Narrative:

Taxied to cle runway 24L for normal 'flex power' takeoff at intersection west. As we approached the hold line we heard radio chatter indicating possible windshear conditions. 2 reports were heard, one indicating a 50 KT shear, another indicating a 20 KT loss west of runway 28. Although tower did not mention any windshear advisory we both agreed that a windshear profile takeoff would be prudent, and told ground that we would now need the full runway length for runway 24L. Ground cleared us to taxi to runway 24L and hold short of the flashing stop bars on runway 28 via what we thought was the standard taxi route and the first officer read back the clearance. As I taxied, the first officer was using the laptop computer and setting the FMS panels to configure for a no flap, maximum power, full length runway, windshear profile takeoff. As I turned left from taxiway J onto taxiway U I felt a bump and commented to the first officer that it felt like we had just fell into a hole. A few seconds later the ground controller informed us that was not the way he had cleared us, that taxiway U was closed, and that we may have taxied over a wooden barricade. While we held short of the active runway our aircraft maintenance personnel were escorted to our position by the airport authority/authorized. They concurred that we had taxied over an unlit wooden barricade. They inspected the tires, wheels, engines, and aircraft general for any damage and reported everything normal and concurred that we were ok to continue the flight. The rest of the flight was uneventful. Crew failures (my opinion): 1) possible misinterp of taxi instructions. At this point, we have not heard a readback of tower tapes or cvr recordings. Both crew members felt that we had taxied in accordance with our taxi instructions. 2) missed noting the closure of taxiway U noted on the printed ATIS obtained by ACARS. 3) captain apparently failed to turn the taxi light back on after initial stop at intersection west. 4) captain's failure to see unlit barricade on taxiway U. Factors (my opinion). 1) both pilots were familiar with the airport. First officer had been flying there all month. Captain had done same trip with same first officer a week prior. 2) txwys J, U, back taxi runway 28 to the flashing stop bars is the standard taxi route and the route used on all previous departures by these crew members including the previous night. 3) airport under construction. Numerous flashing lighted barricades, non standard taxiway markings, and apparently some unlit barricades. 4) night operations. 5) 2 pilot crew. 6) busy ATC controller doing 3 jobs, approach, tower, ground. No remark of closure of taxiway U and unlit barricade. 7) taxiway U had apparently been closed that day or evening. No NOTAMS of closure, but was on last printed ATIS obtained by crew. 8) block out was late, and pre-departure cockpit conversation was mostly concerning maintenance problem and deferral. 9) use of printed ATIS vice listening to verbal ATIS. 10) 'last min' runway/confign change. Supplemental information from acn 589155: as in any incident, there are several contributing factors. The captain and I reviewed WX and NOTAMS prior to departing to the aircraft at cle. We noted no closed txwys although there is construction going on. Upon arrival at the aircraft we performed our usual duties while dealing with a distracting maintenance problem. Upon pushback and engine start, we were cleared to taxi to runway 24L intersection west via txwys J, left, then west. All checklist were run and the captain briefed the taxi route. While waiting at intersection west runway 24L for departure, an aircraft reported a gain of 50 KTS 2 mi west of the field. The captain and I then decided to change our takeoff power from standard to maximum. While doing the new takeoff data on the laptop another report from tower indicated windshear on the field due to an approaching storm. The captain then decided to use full length runway and use windshear procedures. I again pulled out the laptop to recalculate and do a runway change in the FMS. At that time we were cleared by cleveland tower frequency to taxi to runway 24L via txwys J, U, runway 28 hold short runway 24L (we thought). Apparently, taxiway U was closed and barricaded with unlit wooden barricades. While I was 'heads-down' typing on the FMS the captain taxied onto taxiway U and hit the barricades because he didn't see them. He didn'tturn on the taxi light prior to taxi. Cle tower was working 3 frequencys at one time, 1 person. He told us that the clearance was to go to the end of runway 28 via taxiway J and then go to runway 24L. The ATIS said taxiway U was closed but we missed that due to the heavy cockpit distractions going on pre-departure. No damage to aircraft was done. We had maintenance inspect gear and engines prior to takeoff. Human factors: 1) not sure if second taxi clearance and readback the same as the controller acknowledged by readback but he was very busy. 2) 1 controller working clearance, ground, and tower. There was a lot of activity. Captain acknowledged that he knew where to go. 3) not notamed closed -- taxiway U. Crew missed it on the ATIS. 4) unlit barricades on taxiway U. 5) captain and first officer very familiar with airport and taxi rtes. Taxiway U was very often used. This is what the crew expected. 6) first officer heads-down and heavily tasked with data changes, briefing, running checklist, and typing on the FMS while taking the new clearance taxi instructions. New instructions were not briefed, or it was understood the captain knew where to go. The captain said this. 7) controller speaking very rapidly in his clearance. Captain may not have fully understood. 8) taxiway lights were illuminated for taxiway U.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 CREW TAXIED OUT FOR TKOF WITH RPTED 50 KTS AND 20 KTS WINDSHEAR. THEY HIT A WOODEN BARRIER WHEN THEY WERE ON THE WRONG TXWY.

Narrative: TAXIED TO CLE RWY 24L FOR NORMAL 'FLEX PWR' TKOF AT INTXN W. AS WE APCHED THE HOLD LINE WE HEARD RADIO CHATTER INDICATING POSSIBLE WINDSHEAR CONDITIONS. 2 RPTS WERE HEARD, ONE INDICATING A 50 KT SHEAR, ANOTHER INDICATING A 20 KT LOSS W OF RWY 28. ALTHOUGH TWR DID NOT MENTION ANY WINDSHEAR ADVISORY WE BOTH AGREED THAT A WINDSHEAR PROFILE TKOF WOULD BE PRUDENT, AND TOLD GND THAT WE WOULD NOW NEED THE FULL RWY LENGTH FOR RWY 24L. GND CLRED US TO TAXI TO RWY 24L AND HOLD SHORT OF THE FLASHING STOP BARS ON RWY 28 VIA WHAT WE THOUGHT WAS THE STANDARD TAXI RTE AND THE FO READ BACK THE CLRNC. AS I TAXIED, THE FO WAS USING THE LAPTOP COMPUTER AND SETTING THE FMS PANELS TO CONFIGURE FOR A NO FLAP, MAX PWR, FULL LENGTH RWY, WINDSHEAR PROFILE TKOF. AS I TURNED L FROM TXWY J ONTO TXWY U I FELT A BUMP AND COMMENTED TO THE FO THAT IT FELT LIKE WE HAD JUST FELL INTO A HOLE. A FEW SECONDS LATER THE GND CTLR INFORMED US THAT WAS NOT THE WAY HE HAD CLRED US, THAT TXWY U WAS CLOSED, AND THAT WE MAY HAVE TAXIED OVER A WOODEN BARRICADE. WHILE WE HELD SHORT OF THE ACTIVE RWY OUR ACFT MAINT PERSONNEL WERE ESCORTED TO OUR POS BY THE ARPT AUTH. THEY CONCURRED THAT WE HAD TAXIED OVER AN UNLIT WOODEN BARRICADE. THEY INSPECTED THE TIRES, WHEELS, ENGS, AND ACFT GENERAL FOR ANY DAMAGE AND RPTED EVERYTHING NORMAL AND CONCURRED THAT WE WERE OK TO CONTINUE THE FLT. THE REST OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. CREW FAILURES (MY OPINION): 1) POSSIBLE MISINTERP OF TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. AT THIS POINT, WE HAVE NOT HEARD A READBACK OF TWR TAPES OR CVR RECORDINGS. BOTH CREW MEMBERS FELT THAT WE HAD TAXIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. 2) MISSED NOTING THE CLOSURE OF TXWY U NOTED ON THE PRINTED ATIS OBTAINED BY ACARS. 3) CAPT APPARENTLY FAILED TO TURN THE TAXI LIGHT BACK ON AFTER INITIAL STOP AT INTXN W. 4) CAPT'S FAILURE TO SEE UNLIT BARRICADE ON TXWY U. FACTORS (MY OPINION). 1) BOTH PLTS WERE FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT. FO HAD BEEN FLYING THERE ALL MONTH. CAPT HAD DONE SAME TRIP WITH SAME FO A WEEK PRIOR. 2) TXWYS J, U, BACK TAXI RWY 28 TO THE FLASHING STOP BARS IS THE STANDARD TAXI RTE AND THE RTE USED ON ALL PREVIOUS DEPS BY THESE CREW MEMBERS INCLUDING THE PREVIOUS NIGHT. 3) ARPT UNDER CONSTRUCTION. NUMEROUS FLASHING LIGHTED BARRICADES, NON STANDARD TXWY MARKINGS, AND APPARENTLY SOME UNLIT BARRICADES. 4) NIGHT OPS. 5) 2 PLT CREW. 6) BUSY ATC CTLR DOING 3 JOBS, APCH, TWR, GND. NO REMARK OF CLOSURE OF TXWY U AND UNLIT BARRICADE. 7) TXWY U HAD APPARENTLY BEEN CLOSED THAT DAY OR EVENING. NO NOTAMS OF CLOSURE, BUT WAS ON LAST PRINTED ATIS OBTAINED BY CREW. 8) BLOCK OUT WAS LATE, AND PRE-DEP COCKPIT CONVERSATION WAS MOSTLY CONCERNING MAINT PROB AND DEFERRAL. 9) USE OF PRINTED ATIS VICE LISTENING TO VERBAL ATIS. 10) 'LAST MIN' RWY/CONFIGN CHANGE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 589155: AS IN ANY INCIDENT, THERE ARE SEVERAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. THE CAPT AND I REVIEWED WX AND NOTAMS PRIOR TO DEPARTING TO THE ACFT AT CLE. WE NOTED NO CLOSED TXWYS ALTHOUGH THERE IS CONSTRUCTION GOING ON. UPON ARR AT THE ACFT WE PERFORMED OUR USUAL DUTIES WHILE DEALING WITH A DISTRACTING MAINT PROB. UPON PUSHBACK AND ENG START, WE WERE CLRED TO TAXI TO RWY 24L INTXN W VIA TXWYS J, L, THEN W. ALL CHKLIST WERE RUN AND THE CAPT BRIEFED THE TAXI RTE. WHILE WAITING AT INTXN W RWY 24L FOR DEP, AN ACFT RPTED A GAIN OF 50 KTS 2 MI W OF THE FIELD. THE CAPT AND I THEN DECIDED TO CHANGE OUR TKOF PWR FROM STANDARD TO MAX. WHILE DOING THE NEW TKOF DATA ON THE LAPTOP ANOTHER RPT FROM TWR INDICATED WINDSHEAR ON THE FIELD DUE TO AN APCHING STORM. THE CAPT THEN DECIDED TO USE FULL LENGTH RWY AND USE WINDSHEAR PROCS. I AGAIN PULLED OUT THE LAPTOP TO RECALCULATE AND DO A RWY CHANGE IN THE FMS. AT THAT TIME WE WERE CLRED BY CLEVELAND TWR FREQ TO TAXI TO RWY 24L VIA TXWYS J, U, RWY 28 HOLD SHORT RWY 24L (WE THOUGHT). APPARENTLY, TXWY U WAS CLOSED AND BARRICADED WITH UNLIT WOODEN BARRICADES. WHILE I WAS 'HEADS-DOWN' TYPING ON THE FMS THE CAPT TAXIED ONTO TXWY U AND HIT THE BARRICADES BECAUSE HE DIDN'T SEE THEM. HE DIDN'TTURN ON THE TAXI LIGHT PRIOR TO TAXI. CLE TWR WAS WORKING 3 FREQS AT ONE TIME, 1 PERSON. HE TOLD US THAT THE CLRNC WAS TO GO TO THE END OF RWY 28 VIA TXWY J AND THEN GO TO RWY 24L. THE ATIS SAID TXWY U WAS CLOSED BUT WE MISSED THAT DUE TO THE HVY COCKPIT DISTRACTIONS GOING ON PRE-DEP. NO DAMAGE TO ACFT WAS DONE. WE HAD MAINT INSPECT GEAR AND ENGS PRIOR TO TKOF. HUMAN FACTORS: 1) NOT SURE IF SECOND TAXI CLRNC AND READBACK THE SAME AS THE CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED BY READBACK BUT HE WAS VERY BUSY. 2) 1 CTLR WORKING CLRNC, GND, AND TWR. THERE WAS A LOT OF ACTIVITY. CAPT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE KNEW WHERE TO GO. 3) NOT NOTAMED CLOSED -- TXWY U. CREW MISSED IT ON THE ATIS. 4) UNLIT BARRICADES ON TXWY U. 5) CAPT AND FO VERY FAMILIAR WITH ARPT AND TAXI RTES. TXWY U WAS VERY OFTEN USED. THIS IS WHAT THE CREW EXPECTED. 6) FO HEADS-DOWN AND HEAVILY TASKED WITH DATA CHANGES, BRIEFING, RUNNING CHKLIST, AND TYPING ON THE FMS WHILE TAKING THE NEW CLRNC TAXI INSTRUCTIONS. NEW INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT BRIEFED, OR IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THE CAPT KNEW WHERE TO GO. THE CAPT SAID THIS. 7) CTLR SPEAKING VERY RAPIDLY IN HIS CLRNC. CAPT MAY NOT HAVE FULLY UNDERSTOOD. 8) TXWY LIGHTS WERE ILLUMINATED FOR TXWY U.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.