Narrative:

I was working the richmond departure sector. I was vectoring a runway 1 departure from sfo around traffic on the north downwind for oak. This was occurring about 6 mi north of sfo. During that time air carrier X departed runway 28, and on initial contact, I issued a climb to 10000 ft. I went back to turning the previously vectored departure on course. As I scanned my traffic I saw an aircraft squawking 1200 sbound along the west coast of the sfo peninsula, outside the B airspace, indicating 2000 ft. Air carrier X was approaching the coastline also at 2000 ft, on a converging course with the VFR traffic. I immediately issued a traffic alert to air carrier X. He didn't answer my initial call, but a few seconds later advised me that he was getting a TCASII RA to climb. I confirmed the validity of that instruction. I advised air carrier X when the traffic was no longer a factor. The pilot of air carrier X was extremely upset and told me that the B747 does not climb well at that particular weight or at that particular temperature. I advised him that the other aircraft was VFR, outside of the B airspace and there was nothing I could do to prevent the other aircraft from being there because I was not talking to him and because he was outside the B airspace in a perfectly legal position. Air carrier X said that he should never have received a departure clearance if there was known traffic in his way. I advised that I did the best I could by issuing the traffic alert. After a brief discussion, I offered to turn the matter over to the supervisor, and air carrier X said he would like me to do that. The flight continued out of my airspace without further incident. I noticed that aircraft X was unusually low as he approached the coastline. He appeared to be level at 2000 ft for at least 2 or 3 mi. I hadn't seen any other aircraft in that position during any of my time that day on position. It is my belief that the crew of air carrier X were sightseeing in the 'gap' west of sfo, unaware of the consequences of his actions. It is interesting to note that the temperature was being reported as 19 degrees C or 66.2 degrees F, hardly what would be considered 'hot.' after the traffic alert and TCASII advisory, air carrier X's rate of climb increased markedly. I believe that this pilot has an unrealistic perspective on the realities of the united states ATC system. I don't believe he understands the concept of VFR flight outside the B airspace, especially in close proximity to a major city or cities. I believe this pilot doesn't understand the concept of class B airspace as it pertains to air carrier aircraft and the fact they should stay in the B airspace. I also believe that this pilot is trying to apply procedures and practices that are the norm in his country to the united states ATC system. This pilot needs to realize that this is the united states, not his foreign country and VFR flight is common and many aircraft choose not to partake of ATC service. Thusly, he can plan his actions based on what everybody else is doing and not just himself. It is unrealistic to expect that either sfo tower or norcal approach would know what a VFR aircraft outside of the B airspace was intending to do. It is unrealistic for any aircraft to expect a totally sterile environment for their flight, especially in the vicinity of a major city. If air carrier X had stayed within the B airspace, the traffic wouldn't have been quite so close. I believe the crew was sightseeing, which needlessly put them and their passenger in unsafe proximity to another aircraft. In the event of an extremely slow climb out, ATC should be advised as soon as practical to allow for planning.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B747 DEPARTING SFO EXPERIENCES A TCASII RA WITH VFR TFC BELOW AND OUTSIDE SFO CLASS B AIRSPACE.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE RICHMOND DEP SECTOR. I WAS VECTORING A RWY 1 DEP FROM SFO AROUND TFC ON THE N DOWNWIND FOR OAK. THIS WAS OCCURRING ABOUT 6 MI N OF SFO. DURING THAT TIME ACR X DEPARTED RWY 28, AND ON INITIAL CONTACT, I ISSUED A CLB TO 10000 FT. I WENT BACK TO TURNING THE PREVIOUSLY VECTORED DEP ON COURSE. AS I SCANNED MY TFC I SAW AN ACFT SQUAWKING 1200 SBOUND ALONG THE W COAST OF THE SFO PENINSULA, OUTSIDE THE B AIRSPACE, INDICATING 2000 FT. ACR X WAS APCHING THE COASTLINE ALSO AT 2000 FT, ON A CONVERGING COURSE WITH THE VFR TFC. I IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A TFC ALERT TO ACR X. HE DIDN'T ANSWER MY INITIAL CALL, BUT A FEW SECONDS LATER ADVISED ME THAT HE WAS GETTING A TCASII RA TO CLB. I CONFIRMED THE VALIDITY OF THAT INSTRUCTION. I ADVISED ACR X WHEN THE TFC WAS NO LONGER A FACTOR. THE PLT OF ACR X WAS EXTREMELY UPSET AND TOLD ME THAT THE B747 DOES NOT CLB WELL AT THAT PARTICULAR WT OR AT THAT PARTICULAR TEMP. I ADVISED HIM THAT THE OTHER ACFT WAS VFR, OUTSIDE OF THE B AIRSPACE AND THERE WAS NOTHING I COULD DO TO PREVENT THE OTHER ACFT FROM BEING THERE BECAUSE I WAS NOT TALKING TO HIM AND BECAUSE HE WAS OUTSIDE THE B AIRSPACE IN A PERFECTLY LEGAL POS. ACR X SAID THAT HE SHOULD NEVER HAVE RECEIVED A DEP CLRNC IF THERE WAS KNOWN TFC IN HIS WAY. I ADVISED THAT I DID THE BEST I COULD BY ISSUING THE TFC ALERT. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION, I OFFERED TO TURN THE MATTER OVER TO THE SUPVR, AND ACR X SAID HE WOULD LIKE ME TO DO THAT. THE FLT CONTINUED OUT OF MY AIRSPACE WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. I NOTICED THAT ACFT X WAS UNUSUALLY LOW AS HE APCHED THE COASTLINE. HE APPEARED TO BE LEVEL AT 2000 FT FOR AT LEAST 2 OR 3 MI. I HADN'T SEEN ANY OTHER ACFT IN THAT POS DURING ANY OF MY TIME THAT DAY ON POS. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THE CREW OF ACR X WERE SIGHTSEEING IN THE 'GAP' W OF SFO, UNAWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS ACTIONS. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT THE TEMP WAS BEING RPTED AS 19 DEGS C OR 66.2 DEGS F, HARDLY WHAT WOULD BE CONSIDERED 'HOT.' AFTER THE TFC ALERT AND TCASII ADVISORY, ACR X'S RATE OF CLB INCREASED MARKEDLY. I BELIEVE THAT THIS PLT HAS AN UNREALISTIC PERSPECTIVE ON THE REALITIES OF THE UNITED STATES ATC SYS. I DON'T BELIEVE HE UNDERSTANDS THE CONCEPT OF VFR FLT OUTSIDE THE B AIRSPACE, ESPECIALLY IN CLOSE PROX TO A MAJOR CITY OR CITIES. I BELIEVE THIS PLT DOESN'T UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF CLASS B AIRSPACE AS IT PERTAINS TO ACR ACFT AND THE FACT THEY SHOULD STAY IN THE B AIRSPACE. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THIS PLT IS TRYING TO APPLY PROCS AND PRACTICES THAT ARE THE NORM IN HIS COUNTRY TO THE UNITED STATES ATC SYS. THIS PLT NEEDS TO REALIZE THAT THIS IS THE UNITED STATES, NOT HIS FOREIGN COUNTRY AND VFR FLT IS COMMON AND MANY ACFT CHOOSE NOT TO PARTAKE OF ATC SVC. THUSLY, HE CAN PLAN HIS ACTIONS BASED ON WHAT EVERYBODY ELSE IS DOING AND NOT JUST HIMSELF. IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT THAT EITHER SFO TWR OR NORCAL APCH WOULD KNOW WHAT A VFR ACFT OUTSIDE OF THE B AIRSPACE WAS INTENDING TO DO. IT IS UNREALISTIC FOR ANY ACFT TO EXPECT A TOTALLY STERILE ENVIRONMENT FOR THEIR FLT, ESPECIALLY IN THE VICINITY OF A MAJOR CITY. IF ACR X HAD STAYED WITHIN THE B AIRSPACE, THE TFC WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN QUITE SO CLOSE. I BELIEVE THE CREW WAS SIGHTSEEING, WHICH NEEDLESSLY PUT THEM AND THEIR PAX IN UNSAFE PROX TO ANOTHER ACFT. IN THE EVENT OF AN EXTREMELY SLOW CLBOUT, ATC SHOULD BE ADVISED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL TO ALLOW FOR PLANNING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.