Narrative:

Although I had we heard about difficult departures out of sna, I thought we were well prepared for the task at hand. This was my second time in sna and first ever takeoff from there. The last time I was there, I deadheaded back so I missed my opportunity to experience runway 19 departure out of sna. After the thorough briefing, I applied maximum takeoff power. Initial engine scan looked normal and power was set exactly at target EPR. I had no reason to suspect autothrottle may not engage on climb out. Due to lack of pressurization, resulting in louder than normal cockpit environment, I did not hear captain mentioning 'no throttle hold.' I thought I heard normal 80 KT callout. At this point, I was concentrating on flying departure and maintaining vref +15 KTS. By the time I realized the anticipated big power reduction did not happen, we were heading 175 degrees and already passed 1 DME mark, still at full throttle. Captain immediately pulled throttle back and recycled autothrottle switch, at which time climb 2 power was restored. I feel that we may have triggered noise sensor near 1 DME mark since power reduction did not happen at that point. We both felt really bad about what happened, since our company may be facing fine or other forms of penalty. I am a relatively new first officer on the B757 and this was a humbling experience for me to say the least. The whole thing happened very fast and clearly I was not ahead of the aircraft as I should have been. Although our ground track and altitude was right on target, I shouldn't have trusted autothrottle completely to bring the throttle back. I did learn a good lesson and I will be better prepared for that departure, autothrottle or not. Supplemental information from acn 585438: at 80 KTS, 'throttle hold' did not display, which I announced as 'no throttle hold' at 854 ft, climb power was called for. Shortly thereafter, I was beginning to restore the bleeds during which time the 1 DME fix came up for the turn to 175 degrees. At that point, I noticed that the copilot had not reduced his power yet and I pulled it back. Because of the delay in power reduction, I feel that we may have triggered a noise violation. I believe that the inbound leg is much easier to stay ahead of than the takeoff and departure segments. For crew members new to sna, the more experienced pilot should fly the departure. I hate to take lndgs or takeoffs like this away from first officer's, but to preserve our operation, maybe it should be considered a necessity until greater experienced is obtained through observation.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DEP B757 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES A PROB WITH THEIR AUTOTHROTTLE SYS AND MAY HAVE VIOLATED THE SOUND ABATEMENT PROC WHEN DEPARTING RWY 19R AT SNA, CA.

Narrative: ALTHOUGH I HAD WE HEARD ABOUT DIFFICULT DEPS OUT OF SNA, I THOUGHT WE WERE WELL PREPARED FOR THE TASK AT HAND. THIS WAS MY SECOND TIME IN SNA AND FIRST EVER TKOF FROM THERE. THE LAST TIME I WAS THERE, I DEADHEADED BACK SO I MISSED MY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPERIENCE RWY 19 DEP OUT OF SNA. AFTER THE THOROUGH BRIEFING, I APPLIED MAX TKOF PWR. INITIAL ENG SCAN LOOKED NORMAL AND PWR WAS SET EXACTLY AT TARGET EPR. I HAD NO REASON TO SUSPECT AUTOTHROTTLE MAY NOT ENGAGE ON CLBOUT. DUE TO LACK OF PRESSURIZATION, RESULTING IN LOUDER THAN NORMAL COCKPIT ENVIRONMENT, I DID NOT HEAR CAPT MENTIONING 'NO THROTTLE HOLD.' I THOUGHT I HEARD NORMAL 80 KT CALLOUT. AT THIS POINT, I WAS CONCENTRATING ON FLYING DEP AND MAINTAINING VREF +15 KTS. BY THE TIME I REALIZED THE ANTICIPATED BIG PWR REDUCTION DID NOT HAPPEN, WE WERE HEADING 175 DEGS AND ALREADY PASSED 1 DME MARK, STILL AT FULL THROTTLE. CAPT IMMEDIATELY PULLED THROTTLE BACK AND RECYCLED AUTOTHROTTLE SWITCH, AT WHICH TIME CLB 2 PWR WAS RESTORED. I FEEL THAT WE MAY HAVE TRIGGERED NOISE SENSOR NEAR 1 DME MARK SINCE PWR REDUCTION DID NOT HAPPEN AT THAT POINT. WE BOTH FELT REALLY BAD ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED, SINCE OUR COMPANY MAY BE FACING FINE OR OTHER FORMS OF PENALTY. I AM A RELATIVELY NEW FO ON THE B757 AND THIS WAS A HUMBLING EXPERIENCE FOR ME TO SAY THE LEAST. THE WHOLE THING HAPPENED VERY FAST AND CLRLY I WAS NOT AHEAD OF THE ACFT AS I SHOULD HAVE BEEN. ALTHOUGH OUR GND TRACK AND ALT WAS RIGHT ON TARGET, I SHOULDN'T HAVE TRUSTED AUTOTHROTTLE COMPLETELY TO BRING THE THROTTLE BACK. I DID LEARN A GOOD LESSON AND I WILL BE BETTER PREPARED FOR THAT DEP, AUTOTHROTTLE OR NOT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 585438: AT 80 KTS, 'THROTTLE HOLD' DID NOT DISPLAY, WHICH I ANNOUNCED AS 'NO THROTTLE HOLD' AT 854 FT, CLB PWR WAS CALLED FOR. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, I WAS BEGINNING TO RESTORE THE BLEEDS DURING WHICH TIME THE 1 DME FIX CAME UP FOR THE TURN TO 175 DEGS. AT THAT POINT, I NOTICED THAT THE COPLT HAD NOT REDUCED HIS PWR YET AND I PULLED IT BACK. BECAUSE OF THE DELAY IN PWR REDUCTION, I FEEL THAT WE MAY HAVE TRIGGERED A NOISE VIOLATION. I BELIEVE THAT THE INBOUND LEG IS MUCH EASIER TO STAY AHEAD OF THAN THE TKOF AND DEP SEGMENTS. FOR CREW MEMBERS NEW TO SNA, THE MORE EXPERIENCED PLT SHOULD FLY THE DEP. I HATE TO TAKE LNDGS OR TKOFS LIKE THIS AWAY FROM FO'S, BUT TO PRESERVE OUR OP, MAYBE IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A NECESSITY UNTIL GREATER EXPERIENCED IS OBTAINED THROUGH OBSERVATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.