Narrative:

After engine shutdown, during the postflt flow, captain opened the guard and flipped the switch up for the #2 right CSD disconnect. His intent was to turn off the 'emergency exit lights,' which is a black guarded switch in close proximity to the red guarded CSD switch. The right engine had been shut down during taxi in for single engine procedures. We made a logbook entry and called maintenance to check the CSD. On the return flight to mia we started the right engine first to ensure proper CSD operation. After takeoff we noticed a faint oil smell in the cockpit. I called the flight attendants and they said they could smell it too. I turned off the recirculation fans for about 1 min to aid in dissipation of the smell. We concluded, due to the short duration of the smell, that some oil from the 'engine or CSD' had circulated through the air conditioning system, as this is typical with engine or CSD oil servicing. The rest of the flight was uneventful. In the B767, the deactivation of the emergency exit lights was part of the first officer's flow. A very justifiable reason for this was given to me by my instructors during initial qualification. 'When the captain needs to use that switch during an evacuate/evacuation, we don't want him to FLIP it in the wrong direction due to habit.' also I believe for standardization reasons, the deactivation of this switch should be an first officer on duty on all aircraft. In the heat of the battle, it is human nature to fall back on habit patterns. Since it is generally the captain who will command an evacuate/evacuation it also follows that we don't want the captain to have to use that switch unless a serious situation exists. There are safety wire holes on the CSD switches, as well as the passenger oxygen switch and the altitude flap switch. Because these 4 switches activate irreversible actions in the cockpit, I believe that they should be safety wired. Supplemental information from acn 576876: when the item 'emergency exit lights' was called by the first officer, I reached up to turn them off per the checklist. In the dark I inadvertently lifted the #2 engine idg guard, and moved the switch to the disconnect position. In the B737, none of the switch guards are safety wired. The idg switch and the emergency exit light switch are next to each other and, while the idg switch guard is colored red, the difference is not discernable at night in a dark cockpit. Since the engine had been shut down for approximately 4 mins and stopped rotation, I do not believe the idg was actually disconnected but atl maintenance was called to examine the engine and they accomplished a manual reset to ensure electrics were available when the engine was started.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737 INADVERTENTLY ACTIVATED #2 IDG DISCONNECT SWITCH VICE EMER EXIT LIGHTS CTL SWITCH DURING COCKPIT SHUTDOWN CHKLIST CONDUCTED IN LOW LIGHT CONDITIONS.

Narrative: AFTER ENG SHUTDOWN, DURING THE POSTFLT FLOW, CAPT OPENED THE GUARD AND FLIPPED THE SWITCH UP FOR THE #2 R CSD DISCONNECT. HIS INTENT WAS TO TURN OFF THE 'EMER EXIT LIGHTS,' WHICH IS A BLACK GUARDED SWITCH IN CLOSE PROX TO THE RED GUARDED CSD SWITCH. THE R ENG HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN DURING TAXI IN FOR SINGLE ENG PROCS. WE MADE A LOGBOOK ENTRY AND CALLED MAINT TO CHK THE CSD. ON THE RETURN FLT TO MIA WE STARTED THE R ENG FIRST TO ENSURE PROPER CSD OP. AFTER TKOF WE NOTICED A FAINT OIL SMELL IN THE COCKPIT. I CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND THEY SAID THEY COULD SMELL IT TOO. I TURNED OFF THE RECIRCULATION FANS FOR ABOUT 1 MIN TO AID IN DISSIPATION OF THE SMELL. WE CONCLUDED, DUE TO THE SHORT DURATION OF THE SMELL, THAT SOME OIL FROM THE 'ENG OR CSD' HAD CIRCULATED THROUGH THE AIR CONDITIONING SYS, AS THIS IS TYPICAL WITH ENG OR CSD OIL SVCING. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. IN THE B767, THE DEACTIVATION OF THE EMER EXIT LIGHTS WAS PART OF THE FO'S FLOW. A VERY JUSTIFIABLE REASON FOR THIS WAS GIVEN TO ME BY MY INSTRUCTORS DURING INITIAL QUALIFICATION. 'WHEN THE CAPT NEEDS TO USE THAT SWITCH DURING AN EVAC, WE DON'T WANT HIM TO FLIP IT IN THE WRONG DIRECTION DUE TO HABIT.' ALSO I BELIEVE FOR STANDARDIZATION REASONS, THE DEACTIVATION OF THIS SWITCH SHOULD BE AN FO ON DUTY ON ALL ACFT. IN THE HEAT OF THE BATTLE, IT IS HUMAN NATURE TO FALL BACK ON HABIT PATTERNS. SINCE IT IS GENERALLY THE CAPT WHO WILL COMMAND AN EVAC IT ALSO FOLLOWS THAT WE DON'T WANT THE CAPT TO HAVE TO USE THAT SWITCH UNLESS A SERIOUS SIT EXISTS. THERE ARE SAFETY WIRE HOLES ON THE CSD SWITCHES, AS WELL AS THE PAX OXYGEN SWITCH AND THE ALT FLAP SWITCH. BECAUSE THESE 4 SWITCHES ACTIVATE IRREVERSIBLE ACTIONS IN THE COCKPIT, I BELIEVE THAT THEY SHOULD BE SAFETY WIRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 576876: WHEN THE ITEM 'EMER EXIT LIGHTS' WAS CALLED BY THE FO, I REACHED UP TO TURN THEM OFF PER THE CHKLIST. IN THE DARK I INADVERTENTLY LIFTED THE #2 ENG IDG GUARD, AND MOVED THE SWITCH TO THE DISCONNECT POS. IN THE B737, NONE OF THE SWITCH GUARDS ARE SAFETY WIRED. THE IDG SWITCH AND THE EMER EXIT LIGHT SWITCH ARE NEXT TO EACH OTHER AND, WHILE THE IDG SWITCH GUARD IS COLORED RED, THE DIFFERENCE IS NOT DISCERNABLE AT NIGHT IN A DARK COCKPIT. SINCE THE ENG HAD BEEN SHUT DOWN FOR APPROX 4 MINS AND STOPPED ROTATION, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE IDG WAS ACTUALLY DISCONNECTED BUT ATL MAINT WAS CALLED TO EXAMINE THE ENG AND THEY ACCOMPLISHED A MANUAL RESET TO ENSURE ELECTRICS WERE AVAILABLE WHEN THE ENG WAS STARTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.