Narrative:

We had an FAA jumpseater in the jumpseat for this flight crew. We were landing on runway 17L in dfw in VMC conditions, and the first officer was the PF. When we got down to approximately 300-400 ft, the first officer started descending below the GS. Right as I informed him that he needed to add power and correct for the GS -- the GPWS 'GS' warning sounded twice. The first officer added power to correct, but did not verbally respond 'correcting.' we landed well within the touchdown zone right at vref. The vertical speed never was excessive, and the airspeed never went below vref. There was never any point that I felt that the first officer wasn't properly correcting, and there was never a time I felt the landing was in jeopardy. Therefore, I elected not to take control of the aircraft, although I am always prepared to do so. When we got to the gate and finished all of the checklists, I counseled the first officer in the presence of the FAA jumpseater. I told him that it is mandatory to respond verbally to any GPWS warning. I also told him that he should have been more aggressive in correcting back to the GS. The first officer agreed and said he understood. I also told him that I probably should have taken control of the aircraft, but for the reasons above, I elected not to take control. I feel I have to say again that the first officer did take appropriate action when he got the GPWS warning -- he just didn't verbally acknowledge the warning.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN SF340B FO, THE PF, CAUSED THE GPWS 'GS' WARNING WHILE ON THR ILS RWY 17L AT AT DFW.

Narrative: WE HAD AN FAA JUMPSEATER IN THE JUMPSEAT FOR THIS FLT CREW. WE WERE LNDG ON RWY 17L IN DFW IN VMC CONDITIONS, AND THE FO WAS THE PF. WHEN WE GOT DOWN TO APPROX 300-400 FT, THE FO STARTED DSNDING BELOW THE GS. RIGHT AS I INFORMED HIM THAT HE NEEDED TO ADD PWR AND CORRECT FOR THE GS -- THE GPWS 'GS' WARNING SOUNDED TWICE. THE FO ADDED PWR TO CORRECT, BUT DID NOT VERBALLY RESPOND 'CORRECTING.' WE LANDED WELL WITHIN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE RIGHT AT VREF. THE VERT SPD NEVER WAS EXCESSIVE, AND THE AIRSPD NEVER WENT BELOW VREF. THERE WAS NEVER ANY POINT THAT I FELT THAT THE FO WASN'T PROPERLY CORRECTING, AND THERE WAS NEVER A TIME I FELT THE LNDG WAS IN JEOPARDY. THEREFORE, I ELECTED NOT TO TAKE CTL OF THE ACFT, ALTHOUGH I AM ALWAYS PREPARED TO DO SO. WHEN WE GOT TO THE GATE AND FINISHED ALL OF THE CHKLISTS, I COUNSELED THE FO IN THE PRESENCE OF THE FAA JUMPSEATER. I TOLD HIM THAT IT IS MANDATORY TO RESPOND VERBALLY TO ANY GPWS WARNING. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE IN CORRECTING BACK TO THE GS. THE FO AGREED AND SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT I PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE TAKEN CTL OF THE ACFT, BUT FOR THE REASONS ABOVE, I ELECTED NOT TO TAKE CTL. I FEEL I HAVE TO SAY AGAIN THAT THE FO DID TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION WHEN HE GOT THE GPWS WARNING -- HE JUST DIDN'T VERBALLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE WARNING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.