Narrative:

We had brought said aircraft into fargo, nd, the previous evening. Neither the captain nor myself had previously performed the fargo overnight trip. Our company procedure for an overnight aircraft is to repos the act across the field. When we showed for duty the next morning, the same aircraft we had brought in the previous evening, had been pulled out of the hangar and was ready for us. No other aircraft were seen on the field and we assumed this would be our aircraft for the day. We were also under the assumption that our aircraft was the only overnighting aircraft. It turns out, these were incorrect assumptions. The hangar doors were closed when we accepted our aircraft so we could not see that there was an additional overnighting aircraft tucked away inside. With the additional duty and subsequent time constraints of having to repos the aircraft over to the terminal, and in our haste to ensure an on-time departure, the dispatch flight release was not checked thoroughly enough. Dispatch made an error on our flight release in regards to the aircraft n-number. The paperwork showed the wrong aircraft was taken for flight. Ultimately, we, the flight crew, were responsible for not having this corrected before departing. Supplemental information from acn 577184: FBO employees informed me the aircraft was fueled and ready to go. At this time I did not have the dispatch release in my possession, as it was at the main terminal across the airfield at operations. The first officer did the walkaround (preflight) and pulled the gear safety pins as required, while I did the cockpit safety checks. The ramp and gate personnel parked us and we prepared the aircraft for passenger. At this time, I was handed the dispatch release and reviewed it for accuracy. The crew names matched and the route was correct. The required release fuel agreed with what the fuel on board said on the aircraft. Because the night before and we were now the first flight out in the morning with no indication of a second aircraft available, I had no reason to believe this aircraft we had wasn't ours. I do not recall specifically looking at the aircraft tail number of n-number on the dispatch release, not to say I didn't and it just didn't register at the time that I was in the wrong aircraft. The FBO removed the wrong aircraft and fueled it for departure from the hangar and then closed the hangar doors concealing the second aircraft. Recommended corrective actions: 1) in fargo during winter operations, have the PIC call company dispatch T confirm which aircraft is dispatched to them. 2) have the dispatch release available at the fargo FBO so the crew can confirm the current aircraft n-number.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL65 FLT CREW FAILING TO NOTE THAT THEIR RELEASE CARRIED THE WRONG ACFT N-NUMBER TAKES THE WRONG NUMBERED ACFT OUT ON THEIR SCHEDULED FLT FROM FAR, ND.

Narrative: WE HAD BROUGHT SAID ACFT INTO FARGO, ND, THE PREVIOUS EVENING. NEITHER THE CAPT NOR MYSELF HAD PREVIOUSLY PERFORMED THE FARGO OVERNIGHT TRIP. OUR COMPANY PROC FOR AN OVERNIGHT ACFT IS TO REPOS THE ACT ACROSS THE FIELD. WHEN WE SHOWED FOR DUTY THE NEXT MORNING, THE SAME ACFT WE HAD BROUGHT IN THE PREVIOUS EVENING, HAD BEEN PULLED OUT OF THE HANGAR AND WAS READY FOR US. NO OTHER ACFT WERE SEEN ON THE FIELD AND WE ASSUMED THIS WOULD BE OUR ACFT FOR THE DAY. WE WERE ALSO UNDER THE ASSUMPTION THAT OUR ACFT WAS THE ONLY OVERNIGHTING ACFT. IT TURNS OUT, THESE WERE INCORRECT ASSUMPTIONS. THE HANGAR DOORS WERE CLOSED WHEN WE ACCEPTED OUR ACFT SO WE COULD NOT SEE THAT THERE WAS AN ADDITIONAL OVERNIGHTING ACFT TUCKED AWAY INSIDE. WITH THE ADDITIONAL DUTY AND SUBSEQUENT TIME CONSTRAINTS OF HAVING TO REPOS THE ACFT OVER TO THE TERMINAL, AND IN OUR HASTE TO ENSURE AN ON-TIME DEP, THE DISPATCH FLT RELEASE WAS NOT CHKED THOROUGHLY ENOUGH. DISPATCH MADE AN ERROR ON OUR FLT RELEASE IN REGARDS TO THE ACFT N-NUMBER. THE PAPERWORK SHOWED THE WRONG ACFT WAS TAKEN FOR FLT. ULTIMATELY, WE, THE FLT CREW, WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR NOT HAVING THIS CORRECTED BEFORE DEPARTING. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 577184: FBO EMPLOYEES INFORMED ME THE ACFT WAS FUELED AND READY TO GO. AT THIS TIME I DID NOT HAVE THE DISPATCH RELEASE IN MY POSSESSION, AS IT WAS AT THE MAIN TERMINAL ACROSS THE AIRFIELD AT OPS. THE FO DID THE WALKAROUND (PREFLT) AND PULLED THE GEAR SAFETY PINS AS REQUIRED, WHILE I DID THE COCKPIT SAFETY CHKS. THE RAMP AND GATE PERSONNEL PARKED US AND WE PREPARED THE ACFT FOR PAX. AT THIS TIME, I WAS HANDED THE DISPATCH RELEASE AND REVIEWED IT FOR ACCURACY. THE CREW NAMES MATCHED AND THE RTE WAS CORRECT. THE REQUIRED RELEASE FUEL AGREED WITH WHAT THE FUEL ON BOARD SAID ON THE ACFT. BECAUSE THE NIGHT BEFORE AND WE WERE NOW THE FIRST FLT OUT IN THE MORNING WITH NO INDICATION OF A SECOND ACFT AVAILABLE, I HAD NO REASON TO BELIEVE THIS ACFT WE HAD WASN'T OURS. I DO NOT RECALL SPECIFICALLY LOOKING AT THE ACFT TAIL NUMBER OF N-NUMBER ON THE DISPATCH RELEASE, NOT TO SAY I DIDN'T AND IT JUST DIDN'T REGISTER AT THE TIME THAT I WAS IN THE WRONG ACFT. THE FBO REMOVED THE WRONG ACFT AND FUELED IT FOR DEP FROM THE HANGAR AND THEN CLOSED THE HANGAR DOORS CONCEALING THE SECOND ACFT. RECOMMENDED CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: 1) IN FARGO DURING WINTER OPS, HAVE THE PIC CALL COMPANY DISPATCH T CONFIRM WHICH ACFT IS DISPATCHED TO THEM. 2) HAVE THE DISPATCH RELEASE AVAILABLE AT THE FARGO FBO SO THE CREW CAN CONFIRM THE CURRENT ACFT N-NUMBER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.