Narrative:

Preflight, pushback, engine start and taxi out were all normal. Takeoff occurred approximately 11 mins after engine start on runway 4L at ord. Flaps 5 degrees was set with a reduced power of 1.32 EPR, which produced 82 N1 on both engines. All engine indications were normal during the takeoff run, clean-up and acceleration. Aircraft was accelerated at 10000 ft. At 11000 ft and aircraft accelerating through about 280 KTS, there was a loud explosion and violent jolt to the aircraft. The right engine overtemped to 733 degrees and appeared to be in a stall, then flamed out. The first officer was flying the airplane, trimmed out the yaw, leveled off at 12000 ft. I declared an emergency and requested an immediate left turn to a downwind to return and land at ord. The autoplt was engaged, I asked the first officer if he was ok to fly -- he said yes. I told him to continue to fly the aircraft and talk to ATC while I managed the aircraft system and the emergency checklists. The qrc for high engine egt/compressor stall was accomplished, then the reference actions. The engine had already shut itself down. I sent a message to dispatch: 'lost engine, return to land.' the purser was called on the interphone and told: 'do not be concerned, we've lost an engine, returning for a normal landing at ord, cabin advisory only, 10 mins to touchdown, brief the rest of the crew and stay seated. I will make a PA as soon as checklists complete.' I also told the purser that a deadheading B767 captain was in seat 6C and to ask him to go back and view the right engine and report to me what he sees. There must have been some delay in the purser briefing the cabin crew because the aft attendant kept calling the cockpit to inquire what was wrong and that a passenger had seen flame shoot out the front of the engine. The deadheading pilot reported back that the engine looked normal. I made a PA announcement to the cabin that we had shut down 1 of the engines for abnormal operation, that there was no need for concern, that a normal approach back to ord was going to be accomplished. Once at the gate, customer service would handle alternate flts to accommodate their travel. The checklist then directed analysis of the engine. It took a while for the egt to drop down into the normal range. All other indications were normal. 20 quarts oil, N1, N2, rotation and egt had dropped below 200. At this point, I told approach control that we were no longer an emergency aircraft, would be ready for a normal approach in 5 mins and requested a 20 mi final. He asked us if we needed the equipment and we told him that it was not necessary since we had no indications of fire. As directed by the compressor stall checklist, we decided to run the in-flight engine start irregular procedure while on downwind for runway 4R. Xbleed was displayed, so we configured for a xbleed start. The engine ignited, started a normal acceleration, then hung at 19% N1, with the egt rising toward 600 degrees. Then the N1 started to decrease, N2 stopped accelerating and temperature continued to rise, now at about 580 degrees. We elected to accomplish the in-flight engine failure/shutdown checklist and secured the engine. Xfeeding was accomplished. We ran the normal checklists, configured the aircraft for a single engine flaps 20 degree ILS approach to runway 4R. A normal approach and landing was accomplished, we cleared the runway, and taxied to gate. Even though we did not request the equipment and informed the tower that we did not need any assistance getting to the gate, they city elected to have the emergency vehicles follow us to the gate. I had the first officer make a PA that everything was fine and it was normal procedure for the equipment to monitor our taxi to the gate. I elected to have the first officer continue to fly the airplane and have him fly a monitored approach so that I could manage overall control and situational awareness of the flight through the landing roll. He had done an exceptional job of handling the engine failure and plting the aircraft around the pattern and during the approach and landing. I was also concerned with the confusion of the cabin crew due to the purser not handling the situation very well. She was very upset and was having difficulty communicating with the rest of the crew, to the extent that I had to communication what washappening to the other flight attendant on the crew. Upon our visual inspection of the engine at the gate, we found metal chips in the tail pipe of the engine and a chalky white coating on both the compressor and turbine blades. We then were reassigned to fly a trip with a new aircraft. All of our passenger and crew, except the purser, came with us on the second flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 FLT CREW HAS ENG FAILURE DURING DEP FROM ORD.

Narrative: PREFLT, PUSHBACK, ENG START AND TAXI OUT WERE ALL NORMAL. TKOF OCCURRED APPROX 11 MINS AFTER ENG START ON RWY 4L AT ORD. FLAPS 5 DEGS WAS SET WITH A REDUCED PWR OF 1.32 EPR, WHICH PRODUCED 82 N1 ON BOTH ENGS. ALL ENG INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL DURING THE TKOF RUN, CLEAN-UP AND ACCELERATION. ACFT WAS ACCELERATED AT 10000 FT. AT 11000 FT AND ACFT ACCELERATING THROUGH ABOUT 280 KTS, THERE WAS A LOUD EXPLOSION AND VIOLENT JOLT TO THE ACFT. THE R ENG OVERTEMPED TO 733 DEGS AND APPEARED TO BE IN A STALL, THEN FLAMED OUT. THE FO WAS FLYING THE AIRPLANE, TRIMMED OUT THE YAW, LEVELED OFF AT 12000 FT. I DECLARED AN EMER AND REQUESTED AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO A DOWNWIND TO RETURN AND LAND AT ORD. THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED, I ASKED THE FO IF HE WAS OK TO FLY -- HE SAID YES. I TOLD HIM TO CONTINUE TO FLY THE ACFT AND TALK TO ATC WHILE I MANAGED THE ACFT SYS AND THE EMER CHKLISTS. THE QRC FOR HIGH ENG EGT/COMPRESSOR STALL WAS ACCOMPLISHED, THEN THE REF ACTIONS. THE ENG HAD ALREADY SHUT ITSELF DOWN. I SENT A MESSAGE TO DISPATCH: 'LOST ENG, RETURN TO LAND.' THE PURSER WAS CALLED ON THE INTERPHONE AND TOLD: 'DO NOT BE CONCERNED, WE'VE LOST AN ENG, RETURNING FOR A NORMAL LNDG AT ORD, CABIN ADVISORY ONLY, 10 MINS TO TOUCHDOWN, BRIEF THE REST OF THE CREW AND STAY SEATED. I WILL MAKE A PA AS SOON AS CHKLISTS COMPLETE.' I ALSO TOLD THE PURSER THAT A DEADHEADING B767 CAPT WAS IN SEAT 6C AND TO ASK HIM TO GO BACK AND VIEW THE R ENG AND RPT TO ME WHAT HE SEES. THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME DELAY IN THE PURSER BRIEFING THE CABIN CREW BECAUSE THE AFT ATTENDANT KEPT CALLING THE COCKPIT TO INQUIRE WHAT WAS WRONG AND THAT A PAX HAD SEEN FLAME SHOOT OUT THE FRONT OF THE ENG. THE DEADHEADING PLT RPTED BACK THAT THE ENG LOOKED NORMAL. I MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE CABIN THAT WE HAD SHUT DOWN 1 OF THE ENGS FOR ABNORMAL OP, THAT THERE WAS NO NEED FOR CONCERN, THAT A NORMAL APCH BACK TO ORD WAS GOING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. ONCE AT THE GATE, CUSTOMER SVC WOULD HANDLE ALTERNATE FLTS TO ACCOMMODATE THEIR TRAVEL. THE CHKLIST THEN DIRECTED ANALYSIS OF THE ENG. IT TOOK A WHILE FOR THE EGT TO DROP DOWN INTO THE NORMAL RANGE. ALL OTHER INDICATIONS WERE NORMAL. 20 QUARTS OIL, N1, N2, ROTATION AND EGT HAD DROPPED BELOW 200. AT THIS POINT, I TOLD APCH CTL THAT WE WERE NO LONGER AN EMER ACFT, WOULD BE READY FOR A NORMAL APCH IN 5 MINS AND REQUESTED A 20 MI FINAL. HE ASKED US IF WE NEEDED THE EQUIP AND WE TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY SINCE WE HAD NO INDICATIONS OF FIRE. AS DIRECTED BY THE COMPRESSOR STALL CHKLIST, WE DECIDED TO RUN THE INFLT ENG START IRREGULAR PROC WHILE ON DOWNWIND FOR RWY 4R. XBLEED WAS DISPLAYED, SO WE CONFIGURED FOR A XBLEED START. THE ENG IGNITED, STARTED A NORMAL ACCELERATION, THEN HUNG AT 19% N1, WITH THE EGT RISING TOWARD 600 DEGS. THEN THE N1 STARTED TO DECREASE, N2 STOPPED ACCELERATING AND TEMP CONTINUED TO RISE, NOW AT ABOUT 580 DEGS. WE ELECTED TO ACCOMPLISH THE INFLT ENG FAILURE/SHUTDOWN CHKLIST AND SECURED THE ENG. XFEEDING WAS ACCOMPLISHED. WE RAN THE NORMAL CHKLISTS, CONFIGURED THE ACFT FOR A SINGLE ENG FLAPS 20 DEG ILS APCH TO RWY 4R. A NORMAL APCH AND LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED, WE CLRED THE RWY, AND TAXIED TO GATE. EVEN THOUGH WE DID NOT REQUEST THE EQUIP AND INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE DID NOT NEED ANY ASSISTANCE GETTING TO THE GATE, THEY CITY ELECTED TO HAVE THE EMER VEHICLES FOLLOW US TO THE GATE. I HAD THE FO MAKE A PA THAT EVERYTHING WAS FINE AND IT WAS NORMAL PROC FOR THE EQUIP TO MONITOR OUR TAXI TO THE GATE. I ELECTED TO HAVE THE FO CONTINUE TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AND HAVE HIM FLY A MONITORED APCH SO THAT I COULD MANAGE OVERALL CTL AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF THE FLT THROUGH THE LNDG ROLL. HE HAD DONE AN EXCEPTIONAL JOB OF HANDLING THE ENG FAILURE AND PLTING THE ACFT AROUND THE PATTERN AND DURING THE APCH AND LNDG. I WAS ALSO CONCERNED WITH THE CONFUSION OF THE CABIN CREW DUE TO THE PURSER NOT HANDLING THE SIT VERY WELL. SHE WAS VERY UPSET AND WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY COMMUNICATING WITH THE REST OF THE CREW, TO THE EXTENT THAT I HAD TO COM WHAT WASHAPPENING TO THE OTHER FLT ATTENDANT ON THE CREW. UPON OUR VISUAL INSPECTION OF THE ENG AT THE GATE, WE FOUND METAL CHIPS IN THE TAIL PIPE OF THE ENG AND A CHALKY WHITE COATING ON BOTH THE COMPRESSOR AND TURBINE BLADES. WE THEN WERE REASSIGNED TO FLY A TRIP WITH A NEW ACFT. ALL OF OUR PAX AND CREW, EXCEPT THE PURSER, CAME WITH US ON THE SECOND FLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.