT RATHER THAN TAXI BACK TO THE GATE. IN SO DOING, I LEFT THE PARKING BRAKE SET RATHER THAN GETTING CHOCKED AND RELEASING THE PARKING BRAKE. IN HINDSIGHT, IT SEEMS SO OBVIOUS, BUT AS I SAT THERE THAT EVENING REPLAYING THE EVENT IN MY MIND, IT NEVER OCCURRED TO ME THAT I NEEDED TO RELEASE THE PARKING BRAKE. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION: MAKE THE NOTE ON THE BRAKE COOLING PAGE READ, 'WAIT XX MINS WITH THE PARKING BRAKE RELEASED (YOU KNUCKLE HEAD) PRIOR TO ATTEMPTING ANOTHER TKOF.' I WILL DO BETTER NEXT TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.