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Attributes | |
ACN | 580201 |
Time | |
Date | 200304 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sba.airport |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sba.tower |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | M-20 B/C Ranger |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sba.tower |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Flight Phase | landing : go around |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : private pilot : instrument |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 400 flight time type : 170 |
ASRS Report | 580201 |
Person 2 | |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe incursion : runway non adherence : far non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other controllerb other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued advisory |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
I hold a private pilot's license, an instrument rating, and a ground instructor's certificate. I was departing sba for the first leg of the return flight. At the FBO, I called FSS, received a standard briefing, and filed an IFR flight plan. The IFR flight plan was based on a suggested mountain-crossing route received from AOPA prior to the trip. Although conditions were VMC, I was concerned about transitioning the la airspace and crossing the mountains. I felt the IFR flight plan would offer an additional measure of security and assistance. After starting the engine, I checked ATIS and called clearance delivery, then called ground control. I had the commercial chart taxiway diagram for sba, which I had printed out prior to the trip, on my knee board. I told ground that I was not familiar with the airport, and asked him to 'stay with me' throughout taxiing, which he did, directing me to the run-up area for runway 15L. The ground controller was thorough and stayed right on the frequency with me throughout the taxiing to the run-up area. Upon completing the run-up, I thought I needed to continue to taxi to a holding line for the parallel runways. I was expecting a defining change between the txwys and the runways, and did not reconcile the actual environment with the taxiway diagram. I taxied towards the runways looking for additional signs. The hold short line for runway 15L had been repainted recently, and was smaller in scale than what I had been expecting. Although I did see the line, it did not register as a hold short line. As I was taxiing forward, it registered that the line I was looking down on and crossing was the hold short line. I immediately stopped, but most of the plane was already over the hold short line. I called ground to tell them that I had crossed the hold short line. 'Ground: aircraft X' and received a reply 'aircraft X, stop,' which I already had done. I was instructed by ground to contact the tower, and did so, stating that I had crossed the hold short line without a clearance. The tower gave me a phone number to call, I taxied back to the FBO, called the number, and was told that the tower had to call an immediate go around for an incoming plane, which I understand makes this classified as an incursion. This was solely a result of my failure to obey the hold short line. The contributing factors were my distraction by concerns about the impending mountain crossing and the high-density traffic I would be encountering shortly after takeoff. I was mentally focusing too much on the taxiway diagram and looking for the posted signs I was expecting to see, and not paying adequate attention to the markings. I had done all the things I tell my ground school students to do in regards to getting taxiway diagrams prior to the trip, having them oriented correctly on your knee board, and asking ground control for progressive taxi assistance. I have the FAA taxiway signage sheet on my knee board for reference. What I had not done, was to pay adequate attention to the markings, I remember looking at the hold short markings and thinking that they had been repainted recently due to the black backgnd. I should have contacted ground again before leaving the run-up area. A minor contributing factor is my impression that the hold short line at runway 15L appeared to be smaller in scale than I have previously seen. Perhaps it was just my impression. The ground controller was very helpful and did everything I asked. The tower was right on top of her job in seeing the situation and calling for a go around on the incoming aircraft. I know the signs and markings, and I know the rules and regulations. I do not know why the hold short line did not register with me. If someone had asked what the line meant, I could have told them immediately what it was. I allowed myself to focus on what I was expecting to see rather than what was in front of me. I do know that this has caused me to see, recognize and mentally confirm all runway and taxiway markings and signs that I encounter. On the return trip to ny, I found that I was looking at all markings and signs, mentally confirming what they were, and confirming appropriate action. Continuing this should prevent any recurrence, and will be a valuable lesson to use in future ground school classes. The ATC people at sba were very professional and thorough, both before and after this occurred. There was certainly no reason to not contact ground again prior to moving, being uncertain about the signage I should have done so.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: M20C PLT HAS RWY INCURSION AT SBA.
Narrative: I HOLD A PVT PLT'S LICENSE, AN INST RATING, AND A GND INSTRUCTOR'S CERTIFICATE. I WAS DEPARTING SBA FOR THE FIRST LEG OF THE RETURN FLT. AT THE FBO, I CALLED FSS, RECEIVED A STANDARD BRIEFING, AND FILED AN IFR FLT PLAN. THE IFR FLT PLAN WAS BASED ON A SUGGESTED MOUNTAIN-XING RTE RECEIVED FROM AOPA PRIOR TO THE TRIP. ALTHOUGH CONDITIONS WERE VMC, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT TRANSITIONING THE LA AIRSPACE AND XING THE MOUNTAINS. I FELT THE IFR FLT PLAN WOULD OFFER AN ADDITIONAL MEASURE OF SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE. AFTER STARTING THE ENG, I CHKED ATIS AND CALLED CLRNC DELIVERY, THEN CALLED GND CTL. I HAD THE COMMERCIAL CHART TXWY DIAGRAM FOR SBA, WHICH I HAD PRINTED OUT PRIOR TO THE TRIP, ON MY KNEE BOARD. I TOLD GND THAT I WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT, AND ASKED HIM TO 'STAY WITH ME' THROUGHOUT TAXIING, WHICH HE DID, DIRECTING ME TO THE RUN-UP AREA FOR RWY 15L. THE GND CTLR WAS THOROUGH AND STAYED RIGHT ON THE FREQ WITH ME THROUGHOUT THE TAXIING TO THE RUN-UP AREA. UPON COMPLETING THE RUN-UP, I THOUGHT I NEEDED TO CONTINUE TO TAXI TO A HOLDING LINE FOR THE PARALLEL RWYS. I WAS EXPECTING A DEFINING CHANGE BTWN THE TXWYS AND THE RWYS, AND DID NOT RECONCILE THE ACTUAL ENVIRONMENT WITH THE TXWY DIAGRAM. I TAXIED TOWARDS THE RWYS LOOKING FOR ADDITIONAL SIGNS. THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR RWY 15L HAD BEEN REPAINTED RECENTLY, AND WAS SMALLER IN SCALE THAN WHAT I HAD BEEN EXPECTING. ALTHOUGH I DID SEE THE LINE, IT DID NOT REGISTER AS A HOLD SHORT LINE. AS I WAS TAXIING FORWARD, IT REGISTERED THAT THE LINE I WAS LOOKING DOWN ON AND XING WAS THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I IMMEDIATELY STOPPED, BUT MOST OF THE PLANE WAS ALREADY OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE. I CALLED GND TO TELL THEM THAT I HAD CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE. 'GND: ACFT X' AND RECEIVED A REPLY 'ACFT X, STOP,' WHICH I ALREADY HAD DONE. I WAS INSTRUCTED BY GND TO CONTACT THE TWR, AND DID SO, STATING THAT I HAD CROSSED THE HOLD SHORT LINE WITHOUT A CLRNC. THE TWR GAVE ME A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL, I TAXIED BACK TO THE FBO, CALLED THE NUMBER, AND WAS TOLD THAT THE TWR HAD TO CALL AN IMMEDIATE GAR FOR AN INCOMING PLANE, WHICH I UNDERSTAND MAKES THIS CLASSIFIED AS AN INCURSION. THIS WAS SOLELY A RESULT OF MY FAILURE TO OBEY THE HOLD SHORT LINE. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE MY DISTR BY CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPENDING MOUNTAIN XING AND THE HIGH-DENSITY TFC I WOULD BE ENCOUNTERING SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. I WAS MENTALLY FOCUSING TOO MUCH ON THE TXWY DIAGRAM AND LOOKING FOR THE POSTED SIGNS I WAS EXPECTING TO SEE, AND NOT PAYING ADEQUATE ATTN TO THE MARKINGS. I HAD DONE ALL THE THINGS I TELL MY GND SCHOOL STUDENTS TO DO IN REGARDS TO GETTING TXWY DIAGRAMS PRIOR TO THE TRIP, HAVING THEM ORIENTED CORRECTLY ON YOUR KNEE BOARD, AND ASKING GND CTL FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXI ASSISTANCE. I HAVE THE FAA TXWY SIGNAGE SHEET ON MY KNEE BOARD FOR REF. WHAT I HAD NOT DONE, WAS TO PAY ADEQUATE ATTN TO THE MARKINGS, I REMEMBER LOOKING AT THE HOLD SHORT MARKINGS AND THINKING THAT THEY HAD BEEN REPAINTED RECENTLY DUE TO THE BLACK BACKGND. I SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED GND AGAIN BEFORE LEAVING THE RUN-UP AREA. A MINOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE HOLD SHORT LINE AT RWY 15L APPEARED TO BE SMALLER IN SCALE THAN I HAVE PREVIOUSLY SEEN. PERHAPS IT WAS JUST MY IMPRESSION. THE GND CTLR WAS VERY HELPFUL AND DID EVERYTHING I ASKED. THE TWR WAS RIGHT ON TOP OF HER JOB IN SEEING THE SIT AND CALLING FOR A GAR ON THE INCOMING ACFT. I KNOW THE SIGNS AND MARKINGS, AND I KNOW THE RULES AND REGS. I DO NOT KNOW WHY THE HOLD SHORT LINE DID NOT REGISTER WITH ME. IF SOMEONE HAD ASKED WHAT THE LINE MEANT, I COULD HAVE TOLD THEM IMMEDIATELY WHAT IT WAS. I ALLOWED MYSELF TO FOCUS ON WHAT I WAS EXPECTING TO SEE RATHER THAN WHAT WAS IN FRONT OF ME. I DO KNOW THAT THIS HAS CAUSED ME TO SEE, RECOGNIZE AND MENTALLY CONFIRM ALL RWY AND TXWY MARKINGS AND SIGNS THAT I ENCOUNTER. ON THE RETURN TRIP TO NY, I FOUND THAT I WAS LOOKING AT ALL MARKINGS AND SIGNS, MENTALLY CONFIRMING WHAT THEY WERE, AND CONFIRMING APPROPRIATE ACTION. CONTINUING THIS SHOULD PREVENT ANY RECURRENCE, AND WILL BE A VALUABLE LESSON TO USE IN FUTURE GND SCHOOL CLASSES. THE ATC PEOPLE AT SBA WERE VERY PROFESSIONAL AND THOROUGH, BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER THIS OCCURRED. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO REASON TO NOT CONTACT GND AGAIN PRIOR TO MOVING, BEING UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE SIGNAGE I SHOULD HAVE DONE SO.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.