Narrative:

I was the PNF into las. While the captain was preoccupied with password, door security, allowing the flight attendant access to the cockpit to bring us some water, I accepted a clearance. The clearance was to cross pgs 85 NM east at FL310. We were at FL350. I put FL310 in the altitude alerter, and since the captain was busy, I also entered the position and altitude in the FMS. At just about that time, the flight attendant closed the door, and I pointed at the altitude alerter and the FMS. I thought the captain responded to my pointing with a nod. We pressed on. A conversation with the flight attendant ensued. A frequency change occurred. Upon initial call-up, I told the new controller company flight number level FL350 to cross 85 NM east of pgs at FL310. The controller responded. Later, the controller asked, did you get a clearance to cross 85 NM east of pgs at FL310? I said yes, at the same time looking at the raw data, realizing that we had just passed 85 NM east of pgs. We make a hasty descent to FL310. The controller said to not worry about it. The captain looked at me with a quizzical look and said this was the first we'd heard of it. The contributing factors were: the distraction of a flight attendant and cockpit door entrance procedure. Me, not following the fom in requiring a verbal response from the PF and me not following fom in having the PF entering the restr. Had I done either, the appropriate and expected company way, the chain of confusion would not have occurred. I take responsibility for this event. I did not get a verbal response from the captain, and I entered the information in the FMS thinking the descent prompt would suffice in case my communication hadn't made it to the captain. The crew got along well, both well rested. Beautiful WX. Extra vigilance is required on my part in communicating and monitoring dscnts, restrs. Supplemental information from acn 582832: besides the obvious breakdown in crew coordination, which directly resulted in this situation, contributing to it was the fact that I could not hear the first officer when he transmitted. I had noted this throughout the flight, but had experienced it before and minimized its impact. I have a sennheiser headset, but the first officer was using the standard cockpit issue. I'm not sure if the problem wasn't in the radio control heads or if it was a problem at all. We fly with so many different control heads, I'm not certain they all perform the same way. Regardless, perhaps I had my volume too low. I really am not sure how I missed the initial ATC call. It doesn't take a lot of focus to let a flight attendant into the cockpit.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW MISSED A XING RESTR WHEN THE CAPT, PF, BECOMES PREOCCUPIED OPENING THE COCKPIT DOOR FOR A FLT ATTENDANT.

Narrative: I WAS THE PNF INTO LAS. WHILE THE CAPT WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH PASSWORD, DOOR SECURITY, ALLOWING THE FLT ATTENDANT ACCESS TO THE COCKPIT TO BRING US SOME WATER, I ACCEPTED A CLRNC. THE CLRNC WAS TO CROSS PGS 85 NM E AT FL310. WE WERE AT FL350. I PUT FL310 IN THE ALT ALERTER, AND SINCE THE CAPT WAS BUSY, I ALSO ENTERED THE POS AND ALT IN THE FMS. AT JUST ABOUT THAT TIME, THE FLT ATTENDANT CLOSED THE DOOR, AND I POINTED AT THE ALT ALERTER AND THE FMS. I THOUGHT THE CAPT RESPONDED TO MY POINTING WITH A NOD. WE PRESSED ON. A CONVERSATION WITH THE FLT ATTENDANT ENSUED. A FREQ CHANGE OCCURRED. UPON INITIAL CALL-UP, I TOLD THE NEW CTLR COMPANY FLT NUMBER LEVEL FL350 TO CROSS 85 NM E OF PGS AT FL310. THE CTLR RESPONDED. LATER, THE CTLR ASKED, DID YOU GET A CLRNC TO CROSS 85 NM E OF PGS AT FL310? I SAID YES, AT THE SAME TIME LOOKING AT THE RAW DATA, REALIZING THAT WE HAD JUST PASSED 85 NM E OF PGS. WE MAKE A HASTY DSCNT TO FL310. THE CTLR SAID TO NOT WORRY ABOUT IT. THE CAPT LOOKED AT ME WITH A QUIZZICAL LOOK AND SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST WE'D HEARD OF IT. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: THE DISTR OF A FLT ATTENDANT AND COCKPIT DOOR ENTRANCE PROC. ME, NOT FOLLOWING THE FOM IN REQUIRING A VERBAL RESPONSE FROM THE PF AND ME NOT FOLLOWING FOM IN HAVING THE PF ENTERING THE RESTR. HAD I DONE EITHER, THE APPROPRIATE AND EXPECTED COMPANY WAY, THE CHAIN OF CONFUSION WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. I TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS EVENT. I DID NOT GET A VERBAL RESPONSE FROM THE CAPT, AND I ENTERED THE INFO IN THE FMS THINKING THE DSCNT PROMPT WOULD SUFFICE IN CASE MY COM HADN'T MADE IT TO THE CAPT. THE CREW GOT ALONG WELL, BOTH WELL RESTED. BEAUTIFUL WX. EXTRA VIGILANCE IS REQUIRED ON MY PART IN COMMUNICATING AND MONITORING DSCNTS, RESTRS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 582832: BESIDES THE OBVIOUS BREAKDOWN IN CREW COORD, WHICH DIRECTLY RESULTED IN THIS SIT, CONTRIBUTING TO IT WAS THE FACT THAT I COULD NOT HEAR THE FO WHEN HE XMITTED. I HAD NOTED THIS THROUGHOUT THE FLT, BUT HAD EXPERIENCED IT BEFORE AND MINIMIZED ITS IMPACT. I HAVE A SENNHEISER HEADSET, BUT THE FO WAS USING THE STANDARD COCKPIT ISSUE. I'M NOT SURE IF THE PROB WASN'T IN THE RADIO CTL HEADS OR IF IT WAS A PROB AT ALL. WE FLY WITH SO MANY DIFFERENT CTL HEADS, I'M NOT CERTAIN THEY ALL PERFORM THE SAME WAY. REGARDLESS, PERHAPS I HAD MY VOLUME TOO LOW. I REALLY AM NOT SURE HOW I MISSED THE INITIAL ATC CALL. IT DOESN'T TAKE A LOT OF FOCUS TO LET A FLT ATTENDANT INTO THE COCKPIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.