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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 583973 |
Time | |
Date | 200306 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : sea.airport |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
Make Model Name | SA-227 AC Metro III |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | ground : holding ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : sea.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi landing : roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 220 flight time total : 5280 flight time type : 23600 |
ASRS Report | 583973 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe incursion : runway non adherence : far non adherence : clearance non adherence : company policies |
Independent Detector | other controllera other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
After landing on runway 34L at seattle tacoma international, we taxied off onto taxiway F and were instructed to hold short of runway 34R. Our call sign was xxxaea. Shortly the controller called with the following instruction: 'yyyaea cross runway 34R without delay.' hearing the number 'aea,' I started the roll. The first officer verified that the crossing instruction was for us. The tower then instructed us to hold short: 'xxxaea hold short of runway 34R.' I stopped immediately but had passed the hold short lines by about 20 ft but was still far from the runway edge lines. The tower did not say anything else. An airliner landed on runway 34R, stopped well short of our intersection, and cleared the runway. We were then instructed to cross runway 34R. The primary cause for this incident was the controller calling us YYY instead of XXX. I did not hear any YYY flight with the same call sign while on the approach. If the first officer had not verified the instruction we would have crossed the runway before the airliner landed. However the best course of action, which would certainly have avoided this incident, would have been to verify the crossing instruction before starting the crossing of runway 34R.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLT CREW OF SA227, CONFUSED BY ATCT LCL CTLR'S IDENT OF THEIR FLT NUMBER INCURRED ON RWY 34R AT SEA WHEN 1 PLT MISTOOK THE CLRNC TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO ANOTHER ACFT.
Narrative: AFTER LNDG ON RWY 34L AT SEATTLE TACOMA INTL, WE TAXIED OFF ONTO TXWY F AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 34R. OUR CALL SIGN WAS XXXAEA. SHORTLY THE CTLR CALLED WITH THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTION: 'YYYAEA CROSS RWY 34R WITHOUT DELAY.' HEARING THE NUMBER 'AEA,' I STARTED THE ROLL. THE FO VERIFIED THAT THE XING INSTRUCTION WAS FOR US. THE TWR THEN INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD SHORT: 'XXXAEA HOLD SHORT OF RWY 34R.' I STOPPED IMMEDIATELY BUT HAD PASSED THE HOLD SHORT LINES BY ABOUT 20 FT BUT WAS STILL FAR FROM THE RWY EDGE LINES. THE TWR DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ELSE. AN AIRLINER LANDED ON RWY 34R, STOPPED WELL SHORT OF OUR INTXN, AND CLRED THE RWY. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO CROSS RWY 34R. THE PRIMARY CAUSE FOR THIS INCIDENT WAS THE CTLR CALLING US YYY INSTEAD OF XXX. I DID NOT HEAR ANY YYY FLT WITH THE SAME CALL SIGN WHILE ON THE APCH. IF THE FO HAD NOT VERIFIED THE INSTRUCTION WE WOULD HAVE CROSSED THE RWY BEFORE THE AIRLINER LANDED. HOWEVER THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION, WHICH WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE AVOIDED THIS INCIDENT, WOULD HAVE BEEN TO VERIFY THE XING INSTRUCTION BEFORE STARTING THE XING OF RWY 34R.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.