Narrative:

Runway 5L ind was planned for and briefed during the preflight checklist since it was the departure runway on west side and we were going west. Our taxi instructions were to taxi to runway 14. We made a quick determination that we were too heavy to accept runway 14, runway 5R was our next clearance. As we approached the departure end of runway 23 we were reclred to runway 23L. The cockpit was extremely busy trying to get numbers, change the FMS, MCP, check departure plate, see if a 'T' procedure existed, and then do the before takeoff checklist. I did not notice the lack of a green light with challenge of 'flaps' although I responded in the affirmative. As soon as power was added for takeoff the takeoff warning horn sounded. We exited the runway, physically checked flap handle and indicator, speed brake and knew the brakes had been released. All were positioned correctly (or so we thought). The list again did not catch the lack of a green light. Of course a second time the horn went off. This time we were very deliberate and discovered that the leading edge flaps exterior light was not on at the same time we were checking the circuit breakers. The leading edge flap position indicator circuit breaker was not pushed in on the preflight. I can understand not noticing the lack of a green light the first time because of the many changes taking place. I cannot understand how it was missed again. Slow down and do things right when pressured would have been the answer I am sure.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-300 FLT CREW MISSES THE OPEN CIRCUIT BREAKER IN THE COCKPIT FOR THE LEADING EDGE FLAP EXTENDED LIGHT AND SUFFER 2 ACFT CONFIGN WARNINGS ON THE 2 RELATED TKOF ATTEMPTS AT IND, IN.

Narrative: RWY 5L IND WAS PLANNED FOR AND BRIEFED DURING THE PREFLT CHKLIST SINCE IT WAS THE DEP RWY ON W SIDE AND WE WERE GOING W. OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TAXI TO RWY 14. WE MADE A QUICK DETERMINATION THAT WE WERE TOO HVY TO ACCEPT RWY 14, RWY 5R WAS OUR NEXT CLRNC. AS WE APCHED THE DEP END OF RWY 23 WE WERE RECLRED TO RWY 23L. THE COCKPIT WAS EXTREMELY BUSY TRYING TO GET NUMBERS, CHANGE THE FMS, MCP, CHK DEP PLATE, SEE IF A 'T' PROC EXISTED, AND THEN DO THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST. I DID NOT NOTICE THE LACK OF A GREEN LIGHT WITH CHALLENGE OF 'FLAPS' ALTHOUGH I RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. AS SOON AS PWR WAS ADDED FOR TKOF THE TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED. WE EXITED THE RWY, PHYSICALLY CHKED FLAP HANDLE AND INDICATOR, SPD BRAKE AND KNEW THE BRAKES HAD BEEN RELEASED. ALL WERE POSITIONED CORRECTLY (OR SO WE THOUGHT). THE LIST AGAIN DID NOT CATCH THE LACK OF A GREEN LIGHT. OF COURSE A SECOND TIME THE HORN WENT OFF. THIS TIME WE WERE VERY DELIBERATE AND DISCOVERED THAT THE LEADING EDGE FLAPS EXTERIOR LIGHT WAS NOT ON AT THE SAME TIME WE WERE CHKING THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS. THE LEADING EDGE FLAP POS INDICATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS NOT PUSHED IN ON THE PREFLT. I CAN UNDERSTAND NOT NOTICING THE LACK OF A GREEN LIGHT THE FIRST TIME BECAUSE OF THE MANY CHANGES TAKING PLACE. I CANNOT UNDERSTAND HOW IT WAS MISSED AGAIN. SLOW DOWN AND DO THINGS RIGHT WHEN PRESSURED WOULD HAVE BEEN THE ANSWER I AM SURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.