Narrative:

Incident involved not getting the transponder on prior to departure. Upon landing at dca runway 1 on the previous leg, with a slight tailwind and flaps 3 approach, when reaching the gate the aircraft had hot brakes, averaging 385 degrees. We were to do a quick turn since we had just departed about an hour late with a previous mechanical due to a fault on a fuel tank pump. The captain was new to the aircraft, still on high minimums, and was concerned with the brake temperatures being below the required 300 degree limitation for departure. We discussed the issue and determined they should be cool below the 300 degree limit for our next departure to dtw. Therefore, before we left the gate, they indeed had cooled below the 300 degree limitation required for takeoff. We pushed back from the gate, started up, and had a short taxi to the runway 1. The captain was mindful that the temperatures might rise again when taxiing to the runway, and we would have to consider the temperatures before takeoff, especially since we were departing runway 1 with a slight tailwind and fairly short runway. We could not use flex power on takeoff due to the tailwind and discussed the fact we would be using toga thrust for takeoff. We were mindful of the requirements to maintain the track of the river, avoiding the restr areas, the fact the wind would push us toward the east side of the river toward the restr areas, and fly the managed departure procedure. With all that, the tower landed an aircraft, had another on final to our runway, and cleared us into position for takeoff. We ran the before takeoff checklist, and somehow since I was to fly the leg, I missed turning the transponder to RA/TA. We were cleared for an immediate takeoff, flew the required departure procedure, avoided the restr areas, and then were told by ATC potomac departure to check transponder shortly after takeoff. It was immediately turned on, and the controller immediately responded with 'radar contact.' we continued the departure procedure and later into the flight, the center told the captain to call dca TRACON operations on arrival in dtw. He did, and the call concerned the departure with the transponder not on. The captain told them what happened, it had missed being turned on because of all the other concerns we had with departing safely, maintaining the required track, and the hurried nature of ATC clearing us for takeoff. This incident should not have happened, but it did. It can happen with multiple distrs concerning the departure of a flight when you are trying to cover everything to make the flight as safe as possible. We did everything we were supposed to do, but just missed flipping the switch to the 'on' position. I was also trying to be as helpful as possible with a new captain on the aircraft, making sure we would not miss anything, when in fact we did. In today's environment with all the requirements of the crew, unfortunately no matter how much we try not to make any mistakes -- they still can happen. If it is so critical to have a transponder operating immediately upon takeoff, even though you are in positive control (as the TRACON operations supervisor stated), then maybe consideration should be given to having the transponder automatically come on upon liftoff or some other parameter on takeoff. A primary target that just lifted off a tower controled field and then is handed off to a departure controller should be no problem, even at dca, since they know where the target came from and they are talking to them. Simply remind them to check it on -- not threaten to violate them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MULTIPLE DISTRS RESULT IN DEP FROM DCA WITHOUT HAVING A XPONDER ON CAUSING MORE CONCERN TO ATC THAN NORMAL BECAUSE OF SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN THE AREA.

Narrative: INCIDENT INVOLVED NOT GETTING THE XPONDER ON PRIOR TO DEP. UPON LNDG AT DCA RWY 1 ON THE PREVIOUS LEG, WITH A SLIGHT TAILWIND AND FLAPS 3 APCH, WHEN REACHING THE GATE THE ACFT HAD HOT BRAKES, AVERAGING 385 DEGS. WE WERE TO DO A QUICK TURN SINCE WE HAD JUST DEPARTED ABOUT AN HR LATE WITH A PREVIOUS MECHANICAL DUE TO A FAULT ON A FUEL TANK PUMP. THE CAPT WAS NEW TO THE ACFT, STILL ON HIGH MINIMUMS, AND WAS CONCERNED WITH THE BRAKE TEMPS BEING BELOW THE REQUIRED 300 DEG LIMITATION FOR DEP. WE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE AND DETERMINED THEY SHOULD BE COOL BELOW THE 300 DEG LIMIT FOR OUR NEXT DEP TO DTW. THEREFORE, BEFORE WE LEFT THE GATE, THEY INDEED HAD COOLED BELOW THE 300 DEG LIMITATION REQUIRED FOR TKOF. WE PUSHED BACK FROM THE GATE, STARTED UP, AND HAD A SHORT TAXI TO THE RWY 1. THE CAPT WAS MINDFUL THAT THE TEMPS MIGHT RISE AGAIN WHEN TAXIING TO THE RWY, AND WE WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER THE TEMPS BEFORE TKOF, ESPECIALLY SINCE WE WERE DEPARTING RWY 1 WITH A SLIGHT TAILWIND AND FAIRLY SHORT RWY. WE COULD NOT USE FLEX PWR ON TKOF DUE TO THE TAILWIND AND DISCUSSED THE FACT WE WOULD BE USING TOGA THRUST FOR TKOF. WE WERE MINDFUL OF THE REQUIREMENTS TO MAINTAIN THE TRACK OF THE RIVER, AVOIDING THE RESTR AREAS, THE FACT THE WIND WOULD PUSH US TOWARD THE E SIDE OF THE RIVER TOWARD THE RESTR AREAS, AND FLY THE MANAGED DEP PROC. WITH ALL THAT, THE TWR LANDED AN ACFT, HAD ANOTHER ON FINAL TO OUR RWY, AND CLRED US INTO POS FOR TKOF. WE RAN THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST, AND SOMEHOW SINCE I WAS TO FLY THE LEG, I MISSED TURNING THE XPONDER TO RA/TA. WE WERE CLRED FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF, FLEW THE REQUIRED DEP PROC, AVOIDED THE RESTR AREAS, AND THEN WERE TOLD BY ATC POTOMAC DEP TO CHK XPONDER SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. IT WAS IMMEDIATELY TURNED ON, AND THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED WITH 'RADAR CONTACT.' WE CONTINUED THE DEP PROC AND LATER INTO THE FLT, THE CTR TOLD THE CAPT TO CALL DCA TRACON OPS ON ARR IN DTW. HE DID, AND THE CALL CONCERNED THE DEP WITH THE XPONDER NOT ON. THE CAPT TOLD THEM WHAT HAPPENED, IT HAD MISSED BEING TURNED ON BECAUSE OF ALL THE OTHER CONCERNS WE HAD WITH DEPARTING SAFELY, MAINTAINING THE REQUIRED TRACK, AND THE HURRIED NATURE OF ATC CLRING US FOR TKOF. THIS INCIDENT SHOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED, BUT IT DID. IT CAN HAPPEN WITH MULTIPLE DISTRS CONCERNING THE DEP OF A FLT WHEN YOU ARE TRYING TO COVER EVERYTHING TO MAKE THE FLT AS SAFE AS POSSIBLE. WE DID EVERYTHING WE WERE SUPPOSED TO DO, BUT JUST MISSED FLIPPING THE SWITCH TO THE 'ON' POS. I WAS ALSO TRYING TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE WITH A NEW CAPT ON THE ACFT, MAKING SURE WE WOULD NOT MISS ANYTHING, WHEN IN FACT WE DID. IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT WITH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CREW, UNFORTUNATELY NO MATTER HOW MUCH WE TRY NOT TO MAKE ANY MISTAKES -- THEY STILL CAN HAPPEN. IF IT IS SO CRITICAL TO HAVE A XPONDER OPERATING IMMEDIATELY UPON TKOF, EVEN THOUGH YOU ARE IN POSITIVE CTL (AS THE TRACON OPS SUPVR STATED), THEN MAYBE CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HAVING THE XPONDER AUTOMATICALLY COME ON UPON LIFTOFF OR SOME OTHER PARAMETER ON TKOF. A PRIMARY TARGET THAT JUST LIFTED OFF A TWR CTLED FIELD AND THEN IS HANDED OFF TO A DEP CTLR SHOULD BE NO PROB, EVEN AT DCA, SINCE THEY KNOW WHERE THE TARGET CAME FROM AND THEY ARE TALKING TO THEM. SIMPLY REMIND THEM TO CHK IT ON -- NOT THREATEN TO VIOLATE THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.