Narrative:

The runway lights at the destination airport (death valley np) were out, and there was no NOTAM about it, either from cedar city, ut, ffs or in the AFD. This contributed to an unsafe condition. The beacon was operative, although I had problems with it, because I had not read the on/off procedure in the AFD. Believing fewer radio clicks would dim the runway lights and more clicks would brighten them, I attempted to use 7 clicks, which briefly turned on the beacon, and then turned it off when I reached 7 clicks. Proper procedure is 5 clicks off. The runway lights were and remained completely inoperative. I had an operative landing light, and between that and the fact that I know the area, I attempted to land, after having made several passes. It was a moonless, extremely dark night, and I could not see where the runway began, nor could I tell exactly where it was, left or right of my approach to runway 15. Only when I was 'on top' of the runway could I tell exactly where it was and adjusted my position accordingly. However, because I couldn't see the beginning of the runway, I initially found myself much too high on every approach, and by the time I got aligned and low enough to land, I ran out of runway and had to go around. I did this many times, and finally began approaching much lower, too low, in order to get down prior to the end of the runway. Once, while on such a low approach, and while looking at the GPS in an effort to align myself with the runway, I looked at the GPS a little too long and found myself dangerously low -- 100-150 ft AGL! Remember, I was deliberately making a low approach so I wouldn't run out of runway once over it, but I sure didn't intend to be that low! The next day, I learned that if I had been that low on approach to runway 33, instead of runway 15, I may have hit some trees. While circling away from the airport, I found myself in a 'black hole,' and had to use only my instruments to maintain control and avoid special disorientation. I made many, many passes (maybe 10) before finally getting safely on the ground, just barely stopping before the end of the runway. I had a feeling in my gut that I shouldn't do this, and I did not know if a night landing without runway lights (but with a landing light) was legal, but there were extenuating circumstances. For one thing, I had a reservation at death valley, but this is not a good reason for pushing safety. The primary reason I didn't attempt to go somewhere else to land is the following: my route to death valley from st george, ut, was well planned out, but I had not planned for an alternate. Death valley is surrounded by mountains. I knew where I was, and I am very familiar with the death valley area, but I was not familiar, nor prepared for, an unplanned alternate. I did not cherish the thought of having to climb up to a safe altitude while avoiding the mountains, determine (in a black cockpit, with a flashlight in one hand and the aircraft yoke in the other) what that safe altitude was, determine where to go for an alternate, determine what heading and altitude I would need to get there while avoiding obstacles en route, determine the distance and time to the alternate, and thus whether or not I had enough fuel to safely get there. What I should have done is to have headed for an alternate as soon as I determined that the runway lights would not work. I knew, in the back of my mind, that beatty, nv, wasn't far away. I knew about where it was, and there is no doubt in my mind that I could have safely gone there, although the situation would have certainly been unnerving, but then it was anyway. Beatty was about 1/2 hour or so away, and I had about 1 3/4 hours of fuel left. I later learned that beatty has no fuel for sale, and if I had gone there I may have become stranded, but at least I would have performed a safe operation. Other circumstances you should be aware of. I learned upon landing that the runway lights had been out for 3 days prior. The person in charge of the airport told me this. It was a known condition that went unrpted. I personally reported the condition to riverside FSS upon closing my flight plan and 2 days later when I departed (duringdaylight hours), a NOTAM was given to me about the lights. Another note -- the ranger and 2 others had seen me circling and attempted to light the runway with their headlights, but this didn't help much. One such person actually drove to the end of the runway and parked there with his lights pointed toward me in an effort to light the runway. What this actually did was to blind me somewhat, and I was concerned that if I had to go around again, he might be in my way. Finally, what I have learned from this is the following: in addition to having a plan for an alternate landing for marginal WX conditions (such as, IFR), always have an alternate plan for night flts. And, if something doesn't feel right, it isn't.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF C172 LANDED AT L06 IN DEATH VALLEY AT NIGHT. RWY LIGHTS HAD BEEN INOP FOR 3 DAYS, BUT NO NOTAM HAD BEEN ISSUED.

Narrative: THE RWY LIGHTS AT THE DEST ARPT (DEATH VALLEY NP) WERE OUT, AND THERE WAS NO NOTAM ABOUT IT, EITHER FROM CEDAR CITY, UT, FFS OR IN THE AFD. THIS CONTRIBUTED TO AN UNSAFE CONDITION. THE BEACON WAS OPERATIVE, ALTHOUGH I HAD PROBS WITH IT, BECAUSE I HAD NOT READ THE ON/OFF PROC IN THE AFD. BELIEVING FEWER RADIO CLICKS WOULD DIM THE RWY LIGHTS AND MORE CLICKS WOULD BRIGHTEN THEM, I ATTEMPTED TO USE 7 CLICKS, WHICH BRIEFLY TURNED ON THE BEACON, AND THEN TURNED IT OFF WHEN I REACHED 7 CLICKS. PROPER PROC IS 5 CLICKS OFF. THE RWY LIGHTS WERE AND REMAINED COMPLETELY INOP. I HAD AN OPERATIVE LNDG LIGHT, AND BTWN THAT AND THE FACT THAT I KNOW THE AREA, I ATTEMPTED TO LAND, AFTER HAVING MADE SEVERAL PASSES. IT WAS A MOONLESS, EXTREMELY DARK NIGHT, AND I COULD NOT SEE WHERE THE RWY BEGAN, NOR COULD I TELL EXACTLY WHERE IT WAS, L OR R OF MY APCH TO RWY 15. ONLY WHEN I WAS 'ON TOP' OF THE RWY COULD I TELL EXACTLY WHERE IT WAS AND ADJUSTED MY POS ACCORDINGLY. HOWEVER, BECAUSE I COULDN'T SEE THE BEGINNING OF THE RWY, I INITIALLY FOUND MYSELF MUCH TOO HIGH ON EVERY APCH, AND BY THE TIME I GOT ALIGNED AND LOW ENOUGH TO LAND, I RAN OUT OF RWY AND HAD TO GAR. I DID THIS MANY TIMES, AND FINALLY BEGAN APCHING MUCH LOWER, TOO LOW, IN ORDER TO GET DOWN PRIOR TO THE END OF THE RWY. ONCE, WHILE ON SUCH A LOW APCH, AND WHILE LOOKING AT THE GPS IN AN EFFORT TO ALIGN MYSELF WITH THE RWY, I LOOKED AT THE GPS A LITTLE TOO LONG AND FOUND MYSELF DANGEROUSLY LOW -- 100-150 FT AGL! REMEMBER, I WAS DELIBERATELY MAKING A LOW APCH SO I WOULDN'T RUN OUT OF RWY ONCE OVER IT, BUT I SURE DIDN'T INTEND TO BE THAT LOW! THE NEXT DAY, I LEARNED THAT IF I HAD BEEN THAT LOW ON APCH TO RWY 33, INSTEAD OF RWY 15, I MAY HAVE HIT SOME TREES. WHILE CIRCLING AWAY FROM THE ARPT, I FOUND MYSELF IN A 'BLACK HOLE,' AND HAD TO USE ONLY MY INSTS TO MAINTAIN CTL AND AVOID SPECIAL DISORIENTATION. I MADE MANY, MANY PASSES (MAYBE 10) BEFORE FINALLY GETTING SAFELY ON THE GND, JUST BARELY STOPPING BEFORE THE END OF THE RWY. I HAD A FEELING IN MY GUT THAT I SHOULDN'T DO THIS, AND I DID NOT KNOW IF A NIGHT LNDG WITHOUT RWY LIGHTS (BUT WITH A LNDG LIGHT) WAS LEGAL, BUT THERE WERE EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES. FOR ONE THING, I HAD A RESERVATION AT DEATH VALLEY, BUT THIS IS NOT A GOOD REASON FOR PUSHING SAFETY. THE PRIMARY REASON I DIDN'T ATTEMPT TO GO SOMEWHERE ELSE TO LAND IS THE FOLLOWING: MY RTE TO DEATH VALLEY FROM ST GEORGE, UT, WAS WELL PLANNED OUT, BUT I HAD NOT PLANNED FOR AN ALTERNATE. DEATH VALLEY IS SURROUNDED BY MOUNTAINS. I KNEW WHERE I WAS, AND I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE DEATH VALLEY AREA, BUT I WAS NOT FAMILIAR, NOR PREPARED FOR, AN UNPLANNED ALTERNATE. I DID NOT CHERISH THE THOUGHT OF HAVING TO CLB UP TO A SAFE ALT WHILE AVOIDING THE MOUNTAINS, DETERMINE (IN A BLACK COCKPIT, WITH A FLASHLIGHT IN ONE HAND AND THE ACFT YOKE IN THE OTHER) WHAT THAT SAFE ALT WAS, DETERMINE WHERE TO GO FOR AN ALTERNATE, DETERMINE WHAT HDG AND ALT I WOULD NEED TO GET THERE WHILE AVOIDING OBSTACLES ENRTE, DETERMINE THE DISTANCE AND TIME TO THE ALTERNATE, AND THUS WHETHER OR NOT I HAD ENOUGH FUEL TO SAFELY GET THERE. WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE IS TO HAVE HEADED FOR AN ALTERNATE AS SOON AS I DETERMINED THAT THE RWY LIGHTS WOULD NOT WORK. I KNEW, IN THE BACK OF MY MIND, THAT BEATTY, NV, WASN'T FAR AWAY. I KNEW ABOUT WHERE IT WAS, AND THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT I COULD HAVE SAFELY GONE THERE, ALTHOUGH THE SIT WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY BEEN UNNERVING, BUT THEN IT WAS ANYWAY. BEATTY WAS ABOUT 1/2 HR OR SO AWAY, AND I HAD ABOUT 1 3/4 HRS OF FUEL LEFT. I LATER LEARNED THAT BEATTY HAS NO FUEL FOR SALE, AND IF I HAD GONE THERE I MAY HAVE BECOME STRANDED, BUT AT LEAST I WOULD HAVE PERFORMED A SAFE OP. OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES YOU SHOULD BE AWARE OF. I LEARNED UPON LNDG THAT THE RWY LIGHTS HAD BEEN OUT FOR 3 DAYS PRIOR. THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE ARPT TOLD ME THIS. IT WAS A KNOWN CONDITION THAT WENT UNRPTED. I PERSONALLY RPTED THE CONDITION TO RIVERSIDE FSS UPON CLOSING MY FLT PLAN AND 2 DAYS LATER WHEN I DEPARTED (DURINGDAYLIGHT HRS), A NOTAM WAS GIVEN TO ME ABOUT THE LIGHTS. ANOTHER NOTE -- THE RANGER AND 2 OTHERS HAD SEEN ME CIRCLING AND ATTEMPTED TO LIGHT THE RWY WITH THEIR HEADLIGHTS, BUT THIS DIDN'T HELP MUCH. ONE SUCH PERSON ACTUALLY DROVE TO THE END OF THE RWY AND PARKED THERE WITH HIS LIGHTS POINTED TOWARD ME IN AN EFFORT TO LIGHT THE RWY. WHAT THIS ACTUALLY DID WAS TO BLIND ME SOMEWHAT, AND I WAS CONCERNED THAT IF I HAD TO GO AROUND AGAIN, HE MIGHT BE IN MY WAY. FINALLY, WHAT I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS IS THE FOLLOWING: IN ADDITION TO HAVING A PLAN FOR AN ALTERNATE LNDG FOR MARGINAL WX CONDITIONS (SUCH AS, IFR), ALWAYS HAVE AN ALTERNATE PLAN FOR NIGHT FLTS. AND, IF SOMETHING DOESN'T FEEL RIGHT, IT ISN'T.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.