DHC1 pilot has collision with C172 aircraft while taxiing at bhm.

Attributes
ACN	581461
Time
Date	200305
Day	Sat
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : bhm.airport
State Reference	AL
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	general aviation : personal
Make Model Name	De Havilland Canada Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	ground : taxi
Flight Plan	None
Aircraft 2
Controlling Facilities	tower : bhm.tower
Operator	general aviation : personal
Make Model Name	Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	ground : taxi
Flight Plan	None
Person 1
Affiliation	other
Function	flight crew : single pilot
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 50 flight time total : 3510 flight time type : 30
ASRS Report	581461
Person 2
Function	flight crew : single pilot
Events
Anomaly	conflict : ground critical incursion : taxiway non adherence : clearance non adherence : far
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	none taken : insufficient time
Consequence	faa : reviewed incident with flight crew other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Aircraft #1 landed on runway 24, instructed to do a 180 degree turn on runway, taxi via taxiway F, hold at runway 18. When aircraft #1 taxied off runway 24 at taxiway A5, the tower told aircraft #1 to cross runway 18 and taxi to the ramp. Aircraft #1 did 'south-turn' (tail dragger) and visualized taxiway north and proceeded to the ramp. The pilot thought tower wanted him to cross at taxiway north. At the same time aircraft #2 was taxiing north on taxiway G to taxiway north and was in the blind spot of the chipmunk (aircraft #1). Aircraft #1 saw aircraft #2 a split second before impact, stopped and aircraft #2 trying to taxi north off taxiway north, collided with aircraft #2, causing minor damage to aircraft #2 when aircraft #1's propeller hit l-hand wing of aircraft #2. Aircraft #1 mistakenly used taxiway north to cross runway 18 since it was at entrance of taxiway north when instructed to cross runway 18. Visibility out of tailwheel airplanes is zero looking forward, requiring s-turns. The problem was that aircraft #2 was moving and therefore, stayed in aircraft #1's blind spot. Aircraft #2 failed to keep a look-out and the tower ground controller failed to monitor his traffic and failed to advise either aircraft #1 or #2 of presence of each other. The ATC operations manual should require the ground controller to visually monitor all movements of aircraft approaching or exiting txwys and runways. The one person in the 'best' position to see and avoid this incident was the tower ground controller. He failed to do his job.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DHC1 PLT HAS COLLISION WITH C172 ACFT WHILE TAXIING AT BHM.

Narrative: ACFT #1 LANDED ON RWY 24, INSTRUCTED TO DO A 180 DEG TURN ON RWY, TAXI VIA TXWY F, HOLD AT RWY 18. WHEN ACFT #1 TAXIED OFF RWY 24 AT TXWY A5, THE TWR TOLD ACFT #1 TO CROSS RWY 18 AND TAXI TO THE RAMP. ACFT #1 DID 'S-TURN' (TAIL DRAGGER) AND VISUALIZED TXWY N AND PROCEEDED TO THE RAMP. THE PLT THOUGHT TWR WANTED HIM TO CROSS AT TXWY N. AT THE SAME TIME ACFT #2 WAS TAXIING N ON TXWY G TO TXWY N AND WAS IN THE BLIND SPOT OF THE CHIPMUNK (ACFT #1). ACFT #1 SAW ACFT #2 A SPLIT SECOND BEFORE IMPACT, STOPPED AND ACFT #2 TRYING TO TAXI N OFF TXWY N, COLLIDED WITH ACFT #2, CAUSING MINOR DAMAGE TO ACFT #2 WHEN ACFT #1'S PROP HIT L-HAND WING OF ACFT #2. ACFT #1 MISTAKENLY USED TXWY N TO CROSS RWY 18 SINCE IT WAS AT ENTRANCE OF TXWY N WHEN INSTRUCTED TO CROSS RWY 18. VISIBILITY OUT OF TAILWHEEL AIRPLANES IS ZERO LOOKING FORWARD, REQUIRING S-TURNS. THE PROB WAS THAT ACFT #2 WAS MOVING AND THEREFORE, STAYED IN ACFT #1'S BLIND SPOT. ACFT #2 FAILED TO KEEP A LOOK-OUT AND THE TWR GND CTLR FAILED TO MONITOR HIS TFC AND FAILED TO ADVISE EITHER ACFT #1 OR #2 OF PRESENCE OF EACH OTHER. THE ATC OPS MANUAL SHOULD REQUIRE THE GND CTLR TO VISUALLY MONITOR ALL MOVEMENTS OF ACFT APCHING OR EXITING TXWYS AND RWYS. THE ONE PERSON IN THE 'BEST' POS TO SEE AND AVOID THIS INCIDENT WAS THE TWR GND CTLR. HE FAILED TO DO HIS JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.