Narrative:

While conducting a charter flight from owensboro, ky (owb), to pittsburgh, PA (pit), we were receiving vectors for the ILS runway 28L. The WX was 800 ft overcast, and the first officer was flying. The approach controller gave us a vector to intercept the localizer runway 28L, cleared us for the approach and instructed us to contact tower once established. I preselected the tower frequency on the standby window of the #1 radio. The vector to intercept was not very good and put us above the GS when the localizer was captured. The first officer did not know how to capture the GS from above using the autoplt and disconnected the autoplt to hand fly the ILS. I did not like that decision and instructed him to re-engage the autoplt and gave him instructions on how to capture the GS. The GS was captured, but the aircraft was not configured for landing. I prompted the first officer to stabilize the aircraft and to configure it for the approach and landing. This was accomplished at around 1000 ft AGL. The visible nervousness of the first officer and his questionable ability to handle the aircraft prompted me to pay additional attention to his performance. In addition to follow the proper procedures for an ILS in IMC. When the runway was in sight, I immediately called it. The first officer disconnected the autoplt and continued the approach struggling to keep the aircraft stabilized, culminating with a mediocre crosswind landing. While exiting the runway and while on control of the aircraft, I realized that during all of this confusion, I forgot to call the tower and landed without a clearance to land. I informed the first officer of my mistake, called the tower and got instructions to call ground. The ground controller gave us instructions to go to the main terminal. Since we had told him we were going to the FBO, we initiated taxi in that direction. The controller told us we were going the wrong way and questioned our intentions. The taxi clearance was amended to the FBO, however, we missed 1 taxiway along the way. Several factors contributed to the problem: captain fatigue, since I was awakened at XD30 on the 4TH day of an XA00 to XN00 reserve window. First officer inexperience. A bad vector for the ILS, which put us above the GS making it difficult to correct the situation. A situation like this can be easily corrected since there are established procedures and protocols for this. They just have to be properly followed by the crew and by ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CL65 FLT CREW LANDS WITHOUT CLRNC AT PIT.

Narrative: WHILE CONDUCTING A CHARTER FLT FROM OWENSBORO, KY (OWB), TO PITTSBURGH, PA (PIT), WE WERE RECEIVING VECTORS FOR THE ILS RWY 28L. THE WX WAS 800 FT OVCST, AND THE FO WAS FLYING. THE APCH CTLR GAVE US A VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE LOC RWY 28L, CLRED US FOR THE APCH AND INSTRUCTED US TO CONTACT TWR ONCE ESTABLISHED. I PRESELECTED THE TWR FREQ ON THE STANDBY WINDOW OF THE #1 RADIO. THE VECTOR TO INTERCEPT WAS NOT VERY GOOD AND PUT US ABOVE THE GS WHEN THE LOC WAS CAPTURED. THE FO DID NOT KNOW HOW TO CAPTURE THE GS FROM ABOVE USING THE AUTOPLT AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT TO HAND FLY THE ILS. I DID NOT LIKE THAT DECISION AND INSTRUCTED HIM TO RE-ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT AND GAVE HIM INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO CAPTURE THE GS. THE GS WAS CAPTURED, BUT THE ACFT WAS NOT CONFIGURED FOR LNDG. I PROMPTED THE FO TO STABILIZE THE ACFT AND TO CONFIGURE IT FOR THE APCH AND LNDG. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED AT AROUND 1000 FT AGL. THE VISIBLE NERVOUSNESS OF THE FO AND HIS QUESTIONABLE ABILITY TO HANDLE THE ACFT PROMPTED ME TO PAY ADDITIONAL ATTN TO HIS PERFORMANCE. IN ADDITION TO FOLLOW THE PROPER PROCS FOR AN ILS IN IMC. WHEN THE RWY WAS IN SIGHT, I IMMEDIATELY CALLED IT. THE FO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND CONTINUED THE APCH STRUGGLING TO KEEP THE ACFT STABILIZED, CULMINATING WITH A MEDIOCRE XWIND LNDG. WHILE EXITING THE RWY AND WHILE ON CTL OF THE ACFT, I REALIZED THAT DURING ALL OF THIS CONFUSION, I FORGOT TO CALL THE TWR AND LANDED WITHOUT A CLRNC TO LAND. I INFORMED THE FO OF MY MISTAKE, CALLED THE TWR AND GOT INSTRUCTIONS TO CALL GND. THE GND CTLR GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO THE MAIN TERMINAL. SINCE WE HAD TOLD HIM WE WERE GOING TO THE FBO, WE INITIATED TAXI IN THAT DIRECTION. THE CTLR TOLD US WE WERE GOING THE WRONG WAY AND QUESTIONED OUR INTENTIONS. THE TAXI CLRNC WAS AMENDED TO THE FBO, HOWEVER, WE MISSED 1 TXWY ALONG THE WAY. SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROB: CAPT FATIGUE, SINCE I WAS AWAKENED AT XD30 ON THE 4TH DAY OF AN XA00 TO XN00 RESERVE WINDOW. FO INEXPERIENCE. A BAD VECTOR FOR THE ILS, WHICH PUT US ABOVE THE GS MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO CORRECT THE SIT. A SIT LIKE THIS CAN BE EASILY CORRECTED SINCE THERE ARE ESTABLISHED PROCS AND PROTOCOLS FOR THIS. THEY JUST HAVE TO BE PROPERLY FOLLOWED BY THE CREW AND BY ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.