Narrative:

I was providing flight instruction to a student preparing for a commercial, multi-engine practical test. I flew with this student at the request of my boss and only had about an hour to work with him, as I was due to leave on a trip around later that day. We began by maneuvering south of the rbv VORTAC between 2000 to 3000 ft AGL. After 10 min of steep turns and simulated loss of power exercises, I asked the student to maneuver directly towards rbv and execute the published approach procedure, which has a holding course reversal on the northeast side of the VOR. At the time, a tfr establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) existed around the ny area. This ADIZ came within 3 NM to the north and northeast of the rbv VOR. Additionally that day, the winds aloft were from the southwest at velocities between 25 to 30 KTS. I intended to use radials from rbv to ensure we remained clear of the ADIZ. During the time the student was maneuvering to establish the aircraft in the holding pattern, it became apparent to me that our HSI was not displaying correct information. To avoid the ADIZ a few miles to the north, I instructed the student to turn south as I estimated our position using outside references. It was then that I saw we were about 2 miles inside the ADIZ north of rbv. After we had exited the ADIZ, I had the student complete the approach west of rbv. I was able to confirm that our HSI was indicating 'on course' with no flags and a good identify when we were actually well off course. After discovering the error in the instrument, I directed the student to return to our airport. At the time, I had not filed an ADIZ flight plan because I did not intend to operate in the ADIZ. The WX was unrestricted visibility with clear skies and strong winds from the southwest. I was monitoring the approach control frequency, but not talking to them. The student was focusing only on the flight instruments. I was very busy with evaluating and critiquing the student's performance, scanning for traffic and ensuring that we were clear of the ADIZ. I was primarily referencing our instruments when we were in the vicinity of the VOR since it was more difficult to use ground references to ensure separation from the airspace. After it became apparent that our HSI was malfunctioning, I realized I might have strayed a few miles into the ADIZ. I believe the contributing factors were: the strong wind from the southwest. My reliance on the HSI to keep us clear of the ADIZ. The malfunctioning HSI. The high workload involved to keep us clear of airspace and traffic while proving instruction. The high workload involved to keep us clear of airspace and traffic while proving instruction. My reluctance to file an ADIZ flight plan since I was only intending to maneuver near the airspace, not in it. In hindsight, this would not have been a problem had I filed an ADIZ flight plan and received a discrete transponder code. It would have resulted in a delay, to file and wait for the clearance, but would have prevented the incursion. I also could have asked the assistance of the approach controller to ensure I stayed out of the airspace. In the future, I will go the extra step of filing and flying practice approachs under IFR, even if it means delay and inconveniences to the student.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PA34 INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT ENTERED NY ADIZ WITHOUT CLRNC OR A DISCRETE XPONDER CODE.

Narrative: I WAS PROVIDING FLT INSTRUCTION TO A STUDENT PREPARING FOR A COMMERCIAL, MULTI-ENGINE PRACTICAL TEST. I FLEW WITH THIS STUDENT AT THE REQUEST OF MY BOSS AND ONLY HAD ABOUT AN HOUR TO WORK WITH HIM, AS I WAS DUE TO LEAVE ON A TRIP AROUND LATER THAT DAY. WE BEGAN BY MANEUVERING S OF THE RBV VORTAC BETWEEN 2000 TO 3000 FT AGL. AFTER 10 MIN OF STEEP TURNS AND SIMULATED LOSS OF PWR EXERCISES, I ASKED THE STUDENT TO MANEUVER DIRECTLY TOWARDS RBV AND EXECUTE THE PUBLISHED APCH PROC, WHICH HAS A HOLDING COURSE REVERSAL ON THE NE SIDE OF THE VOR. AT THE TIME, A TFR ESTABLISHING AN AIR DEFENSE IDENTIFICATION ZONE (ADIZ) EXISTED AROUND THE NY AREA. THIS ADIZ CAME WITHIN 3 NM TO THE N AND NE OF THE RBV VOR. ADDITIONALLY THAT DAY, THE WINDS ALOFT WERE FROM THE SW AT VELOCITIES BETWEEN 25 TO 30 KTS. I INTENDED TO USE RADIALS FROM RBV TO ENSURE WE REMAINED CLR OF THE ADIZ. DURING THE TIME THE STUDENT WAS MANEUVERING TO ESTABLISH THE ACFT IN THE HOLDING PATTERN, IT BECAME APPARENT TO ME THAT OUR HSI WAS NOT DISPLAYING CORRECT INFO. TO AVOID THE ADIZ A FEW MILES TO THE N, I INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO TURN S AS I ESTIMATED OUR POSITION USING OUTSIDE REFERENCES. IT WAS THEN THAT I SAW WE WERE ABOUT 2 MILES INSIDE THE ADIZ N OF RBV. AFTER WE HAD EXITED THE ADIZ, I HAD THE STUDENT COMPLETE THE APCH W OF RBV. I WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT OUR HSI WAS INDICATING 'ON COURSE' WITH NO FLAGS AND A GOOD IDENT WHEN WE WERE ACTUALLY WELL OFF COURSE. AFTER DISCOVERING THE ERROR IN THE INSTRUMENT, I DIRECTED THE STUDENT TO RETURN TO OUR ARPT. AT THE TIME, I HAD NOT FILED AN ADIZ FLT PLAN BECAUSE I DID NOT INTEND TO OPERATE IN THE ADIZ. THE WX WAS UNRESTRICTED VISIBILITY WITH CLR SKIES AND STRONG WINDS FROM THE SW. I WAS MONITORING THE APCH CTL FREQUENCY, BUT NOT TALKING TO THEM. THE STUDENT WAS FOCUSING ONLY ON THE FLT INSTRUMENTS. I WAS VERY BUSY WITH EVALUATING AND CRITIQUING THE STUDENT'S PERFORMANCE, SCANNING FOR TFC AND ENSURING THAT WE WERE CLR OF THE ADIZ. I WAS PRIMARILY REFERENCING OUR INSTRUMENTS WHEN WE WERE IN THE VICINITY OF THE VOR SINCE IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO USE GND REFERENCES TO ENSURE SEPARATION FROM THE AIRSPACE. AFTER IT BECAME APPARENT THAT OUR HSI WAS MALFUNCTIONING, I REALIZED I MIGHT HAVE STRAYED A FEW MILES INTO THE ADIZ. I BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: THE STRONG WIND FROM THE SW. MY RELIANCE ON THE HSI TO KEEP US CLR OF THE ADIZ. THE MALFUNCTIONING HSI. THE HIGH WORKLOAD INVOLVED TO KEEP US CLR OF AIRSPACE AND TFC WHILE PROVING INSTRUCTION. THE HIGH WORKLOAD INVOLVED TO KEEP US CLR OF AIRSPACE AND TFC WHILE PROVING INSTRUCTION. MY RELUCTANCE TO FILE AN ADIZ FLT PLAN SINCE I WAS ONLY INTENDING TO MANEUVER NEAR THE AIRSPACE, NOT IN IT. IN HINDSIGHT, THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A PROB HAD I FILED AN ADIZ FLT PLAN AND RECEIVED A DISCRETE XPONDER CODE. IT WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A DELAY, TO FILE AND WAIT FOR THE CLRNC, BUT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE INCURSION. I ALSO COULD HAVE ASKED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE APCH CTLR TO ENSURE I STAYED OUT OF THE AIRSPACE. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL GO THE EXTRA STEP OF FILING AND FLYING PRACTICE APCHS UNDER IFR, EVEN IF IT MEANS DELAY AND INCONVENIENCES TO THE STUDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.