Narrative:

The purpose of this is to document a 4 hour 20 min delay of air carrier X in tampa, florida on jun/sat/03, due to an apparent discrepancy in the placarded weight limits of the aft left overhead bin aircraft X discovered by FAA aviation safety inspector. The inspector boarded my aircraft in atlanta on flight from atlanta to tampa. His desire had been to situation in the cabin in order to inspect cabin/flight attendant procedures. He elected to situation on the cockpit jumpseat, since all cabin seats were occupied. The flight was completed without incident. After passenger had deplaned in tampa, mr X inspected the cabin. He discovered what he perceived to be a discrepancy in the placarded weight limits of the aft left overhead bin. The aft right bin had two 64 pound placards in the interior of each half of the bin. The bin immediately forward had two 87 pound placards. The corresponding bin on the left side of the aircraft also had the 87 pound placards. The aft left bin was configured differently than any other bin, due presumably to a small emergency equipment compartment located on the left side of the bin. There were 3 placards in the bin: one 35 pound placard located in the emergency equipment compartment, one 29 pound placard immediately forward of the compartment and one 64 pound placard located in the right half of the bin. Mr X asked tampa maintenance to verify that the bin was properly placarded. While maintenance was checking their online manuals, I pointed out to mr X that the two left placards added up to 64 pounds. I suggested to him that their respective placement was designed to account for the division of the left half of the bin into two compartments. He agreed with me that this could very well be the case. However, he pointed out that maintenance should have the documentation to verify whether or not this was true. Otherwise, how could one ever properly replace a frayed or removed placard? The online manuals did have several diagrams depicting various bin configns. Unfortunately, maintenance could find the diagram that corresponded to the confign that existed on aircraft X. The MEL explicity stated that the bin could not be secured per the MEL, since it contained emergency equipment. At no time did mr X indicate that we could not dispatch the aircraft. He stated that his role was to point out the potential discrepancy, not validate any particular course of action. Implicit in his statement, however, was that whatever course of action was taken would be subsequently reviewed. The maintenance coordinator suggested that maintenance utilize the flow diagram depicted in manual, and consider whether this affected 'airworthiness, or (was) considered emergency equipment,' thus perhaps negating the requirement for a defferred note. Given mr X's (implied) assertion of postflt review, the lead mechanic was not comfortable pursing this course of action. I concurred (and still do concur) with the lead's conclusion. It was determined during a subsequent phone discussion between the lead and mx shift manager that the 'best' way out of the predicament was to leave the placards as is, but add a temporary 64 pound placard to be placed in the left half of the bin. Appropriate logbook entry and defferred note were initiated. As an added precaution, I instructed my lead flight attendant to ensure that the bin remained empty. The emergency equipment within the bin remained fully accessible at all time. Flight X pushed back 4 hours 20 mins late with 100 passenger. The flight had been completely full.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B-767 INSPECTOR, COMMUTING TO WORK, FOUND INCONSISTENT CARGO BIN LOADING PLACARDS THAT THE ACR WAS UNABLE TO DOCUMENT.

Narrative: THE PURPOSE OF THIS IS TO DOCUMENT A 4 HR 20 MIN DELAY OF ACR X IN TAMPA, FLORIDA ON JUN/SAT/03, DUE TO AN APPARENT DISCREPANCY IN THE PLACARDED WT LIMITS OF THE AFT L OVERHEAD BIN ACFT X DISCOVERED BY FAA AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR. THE INSPECTOR BOARDED MY ACFT IN ATLANTA ON FLT FROM ATLANTA TO TAMPA. HIS DESIRE HAD BEEN TO SIT IN THE CABIN IN ORDER TO INSPECT CABIN/FLT ATTENDANT PROCS. HE ELECTED TO SIT ON THE COCKPIT JUMPSEAT, SINCE ALL CABIN SEATS WERE OCCUPIED. THE FLT WAS COMPLETED WITHOUT INCIDENT. AFTER PAX HAD DEPLANED IN TAMPA, MR X INSPECTED THE CABIN. HE DISCOVERED WHAT HE PERCEIVED TO BE A DISCREPANCY IN THE PLACARDED WT LIMITS OF THE AFT L OVERHEAD BIN. THE AFT R BIN HAD TWO 64 LB PLACARDS IN THE INTERIOR OF EACH HALF OF THE BIN. THE BIN IMMEDIATELY FORWARD HAD TWO 87 LB PLACARDS. THE CORRESPONDING BIN ON THE L SIDE OF THE ACFT ALSO HAD THE 87 LB PLACARDS. THE AFT L BIN WAS CONFIGURED DIFFERENTLY THAN ANY OTHER BIN, DUE PRESUMABLY TO A SMALL EMER EQUIP COMPARTMENT LOCATED ON THE L SIDE OF THE BIN. THERE WERE 3 PLACARDS IN THE BIN: ONE 35 LB PLACARD LOCATED IN THE EMER EQUIP COMPARTMENT, ONE 29 LB PLACARD IMMEDIATELY FORWARD OF THE COMPARTMENT AND ONE 64 LB PLACARD LOCATED IN THE R HALF OF THE BIN. MR X ASKED TAMPA MAINT TO VERIFY THAT THE BIN WAS PROPERLY PLACARDED. WHILE MAINT WAS CHKING THEIR ONLINE MANUALS, I POINTED OUT TO MR X THAT THE TWO L PLACARDS ADDED UP TO 64 LBS. I SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT THEIR RESPECTIVE PLACEMENT WAS DESIGNED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DIVISION OF THE L HALF OF THE BIN INTO TWO COMPARTMENTS. HE AGREED WITH ME THAT THIS COULD VERY WELL BE THE CASE. HOWEVER, HE POINTED OUT THAT MAINT SHOULD HAVE THE DOCUMENTATION TO VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT THIS WAS TRUE. OTHERWISE, HOW COULD ONE EVER PROPERLY REPLACE A FRAYED OR REMOVED PLACARD? THE ONLINE MANUALS DID HAVE SEVERAL DIAGRAMS DEPICTING VARIOUS BIN CONFIGNS. UNFORTUNATELY, MAINT COULD FIND THE DIAGRAM THAT CORRESPONDED TO THE CONFIGN THAT EXISTED ON ACFT X. THE MEL EXPLICITY STATED THAT THE BIN COULD NOT BE SECURED PER THE MEL, SINCE IT CONTAINED EMER EQUIP. AT NO TIME DID MR X INDICATE THAT WE COULD NOT DISPATCH THE ACFT. HE STATED THAT HIS ROLE WAS TO POINT OUT THE POTENTIAL DISCREPANCY, NOT VALIDATE ANY PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION. IMPLICIT IN HIS STATEMENT, HOWEVER, WAS THAT WHATEVER COURSE OF ACTION WAS TAKEN WOULD BE SUBSEQUENTLY REVIEWED. THE MAINT COORDINATOR SUGGESTED THAT MAINT UTILIZE THE FLOW DIAGRAM DEPICTED IN MANUAL, AND CONSIDER WHETHER THIS AFFECTED 'AIRWORTHINESS, OR (WAS) CONSIDERED EMER EQUIP,' THUS PERHAPS NEGATING THE REQUIREMENT FOR A DEFFERRED NOTE. GIVEN MR X'S (IMPLIED) ASSERTION OF POSTFLT REVIEW, THE LEAD MECH WAS NOT COMFORTABLE PURSING THIS COURSE OF ACTION. I CONCURRED (AND STILL DO CONCUR) WITH THE LEAD'S CONCLUSION. IT WAS DETERMINED DURING A SUBSEQUENT PHONE DISCUSSION BTWN THE LEAD AND MX SHIFT MGR THAT THE 'BEST' WAY OUT OF THE PREDICAMENT WAS TO LEAVE THE PLACARDS AS IS, BUT ADD A TEMPORARY 64 LB PLACARD TO BE PLACED IN THE L HALF OF THE BIN. APPROPRIATE LOGBOOK ENTRY AND DEFFERRED NOTE WERE INITIATED. AS AN ADDED PRECAUTION, I INSTRUCTED MY LEAD FLT ATTENDANT TO ENSURE THAT THE BIN REMAINED EMPTY. THE EMER EQUIP WITHIN THE BIN REMAINED FULLY ACCESSIBLE AT ALL TIME. FLT X PUSHED BACK 4 HRS 20 MINS LATE WITH 100 PAX. THE FLT HAD BEEN COMPLETELY FULL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.