Narrative:

I just received a call from union safety, that I neglected to shut down an engine following gate arrival in ord. I don't remember not shutting down the engine. But my first officer and I were in a rush to go from one gate to another gate to connect for our final flight of the sequence home. It is horribly embarrassing to realize that this is possible. I am a very methodical checklist person, but I guess it happened. We were delayed in ZZZ waiting for the aircraft to arrive. Finally getting airborne for ord, we realized our connection was going to be close. Since we were scheduled to deadhead, I instructed the first officer to hurry down to the gate to get us checked in. The lapse is entirely my fault. A couple of things were happening, but the bottom line is that we were rushing, and neglected to finish the checklist. I always tell first officer's not to rush, because they will make mistakes. It is very embarrassing to have this happen to me. The worst thing that could have happened is that we would have missed our deadhead, which we did. Supplemental information from acn 575478: the captain and I flew the entire month together, as well as on other occasions. I am quite familiar with the captain's habit patterns. Our after landing habit patterns changed a great deal during our last trip, due to a jumpseat conversation with the flight operations technical representative, who emphasized fuel savings by not bringing up the APU on taxi in, but instead rolling in on 1 engine. We tried it each leg thereafter. Unfortunately, this changed our habit pattern when in the chocks. Previously, we would 'cut #2, cut #1' on APU, then run the checklist. We have both done this for yrs. With only #1 running, there is sometimes a very long wait until ground power is established. It was during this long wait that habit patterns were interrupted and the shutdown was missed altogether.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR ERROR ADMITTED WHEN AN EMBARRASSED MD80 PIC AND FO RPT ON FAILING TO SHUT DOWN #1 ENG AFTER ARRIVING AT THE GATE IN ORD, IL.

Narrative: I JUST RECEIVED A CALL FROM UNION SAFETY, THAT I NEGLECTED TO SHUT DOWN AN ENG FOLLOWING GATE ARR IN ORD. I DON'T REMEMBER NOT SHUTTING DOWN THE ENG. BUT MY FO AND I WERE IN A RUSH TO GO FROM ONE GATE TO ANOTHER GATE TO CONNECT FOR OUR FINAL FLT OF THE SEQUENCE HOME. IT IS HORRIBLY EMBARRASSING TO REALIZE THAT THIS IS POSSIBLE. I AM A VERY METHODICAL CHKLIST PERSON, BUT I GUESS IT HAPPENED. WE WERE DELAYED IN ZZZ WAITING FOR THE ACFT TO ARRIVE. FINALLY GETTING AIRBORNE FOR ORD, WE REALIZED OUR CONNECTION WAS GOING TO BE CLOSE. SINCE WE WERE SCHEDULED TO DEADHEAD, I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO HURRY DOWN TO THE GATE TO GET US CHKED IN. THE LAPSE IS ENTIRELY MY FAULT. A COUPLE OF THINGS WERE HAPPENING, BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS THAT WE WERE RUSHING, AND NEGLECTED TO FINISH THE CHKLIST. I ALWAYS TELL FO'S NOT TO RUSH, BECAUSE THEY WILL MAKE MISTAKES. IT IS VERY EMBARRASSING TO HAVE THIS HAPPEN TO ME. THE WORST THING THAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED IS THAT WE WOULD HAVE MISSED OUR DEADHEAD, WHICH WE DID. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 575478: THE CAPT AND I FLEW THE ENTIRE MONTH TOGETHER, AS WELL AS ON OTHER OCCASIONS. I AM QUITE FAMILIAR WITH THE CAPT'S HABIT PATTERNS. OUR AFTER LNDG HABIT PATTERNS CHANGED A GREAT DEAL DURING OUR LAST TRIP, DUE TO A JUMPSEAT CONVERSATION WITH THE FLT OPS TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE, WHO EMPHASIZED FUEL SAVINGS BY NOT BRINGING UP THE APU ON TAXI IN, BUT INSTEAD ROLLING IN ON 1 ENG. WE TRIED IT EACH LEG THEREAFTER. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS CHANGED OUR HABIT PATTERN WHEN IN THE CHOCKS. PREVIOUSLY, WE WOULD 'CUT #2, CUT #1' ON APU, THEN RUN THE CHKLIST. WE HAVE BOTH DONE THIS FOR YRS. WITH ONLY #1 RUNNING, THERE IS SOMETIMES A VERY LONG WAIT UNTIL GND PWR IS ESTABLISHED. IT WAS DURING THIS LONG WAIT THAT HABIT PATTERNS WERE INTERRUPTED AND THE SHUTDOWN WAS MISSED ALTOGETHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.