Narrative:

When we taxied out for departure on runway 24 at kix, it was raining hard with winds well in excess of 20 KTS. We waited for a squall line to move off of the airport. This took about 10 mins. After takeoff, at 500 ft, with the first officer flying, the autoplt was engaged with prok, navigation, and FMS airspeed all also engaged. Less than 1 min later, the autoplt kicked offline due to the turbulence. At this time I instructed the first officer to hand fly the airplane. I concentrated on backing him up and watching the radar in order to avoid the areas of heavy rain and thunderstorms. We were in constant moderate turbulence, areas of heavy rain, and in IMC for almost the entire climb. After leveling off at FL290, tokyo control contacted us stating that they were showing us to be 400 ft high on their radar readout. The departure altimeter at kix had been 29.56 inches, and we failed to set 29.92 inches passing through the transition altitude of 14000 ft. We corrected the altimeter settings and descended to FL290. There was no reported conflict, nor was there any reported loss of separation. I feel that the WX was the predominate factor in this incident. It was a distraction as well as an operational hindrance. The first officer was brand new to the MD11 working his second trip. Having to monitor his hand flying of the airplane plus watch the radar and deal with the radios put a big load on me. I gave some thought to taking the airplane and having him do the PNF duties, but I was concerned with adding to the confusion by having him talking on the radio and missing things. New pilots generally have a tough time understanding the japanese controller's english. Looking back on this event, I think I made the right decision having the first officer hand fly the airplane given the conditions. I have no good explanation for not resetting the altimeters, only excuses. As a back-up measure in the future, I plan on being very deliberate in briefing the transition altitude and flight level in both the before takeoff, and prior to descent, phases of flight. I will also make sure that I brief my flying partners on backing each other up with regard to altimeter settings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF WDB FAILED TO SET QNE ON ALTIMETERS WHILE CLBING THROUGH TSTMS AND TURB. ALERTED BY ARTCC AND CORRECTED.

Narrative: WHEN WE TAXIED OUT FOR DEP ON RWY 24 AT KIX, IT WAS RAINING HARD WITH WINDS WELL IN EXCESS OF 20 KTS. WE WAITED FOR A SQUALL LINE TO MOVE OFF OF THE ARPT. THIS TOOK ABOUT 10 MINS. AFTER TKOF, AT 500 FT, WITH THE FO FLYING, THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED WITH PROK, NAV, AND FMS AIRSPD ALL ALSO ENGAGED. LESS THAN 1 MIN LATER, THE AUTOPLT KICKED OFFLINE DUE TO THE TURB. AT THIS TIME I INSTRUCTED THE FO TO HAND FLY THE AIRPLANE. I CONCENTRATED ON BACKING HIM UP AND WATCHING THE RADAR IN ORDER TO AVOID THE AREAS OF HEAVY RAIN AND TSTMS. WE WERE IN CONSTANT MODERATE TURB, AREAS OF HEAVY RAIN, AND IN IMC FOR ALMOST THE ENTIRE CLB. AFTER LEVELING OFF AT FL290, TOKYO CTL CONTACTED US STATING THAT THEY WERE SHOWING US TO BE 400 FT HIGH ON THEIR RADAR READOUT. THE DEP ALTIMETER AT KIX HAD BEEN 29.56 INCHES, AND WE FAILED TO SET 29.92 INCHES PASSING THROUGH THE TRANSITION ALT OF 14000 FT. WE CORRECTED THE ALTIMETER SETTINGS AND DSNDED TO FL290. THERE WAS NO RPTED CONFLICT, NOR WAS THERE ANY RPTED LOSS OF SEPARATION. I FEEL THAT THE WX WAS THE PREDOMINATE FACTOR IN THIS INCIDENT. IT WAS A DISTR AS WELL AS AN OPERATIONAL HINDRANCE. THE FO WAS BRAND NEW TO THE MD11 WORKING HIS SECOND TRIP. HAVING TO MONITOR HIS HAND FLYING OF THE AIRPLANE PLUS WATCH THE RADAR AND DEAL WITH THE RADIOS PUT A BIG LOAD ON ME. I GAVE SOME THOUGHT TO TAKING THE AIRPLANE AND HAVING HIM DO THE PNF DUTIES, BUT I WAS CONCERNED WITH ADDING TO THE CONFUSION BY HAVING HIM TALKING ON THE RADIO AND MISSING THINGS. NEW PLTS GENERALLY HAVE A TOUGH TIME UNDERSTANDING THE JAPANESE CTLR'S ENGLISH. LOOKING BACK ON THIS EVENT, I THINK I MADE THE RIGHT DECISION HAVING THE FO HAND FLY THE AIRPLANE GIVEN THE CONDITIONS. I HAVE NO GOOD EXPLANATION FOR NOT RESETTING THE ALTIMETERS, ONLY EXCUSES. AS A BACK-UP MEASURE IN THE FUTURE, I PLAN ON BEING VERY DELIBERATE IN BRIEFING THE TRANSITION ALT AND FLT LEVEL IN BOTH THE BEFORE TKOF, AND PRIOR TO DSCNT, PHASES OF FLT. I WILL ALSO MAKE SURE THAT I BRIEF MY FLYING PARTNERS ON BACKING EACH OTHER UP WITH REGARD TO ALTIMETER SETTINGS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.