Narrative:

Leg 4 of a 5 leg day. First day for me and the captain. We were enjoying our trip. Descent via rokit STAR into hou for runway 12R. ATIS reported 2900 ft ceiling and 9 mi visibility. Normal descent as per typical hou procedures for runway 12R (high downwind). We were IMC at 6000 ft and expecting a 8-10 mi final. At approximately 6.0 DME from hub VOR, we were given a base turn and descent to 4000 ft, then 2000 ft. I realized we would be high and because of the early turn, deployed speed brake to expedite the descent. The controller stated we would get the airport visually at 2900 ft as we were descending through 3000 ft. The captain told the controller we were still IMC and the controller said he would vector us through the localizer to help us get down. We leveled at 2000 ft and were slowing when we got turned back to the localizer and we acquired the runway visually. We were cleared for the visual and began configuring while switching to tower about 2-3 mi from field at 2000 ft. Configured to flaps 40 degrees, maximum drag and landed. We touched down within the first 1/3 of the runway and braked normally, making the last turnoff. We were configured at 1000 ft, but power and stabilized approach criteria were not met at 500 ft, ie, on speed, spooled and on GS. I should have gone around! With hindsight, we both got slam dunked and were behind the aircraft. The controller said we would get the field at 2900 ft, we barely got it at 2000 ft. When we cleared, the runway tower said approach apologized for the close in vector, high and tight. That has no bearing on my or the captain's screw up. We allowed ourselves to be pushed into a corner by approach and then didn't make a mandatory go around when required. Stupid! Excuses do little good and I won't make any. Both the captain and myself allowed our own judgement (that we would make the landing) to cloud our training to go around. We should have asked for a turnout for a longer final, dropped gear sooner, known that we were going to be tight and gone around sooner. In retrospect, we assumed we would get a longer final and have the field visually (based on the ATIS) a lot sooner. When we got the close in turn, we went into 'do what we have to in order to make it' mode and lost sight of company stabilized approach criteria. I will now keep alert for this when the approach plan in my head doesn't work and go around!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATC SETS UP AN ACR CREW FOR AN UNSTABILIZED APCH TO HOU. THE CREW SECOND GUESSES THEMSELVES AFTER THE FACT REGARDING NON COMPLIANCE WITH THEIR COMPANY STABILIZED APCH POLICY.

Narrative: LEG 4 OF A 5 LEG DAY. FIRST DAY FOR ME AND THE CAPT. WE WERE ENJOYING OUR TRIP. DSCNT VIA ROKIT STAR INTO HOU FOR RWY 12R. ATIS RPTED 2900 FT CEILING AND 9 MI VISIBILITY. NORMAL DSCNT AS PER TYPICAL HOU PROCS FOR RWY 12R (HIGH DOWNWIND). WE WERE IMC AT 6000 FT AND EXPECTING A 8-10 MI FINAL. AT APPROX 6.0 DME FROM HUB VOR, WE WERE GIVEN A BASE TURN AND DSCNT TO 4000 FT, THEN 2000 FT. I REALIZED WE WOULD BE HIGH AND BECAUSE OF THE EARLY TURN, DEPLOYED SPD BRAKE TO EXPEDITE THE DSCNT. THE CTLR STATED WE WOULD GET THE ARPT VISUALLY AT 2900 FT AS WE WERE DSNDING THROUGH 3000 FT. THE CAPT TOLD THE CTLR WE WERE STILL IMC AND THE CTLR SAID HE WOULD VECTOR US THROUGH THE LOC TO HELP US GET DOWN. WE LEVELED AT 2000 FT AND WERE SLOWING WHEN WE GOT TURNED BACK TO THE LOC AND WE ACQUIRED THE RWY VISUALLY. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL AND BEGAN CONFIGURING WHILE SWITCHING TO TWR ABOUT 2-3 MI FROM FIELD AT 2000 FT. CONFIGURED TO FLAPS 40 DEGS, MAX DRAG AND LANDED. WE TOUCHED DOWN WITHIN THE FIRST 1/3 OF THE RWY AND BRAKED NORMALLY, MAKING THE LAST TURNOFF. WE WERE CONFIGURED AT 1000 FT, BUT PWR AND STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA WERE NOT MET AT 500 FT, IE, ON SPD, SPOOLED AND ON GS. I SHOULD HAVE GONE AROUND! WITH HINDSIGHT, WE BOTH GOT SLAM DUNKED AND WERE BEHIND THE ACFT. THE CTLR SAID WE WOULD GET THE FIELD AT 2900 FT, WE BARELY GOT IT AT 2000 FT. WHEN WE CLRED, THE RWY TWR SAID APCH APOLOGIZED FOR THE CLOSE IN VECTOR, HIGH AND TIGHT. THAT HAS NO BEARING ON MY OR THE CAPT'S SCREW UP. WE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO BE PUSHED INTO A CORNER BY APCH AND THEN DIDN'T MAKE A MANDATORY GAR WHEN REQUIRED. STUPID! EXCUSES DO LITTLE GOOD AND I WON'T MAKE ANY. BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF ALLOWED OUR OWN JUDGEMENT (THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE LNDG) TO CLOUD OUR TRAINING TO GO AROUND. WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR A TURNOUT FOR A LONGER FINAL, DROPPED GEAR SOONER, KNOWN THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE TIGHT AND GONE AROUND SOONER. IN RETROSPECT, WE ASSUMED WE WOULD GET A LONGER FINAL AND HAVE THE FIELD VISUALLY (BASED ON THE ATIS) A LOT SOONER. WHEN WE GOT THE CLOSE IN TURN, WE WENT INTO 'DO WHAT WE HAVE TO IN ORDER TO MAKE IT' MODE AND LOST SIGHT OF COMPANY STABILIZED APCH CRITERIA. I WILL NOW KEEP ALERT FOR THIS WHEN THE APCH PLAN IN MY HEAD DOESN'T WORK AND GO AROUND!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.