Narrative:

Wind reported vrb at 6 KTS, but slight tailwind on final, so we selected flaps 30 degrees then flaps 40 degrees in quick succession as airplane was slowing nicely. Flaps stopped at position 25 degrees. We quickly checked the circuit breakers in, hydraulic pressure normal. Too close to field to run non-normal checklist. I executed a go around. On go around got 'too low flaps' on GPWS as per design. ATC very helpful. Numerous heading changes and altitude changes to get us out of pattern. We were very busy. On downwind made PA to customers, ran the symmetrical non-normal trailing edge flaps or no flaps checklist (H-22). ATC asked if we would need further assistance. I told them to roll the equipment as an added precaution. We gave them souls on board and remaining fuel. We intended to first try to lower the flaps normally, but were prepared to fly flaps 15 degrees via above checklist if necessary. We also ran the opc numbers for runway 19L due to tailwind on final for runway 25L. We requested runway 19L and received vectors to final. Passed aircraft control to first officer. I briefed the flight attendants, told them would be a normal landing, possibly a little fast if we need to use flaps 15 degrees, stressed for them not to prepare the cabin. I made a PA to customers, reassured them a normal landing would ensue. Briefed them on presence of emergency vehicles. On a 9-10 mi final, runway 19L, configured to flaps 40 degrees normally. Ran normal final descent checklist, told tower confign normal. Landing and taxi to gate normal. At gate called dispatch. Maintenance found 'right flap voltage excitation problem' fault. Reason for as soon as possible: on go around, before aircraft cleaned up, the 'C' flight attendant got on the service interphone and started talking to me. He did not ding me, he just started talking in my ear. This brought confusion into the cockpit. He said something like 'I don't know if you are listening, but if you are, maybe you would like to tell me something. I really don't know what is going on...' etc. It was obvious he was not going to stop. I got on the service interphone and told him that I would brief him when I could, but to stay off the interphone. I deselected service interphone. I talked to the flight attendant later.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-700 ON APCH HAS TO MAKE A GAR WHEN THE TRAILING EDGE FLAPS FAIL TO EXTEND PAST THE 25 DEG FLAP POS, 2 NM E OF LAS, NV.

Narrative: WIND RPTED VRB AT 6 KTS, BUT SLIGHT TAILWIND ON FINAL, SO WE SELECTED FLAPS 30 DEGS THEN FLAPS 40 DEGS IN QUICK SUCCESSION AS AIRPLANE WAS SLOWING NICELY. FLAPS STOPPED AT POS 25 DEGS. WE QUICKLY CHKED THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN, HYD PRESSURE NORMAL. TOO CLOSE TO FIELD TO RUN NON-NORMAL CHKLIST. I EXECUTED A GAR. ON GAR GOT 'TOO LOW FLAPS' ON GPWS AS PER DESIGN. ATC VERY HELPFUL. NUMEROUS HEADING CHANGES AND ALT CHANGES TO GET US OUT OF PATTERN. WE WERE VERY BUSY. ON DOWNWIND MADE PA TO CUSTOMERS, RAN THE SYMMETRICAL NON-NORMAL TRAILING EDGE FLAPS OR NO FLAPS CHKLIST (H-22). ATC ASKED IF WE WOULD NEED FURTHER ASSISTANCE. I TOLD THEM TO ROLL THE EQUIP AS AN ADDED PRECAUTION. WE GAVE THEM SOULS ON BOARD AND REMAINING FUEL. WE INTENDED TO FIRST TRY TO LOWER THE FLAPS NORMALLY, BUT WERE PREPARED TO FLY FLAPS 15 DEGS VIA ABOVE CHKLIST IF NECESSARY. WE ALSO RAN THE OPC NUMBERS FOR RWY 19L DUE TO TAILWIND ON FINAL FOR RWY 25L. WE REQUESTED RWY 19L AND RECEIVED VECTORS TO FINAL. PASSED ACFT CTL TO FO. I BRIEFED THE FLT ATTENDANTS, TOLD THEM WOULD BE A NORMAL LNDG, POSSIBLY A LITTLE FAST IF WE NEED TO USE FLAPS 15 DEGS, STRESSED FOR THEM NOT TO PREPARE THE CABIN. I MADE A PA TO CUSTOMERS, REASSURED THEM A NORMAL LNDG WOULD ENSUE. BRIEFED THEM ON PRESENCE OF EMER VEHICLES. ON A 9-10 MI FINAL, RWY 19L, CONFIGURED TO FLAPS 40 DEGS NORMALLY. RAN NORMAL FINAL DSCNT CHKLIST, TOLD TWR CONFIGN NORMAL. LNDG AND TAXI TO GATE NORMAL. AT GATE CALLED DISPATCH. MAINT FOUND 'R FLAP VOLTAGE EXCITATION PROB' FAULT. REASON FOR ASAP: ON GAR, BEFORE ACFT CLEANED UP, THE 'C' FLT ATTENDANT GOT ON THE SVC INTERPHONE AND STARTED TALKING TO ME. HE DID NOT DING ME, HE JUST STARTED TALKING IN MY EAR. THIS BROUGHT CONFUSION INTO THE COCKPIT. HE SAID SOMETHING LIKE 'I DON'T KNOW IF YOU ARE LISTENING, BUT IF YOU ARE, MAYBE YOU WOULD LIKE TO TELL ME SOMETHING. I REALLY DON'T KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON...' ETC. IT WAS OBVIOUS HE WAS NOT GOING TO STOP. I GOT ON THE SVC INTERPHONE AND TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD BRIEF HIM WHEN I COULD, BUT TO STAY OFF THE INTERPHONE. I DESELECTED SVC INTERPHONE. I TALKED TO THE FLT ATTENDANT LATER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.