37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 577324 |
Time | |
Date | 200303 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : cvg.airport |
State Reference | KY |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Regional Jet 200 ER&LR |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight ground : parked |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 55 flight time total : 7000 flight time type : 55 |
ASRS Report | 577324 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : became reoriented other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Company Environmental Factor |
Primary Problem | Environmental Factor |
Narrative:
I had just met the very senior captain with whom I was assigned to fly 1 leg. As a new hire first officer, I arrived early with the hope of having the aircraft ready for departure by the time the captain arrived. Unfortunately, as this flight served washington, dc, the dispatcher would not put the flight release into the computer until the captain called to receive his dca security briefing. He arrived late and I scrambled to print the paperwork. 3 printers failed in the terminal. 15 mins later (now nearly departure time), I found an operable printer, printed the release, gave it to the captain and set to work on a weight and balance manifest. I quickly learned that this very senior captain was somewhat eccentric. He did not use standard phraseology (as per the company standardization manual) when asking for or running checklists. We completed boarding and after some confusion ran turnaround/receiving and before start checklists. The next step would have been for him to call 'starting engine checklist.' however, he instead called 'start.' I believed he was asking me to start engine #2. I thought it odd that he would ask that while still at the gate (rather than on pushback) but with only 55 hours in the aircraft, I simply complied with what I perceived to be his request. I completely forgot the checklist. I turned on the fuel pumps, deselected the air conditioning packs, selected ignition 'a,' started my timer and selected #2 'start.' at approximately 15% N2, the captain said 'we have to run a checklist first....' I quickly hit the 'stop' button suddenly realizing that I had attempted to start an engine without clearance from ground personnel on a crowded ramp. We then completed the checklist and the remainder of the flight was without incident. At my level of experience, I should be able to recognize when I am being rushed and becoming task-saturated. At that time a non standard captain should be a big red flag for me to force myself to slow down, check and rechk, and carefully follow company procedures. We are very fortunate that no ground personnel were hurt due to my carelessness.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: JUNIOR FO ON A CL65 FELT RUSHED AND ATTEMPTED AN ENG START PRIOR TO CAPT'S CHKLIST USE AND GND CREW CONFIRMATION AT CVG, KY.
Narrative: I HAD JUST MET THE VERY SENIOR CAPT WITH WHOM I WAS ASSIGNED TO FLY 1 LEG. AS A NEW HIRE FO, I ARRIVED EARLY WITH THE HOPE OF HAVING THE ACFT READY FOR DEP BY THE TIME THE CAPT ARRIVED. UNFORTUNATELY, AS THIS FLT SERVED WASHINGTON, DC, THE DISPATCHER WOULD NOT PUT THE FLT RELEASE INTO THE COMPUTER UNTIL THE CAPT CALLED TO RECEIVE HIS DCA SECURITY BRIEFING. HE ARRIVED LATE AND I SCRAMBLED TO PRINT THE PAPERWORK. 3 PRINTERS FAILED IN THE TERMINAL. 15 MINS LATER (NOW NEARLY DEP TIME), I FOUND AN OPERABLE PRINTER, PRINTED THE RELEASE, GAVE IT TO THE CAPT AND SET TO WORK ON A WT AND BAL MANIFEST. I QUICKLY LEARNED THAT THIS VERY SENIOR CAPT WAS SOMEWHAT ECCENTRIC. HE DID NOT USE STANDARD PHRASEOLOGY (AS PER THE COMPANY STANDARDIZATION MANUAL) WHEN ASKING FOR OR RUNNING CHKLISTS. WE COMPLETED BOARDING AND AFTER SOME CONFUSION RAN TURNAROUND/RECEIVING AND BEFORE START CHKLISTS. THE NEXT STEP WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR HIM TO CALL 'STARTING ENG CHKLIST.' HOWEVER, HE INSTEAD CALLED 'START.' I BELIEVED HE WAS ASKING ME TO START ENG #2. I THOUGHT IT ODD THAT HE WOULD ASK THAT WHILE STILL AT THE GATE (RATHER THAN ON PUSHBACK) BUT WITH ONLY 55 HRS IN THE ACFT, I SIMPLY COMPLIED WITH WHAT I PERCEIVED TO BE HIS REQUEST. I COMPLETELY FORGOT THE CHKLIST. I TURNED ON THE FUEL PUMPS, DESELECTED THE AIR CONDITIONING PACKS, SELECTED IGNITION 'A,' STARTED MY TIMER AND SELECTED #2 'START.' AT APPROX 15% N2, THE CAPT SAID 'WE HAVE TO RUN A CHKLIST FIRST....' I QUICKLY HIT THE 'STOP' BUTTON SUDDENLY REALIZING THAT I HAD ATTEMPTED TO START AN ENG WITHOUT CLRNC FROM GND PERSONNEL ON A CROWDED RAMP. WE THEN COMPLETED THE CHKLIST AND THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS WITHOUT INCIDENT. AT MY LEVEL OF EXPERIENCE, I SHOULD BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE WHEN I AM BEING RUSHED AND BECOMING TASK-SATURATED. AT THAT TIME A NON STANDARD CAPT SHOULD BE A BIG RED FLAG FOR ME TO FORCE MYSELF TO SLOW DOWN, CHK AND RECHK, AND CAREFULLY FOLLOW COMPANY PROCS. WE ARE VERY FORTUNATE THAT NO GND PERSONNEL WERE HURT DUE TO MY CARELESSNESS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.