An airbus 320 was dispatched in non compliance with #1 spoiler and symmetrical spoiler rendered inop...

Attributes
ACN	587343
Time
Date	200307
Day	Thu
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	A320
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : maintenance
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	maintenance : technician
Qualification	technician : powerplant technician : airframe
Experience	maintenance technician : 8
ASRS Report	587343
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	other personnel other
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : company policies non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	other other
Factors
Maintenance	contributing factor : schedule pressure performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : testing
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Environmental Factor Maintenance Human Performance Aircraft
Primary Problem	Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative:

After consultation with flight crew and maintenance control, proceeded to deactivate #1 spoilers (most inboard on each wing). A special caution to ensure that the spoiler was not left in the maintenance position during deactivation as the spoiler will float in-flight, possible damage to aircraft could result. I deactivated spoilers and stowed electrical plugs, but failed to correctly align the stop on the hex head to the '0' position as specified in amm 27-64-01, page 4, (revision 49) step 10. In retrospect, I should have physically checked the spoilers that were deactivated with hydraulic pressure applied to ensure no 'float' was possible. This extra time would have prevented rework and possible damage to equipment, or more importantly, the potential injury or loss of life to crew/passenger or personnel on the ground on the approach path. An ECAM message was how this problem arose (spoiler #1 inoperative). After my work, on final approach into ZZZ1 flaps lowered from 3 degrees to full, caused vibration. With flaps returned to 3 degrees, vibration reduced, but still present due to spoiler float. ZZZ1 maintenance personnel correctly repositioned hex to '0' position and aircraft was dispatched without further incident. The spoiler test specified in amm and ECAM display in amber met parameters for dispatch. Adding the requirement to physically verify no spoiler movement in addition to text, could prevent recurrence. Although supplied with cmm by maintenance control, perhaps being in a hurry to get the airplane pushed was the greatest causal factor. Time spent (wasted) looking for deactivation tool prior to confirming actuator confign ate up valuable time that would have been better spent double-checking my work. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the electrical plugs on the spoiler actuators were stowed, but the stop on the hex head was not correctly aligned to the '0' position per the MEL procedures. The reporter said I did not pressurize the hydraulics and make an operational check of the spoilers checking for float.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRBUS 320 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH #1 SPOILER AND SYMMETRICAL SPOILER RENDERED INOP PER MEL INCORRECTLY. SPOILERS FLOATED INFLT.

Narrative: AFTER CONSULTATION WITH FLT CREW AND MAINT CTL, PROCEEDED TO DEACTIVATE #1 SPOILERS (MOST INBOARD ON EACH WING). A SPECIAL CAUTION TO ENSURE THAT THE SPOILER WAS NOT LEFT IN THE MAINT POS DURING DEACTIVATION AS THE SPOILER WILL FLOAT INFLT, POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO ACFT COULD RESULT. I DEACTIVATED SPOILERS AND STOWED ELECTRICAL PLUGS, BUT FAILED TO CORRECTLY ALIGN THE STOP ON THE HEX HEAD TO THE '0' POS AS SPECIFIED IN AMM 27-64-01, PAGE 4, (REVISION 49) STEP 10. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE PHYSICALLY CHKED THE SPOILERS THAT WERE DEACTIVATED WITH HYD PRESSURE APPLIED TO ENSURE NO 'FLOAT' WAS POSSIBLE. THIS EXTRA TIME WOULD HAVE PREVENTED REWORK AND POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO EQUIP, OR MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE POTENTIAL INJURY OR LOSS OF LIFE TO CREW/PAX OR PERSONNEL ON THE GND ON THE APCH PATH. AN ECAM MESSAGE WAS HOW THIS PROB AROSE (SPOILER #1 INOP). AFTER MY WORK, ON FINAL APCH INTO ZZZ1 FLAPS LOWERED FROM 3 DEGS TO FULL, CAUSED VIBRATION. WITH FLAPS RETURNED TO 3 DEGS, VIBRATION REDUCED, BUT STILL PRESENT DUE TO SPOILER FLOAT. ZZZ1 MAINT PERSONNEL CORRECTLY REPOSITIONED HEX TO '0' POS AND ACFT WAS DISPATCHED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. THE SPOILER TEST SPECIFIED IN AMM AND ECAM DISPLAY IN AMBER MET PARAMETERS FOR DISPATCH. ADDING THE REQUIREMENT TO PHYSICALLY VERIFY NO SPOILER MOVEMENT IN ADDITION TO TEXT, COULD PREVENT RECURRENCE. ALTHOUGH SUPPLIED WITH CMM BY MAINT CTL, PERHAPS BEING IN A HURRY TO GET THE AIRPLANE PUSHED WAS THE GREATEST CAUSAL FACTOR. TIME SPENT (WASTED) LOOKING FOR DEACTIVATION TOOL PRIOR TO CONFIRMING ACTUATOR CONFIGN ATE UP VALUABLE TIME THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER SPENT DOUBLE-CHKING MY WORK. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE ELECTRICAL PLUGS ON THE SPOILER ACTUATORS WERE STOWED, BUT THE STOP ON THE HEX HEAD WAS NOT CORRECTLY ALIGNED TO THE '0' POS PER THE MEL PROCS. THE RPTR SAID I DID NOT PRESSURIZE THE HYDS AND MAKE AN OPERATIONAL CHK OF THE SPOILERS CHKING FOR FLOAT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

An airbus 320 was dispatched in non compliance with #1 spoiler and symmetrical spoiler rendered inoperative per MEL incorrectly. Spoilers floated in-flight.