Narrative:

Just prior to pushback, with the jetway already pulled back, the ground crew told the captain they were having trouble latching the forward cargo door. They said the door handle closed, but they couldn't keep the handle held into the door flush with the aircraft surface. (The door light was out.) that's the way I understood the condition. The ground crew asked the captain what he wanted to do. After some talking about the handle and the door security, the captain said we'd take it and have ZZZ1 maintenance look at it. They asked if they should tape it down and the captain said no because it wouldn't hold. I asked the captain if he was going to go out and look at it and he said no. I mumbled something about familiarizing myself with the rapid depressurization checklist. The door held securely in-flight. When I called in range to ZZZ1, I asked if maintenance could come out and see us about some lights in the cockpit. The captain heard the radio call and criticized me for not telling them about the door handle. I told him I didn't think I wanted to broadcast that we had an insecure cargo door handle that we discovered on the ground, but flew with anyway. The captain mumbled something I didn't understand. When maintenance looked at the door in ZZZ1, they said they couldn't fix it, but they would tape it down and put a maintenance note in the logbook. The delay report had a statement about the cargo door and the captain said he was going to call flight operations and have the wording changed. Ok, so we made it to ZZZ1 uneventfully. My concerns are: first of all, the captain didn't go out and see the door handle to assess the situation be before we left. He was picturing what the ground crew was describing. At no time did we got the opinion of an actual a&P on the security of the door handle. Second, the captain made no effort to secure the door handle. I think that was dangerous. Third, the captain criticized me for not broadcasting our stupidity over the air waves. Fourth, the captain was covering up by getting flight operations to change the wording on the delay report so the FAA and others wouldn't find out about the incident. I think this behavior is unacceptable and dangerous. I think this is indicative of a behavioral problem. Later in the same day, we had a plane change and the deplaning crew told us they had a flickering leading edge flaps transit light, but everything was ok and maintenance knew about it. Well, we had a steady light with an overhead annunciator light. He wasn't going to do anything about it until I pulled out the checklist and said we had a checklist about this condition. Then he had maintenance MEL the light. He was a bit miffed when we had to fly slow the rest of the day. He was also ready to point out when I didn't immediately get to 280 KTS when I began the dscnts. This same captain insisted on flying with a malfunctioning AC pack the next day. I told him at least twice that the left pack wasn't shutting off on the ground. I even went outside during a turn to check the pack air flow with different switch configns. He said to leave it alone, he would handle it. I was under the impression that safety was our #1 priority. I know this sounds a bit like a personality conflict, but maintenance issues have no personality in put. I have no problem flying with MEL's. I think maintenance should be given a chance to determine if the situation is an MEL or not.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 FO RPTS CONCERN ABOUT CAPT'S BEHAVIOR IN NOT RPTING OR WRITING UP SERIOUS MAINT ITEMS.

Narrative: JUST PRIOR TO PUSHBACK, WITH THE JETWAY ALREADY PULLED BACK, THE GND CREW TOLD THE CAPT THEY WERE HAVING TROUBLE LATCHING THE FORWARD CARGO DOOR. THEY SAID THE DOOR HANDLE CLOSED, BUT THEY COULDN'T KEEP THE HANDLE HELD INTO THE DOOR FLUSH WITH THE ACFT SURFACE. (THE DOOR LIGHT WAS OUT.) THAT'S THE WAY I UNDERSTOOD THE CONDITION. THE GND CREW ASKED THE CAPT WHAT HE WANTED TO DO. AFTER SOME TALKING ABOUT THE HANDLE AND THE DOOR SECURITY, THE CAPT SAID WE'D TAKE IT AND HAVE ZZZ1 MAINT LOOK AT IT. THEY ASKED IF THEY SHOULD TAPE IT DOWN AND THE CAPT SAID NO BECAUSE IT WOULDN'T HOLD. I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WAS GOING TO GO OUT AND LOOK AT IT AND HE SAID NO. I MUMBLED SOMETHING ABOUT FAMILIARIZING MYSELF WITH THE RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION CHKLIST. THE DOOR HELD SECURELY INFLT. WHEN I CALLED IN RANGE TO ZZZ1, I ASKED IF MAINT COULD COME OUT AND SEE US ABOUT SOME LIGHTS IN THE COCKPIT. THE CAPT HEARD THE RADIO CALL AND CRITICIZED ME FOR NOT TELLING THEM ABOUT THE DOOR HANDLE. I TOLD HIM I DIDN'T THINK I WANTED TO BROADCAST THAT WE HAD AN INSECURE CARGO DOOR HANDLE THAT WE DISCOVERED ON THE GND, BUT FLEW WITH ANYWAY. THE CAPT MUMBLED SOMETHING I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND. WHEN MAINT LOOKED AT THE DOOR IN ZZZ1, THEY SAID THEY COULDN'T FIX IT, BUT THEY WOULD TAPE IT DOWN AND PUT A MAINT NOTE IN THE LOGBOOK. THE DELAY RPT HAD A STATEMENT ABOUT THE CARGO DOOR AND THE CAPT SAID HE WAS GOING TO CALL FLT OPS AND HAVE THE WORDING CHANGED. OK, SO WE MADE IT TO ZZZ1 UNEVENTFULLY. MY CONCERNS ARE: FIRST OF ALL, THE CAPT DIDN'T GO OUT AND SEE THE DOOR HANDLE TO ASSESS THE SIT BE BEFORE WE LEFT. HE WAS PICTURING WHAT THE GND CREW WAS DESCRIBING. AT NO TIME DID WE GOT THE OPINION OF AN ACTUAL A&P ON THE SECURITY OF THE DOOR HANDLE. SECOND, THE CAPT MADE NO EFFORT TO SECURE THE DOOR HANDLE. I THINK THAT WAS DANGEROUS. THIRD, THE CAPT CRITICIZED ME FOR NOT BROADCASTING OUR STUPIDITY OVER THE AIR WAVES. FOURTH, THE CAPT WAS COVERING UP BY GETTING FLT OPS TO CHANGE THE WORDING ON THE DELAY RPT SO THE FAA AND OTHERS WOULDN'T FIND OUT ABOUT THE INCIDENT. I THINK THIS BEHAVIOR IS UNACCEPTABLE AND DANGEROUS. I THINK THIS IS INDICATIVE OF A BEHAVIORAL PROB. LATER IN THE SAME DAY, WE HAD A PLANE CHANGE AND THE DEPLANING CREW TOLD US THEY HAD A FLICKERING LEADING EDGE FLAPS TRANSIT LIGHT, BUT EVERYTHING WAS OK AND MAINT KNEW ABOUT IT. WELL, WE HAD A STEADY LIGHT WITH AN OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT. HE WASN'T GOING TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT UNTIL I PULLED OUT THE CHKLIST AND SAID WE HAD A CHKLIST ABOUT THIS CONDITION. THEN HE HAD MAINT MEL THE LIGHT. HE WAS A BIT MIFFED WHEN WE HAD TO FLY SLOW THE REST OF THE DAY. HE WAS ALSO READY TO POINT OUT WHEN I DIDN'T IMMEDIATELY GET TO 280 KTS WHEN I BEGAN THE DSCNTS. THIS SAME CAPT INSISTED ON FLYING WITH A MALFUNCTIONING AC PACK THE NEXT DAY. I TOLD HIM AT LEAST TWICE THAT THE L PACK WASN'T SHUTTING OFF ON THE GND. I EVEN WENT OUTSIDE DURING A TURN TO CHK THE PACK AIR FLOW WITH DIFFERENT SWITCH CONFIGNS. HE SAID TO LEAVE IT ALONE, HE WOULD HANDLE IT. I WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT SAFETY WAS OUR #1 PRIORITY. I KNOW THIS SOUNDS A BIT LIKE A PERSONALITY CONFLICT, BUT MAINT ISSUES HAVE NO PERSONALITY IN PUT. I HAVE NO PROB FLYING WITH MEL'S. I THINK MAINT SHOULD BE GIVEN A CHANCE TO DETERMINE IF THE SIT IS AN MEL OR NOT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.