Narrative:

On jun/fri/03 at approximately XA30 hours, I was flying in a PA-28-161. I was flying with a certificated private pilot. I was a passenger on board a pleasure flight. The pilot and I are longtime friends, and I was accompanying him after he invited me to join him on a local flight. He was flying in the traffic pattern at the time of this occurrence, practicing his crosswind takeoffs and lndgs. After the second landing, he taxied the aircraft off runway and onto taxiway. After coming to a full stop, we were signaled to by bystanders that were in the area, that there was something wrong with our aircraft. My friend shut down the engine and we exited the plane. We were then notified by the persons that there was a problem with the right main landing gear. I looked at the gear and noticed the problem, and moved the plane to an empty tie-down spot several feet away. I then notified a mechanic that there was a problem with the landing gear. The mechanic then made the following statement: 'that wouldn't happen to be the right main landing gear would it?' I told him that it was, and he implied that he had noticed problems with the screws that were holding it in place previously. The mechanic then inspected the aircraft and said that the screws holding the landing gear in place had come loose, thus causing the gear to become unattached. I researched NTSB 830.5 and felt that this was not a situation that required an immediate notification as prescribed in the section. I based this reasoning due to the minor damage that was sustained to the aircraft, the fact that it appears the landing gear screws were not properly attached, and based on the language of NTSB 830.2 (definitions) clearly stating that this did not fit the criteria for 'substantial damage.' NTSB 830.2 clearly states that 'bent fairings or cowling, dented skin, small puncture holes in the skin or fabric, ground damage to rotor or propeller blades, and damage to landing gear, wheels, tires, flaps, engine accessories, brakes, or wingtips are not considered 'substantial damage' for the purpose of this part.' thus, I understood that this occurrence did not require immediate notification as outlined under NTSB 830.5. The mechanic also told me that he believed that this did not require a major repair. He said that he believed that it needed 8 new screws and a small section of skin repaired, which he said that he could do in his shop in a very short amount of time. I told the mechanic that I was concerned, and that a notification should be made to both the NTSB and the FAA, regardless. He told me that he agreed, and that he would make the appropriate notifications, and that he would call the assistant chief flight instructor immediately and advise him of the situation. The mechanic secured the aircraft with a jack under the right wing to prevent further damage, as it appeared that the condition was worsening with the weight of the aircraft sitting on the unsupported strut. Prior to the flight, my friend and I conducted a thorough preflight inspection and determined that the plane was in a safe condition for flight, complied with type design, and that all inspections had been complied with. Both of the lndgs that he made were not hard. They were aligned with the runway centerline, and at appropriate touchdown speeds. The aircraft was controllable after both lndgs, and there was not indication of any problem while landing, taxiing, turning, or stopping. My friend was the sole manipulator of the controls at all times during the flight and the pilot in command. It should also be mentioned that I have numerous digital photographs of the aircraft that may be used to further assist with this investigation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PIPER PA-28 WAS DISCOVERED BY A PF TO HAVE R MAIN LNDG GEAR FASTENER FAILURE. VERIFIED AS PREVIOUS RPTED DAMAGE.

Narrative: ON JUN/FRI/03 AT APPROX XA30 HRS, I WAS FLYING IN A PA-28-161. I WAS FLYING WITH A CERTIFICATED PVT PLT. I WAS A PAX ON BOARD A PLEASURE FLT. THE PLT AND I ARE LONGTIME FRIENDS, AND I WAS ACCOMPANYING HIM AFTER HE INVITED ME TO JOIN HIM ON A LOCAL FLT. HE WAS FLYING IN THE TFC PATTERN AT THE TIME OF THIS OCCURRENCE, PRACTICING HIS XWIND TKOFS AND LNDGS. AFTER THE SECOND LNDG, HE TAXIED THE ACFT OFF RWY AND ONTO TXWY. AFTER COMING TO A FULL STOP, WE WERE SIGNALED TO BY BYSTANDERS THAT WERE IN THE AREA, THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING WRONG WITH OUR ACFT. MY FRIEND SHUT DOWN THE ENG AND WE EXITED THE PLANE. WE WERE THEN NOTIFIED BY THE PERSONS THAT THERE WAS A PROB WITH THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR. I LOOKED AT THE GEAR AND NOTICED THE PROB, AND MOVED THE PLANE TO AN EMPTY TIE-DOWN SPOT SEVERAL FEET AWAY. I THEN NOTIFIED A MECH THAT THERE WAS A PROB WITH THE LNDG GEAR. THE MECH THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: 'THAT WOULDN'T HAPPEN TO BE THE R MAIN LNDG GEAR WOULD IT?' I TOLD HIM THAT IT WAS, AND HE IMPLIED THAT HE HAD NOTICED PROBS WITH THE SCREWS THAT WERE HOLDING IT IN PLACE PREVIOUSLY. THE MECH THEN INSPECTED THE ACFT AND SAID THAT THE SCREWS HOLDING THE LNDG GEAR IN PLACE HAD COME LOOSE, THUS CAUSING THE GEAR TO BECOME UNATTACHED. I RESEARCHED NTSB 830.5 AND FELT THAT THIS WAS NOT A SIT THAT REQUIRED AN IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AS PRESCRIBED IN THE SECTION. I BASED THIS REASONING DUE TO THE MINOR DAMAGE THAT WAS SUSTAINED TO THE ACFT, THE FACT THAT IT APPEARS THE LNDG GEAR SCREWS WERE NOT PROPERLY ATTACHED, AND BASED ON THE LANGUAGE OF NTSB 830.2 (DEFINITIONS) CLEARLY STATING THAT THIS DID NOT FIT THE CRITERIA FOR 'SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE.' NTSB 830.2 CLRLY STATES THAT 'BENT FAIRINGS OR COWLING, DENTED SKIN, SMALL PUNCTURE HOLES IN THE SKIN OR FABRIC, GND DAMAGE TO ROTOR OR PROP BLADES, AND DAMAGE TO LNDG GEAR, WHEELS, TIRES, FLAPS, ENG ACCESSORIES, BRAKES, OR WINGTIPS ARE NOT CONSIDERED 'SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE' FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS PART.' THUS, I UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS OCCURRENCE DID NOT REQUIRE IMMEDIATE NOTIFICATION AS OUTLINED UNDER NTSB 830.5. THE MECH ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THIS DID NOT REQUIRE A MAJOR REPAIR. HE SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT IT NEEDED 8 NEW SCREWS AND A SMALL SECTION OF SKIN REPAIRED, WHICH HE SAID THAT HE COULD DO IN HIS SHOP IN A VERY SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME. I TOLD THE MECH THAT I WAS CONCERNED, AND THAT A NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE MADE TO BOTH THE NTSB AND THE FAA, REGARDLESS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE AGREED, AND THAT HE WOULD MAKE THE APPROPRIATE NOTIFICATIONS, AND THAT HE WOULD CALL THE ASSISTANT CHIEF FLT INSTRUCTOR IMMEDIATELY AND ADVISE HIM OF THE SIT. THE MECH SECURED THE ACFT WITH A JACK UNDER THE R WING TO PREVENT FURTHER DAMAGE, AS IT APPEARED THAT THE CONDITION WAS WORSENING WITH THE WT OF THE ACFT SITTING ON THE UNSUPPORTED STRUT. PRIOR TO THE FLT, MY FRIEND AND I CONDUCTED A THOROUGH PREFLT INSPECTION AND DETERMINED THAT THE PLANE WAS IN A SAFE CONDITION FOR FLT, COMPLIED WITH TYPE DESIGN, AND THAT ALL INSPECTIONS HAD BEEN COMPLIED WITH. BOTH OF THE LNDGS THAT HE MADE WERE NOT HARD. THEY WERE ALIGNED WITH THE RWY CTRLINE, AND AT APPROPRIATE TOUCHDOWN SPDS. THE ACFT WAS CONTROLLABLE AFTER BOTH LNDGS, AND THERE WAS NOT INDICATION OF ANY PROB WHILE LNDG, TAXIING, TURNING, OR STOPPING. MY FRIEND WAS THE SOLE MANIPULATOR OF THE CTLS AT ALL TIMES DURING THE FLT AND THE PLT IN COMMAND. IT SHOULD ALSO BE MENTIONED THAT I HAVE NUMEROUS DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE ACFT THAT MAY BE USED TO FURTHER ASSIST WITH THIS INVESTIGATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.