Narrative:

As we started up, the tower advised that our clearance was available. I had refiled the amended routing we had received earlier in the trip and it was the same, direct esl, direct aml, direct. No obstacle departure procedure was issued or mentioned. We taxied to the departure runway 18 and performed a normal run-up. We were then cleared for takeoff. The takeoff run was normal and we began to gain altitude, accelerating to 80 KTS, flaps were retracted to zero for cruise climb. Before reaching the departure end of the runway, we were instructed by the tower to 'proceed on course and contact departure.' I then set the propeller control to 2500 RPM and verified full throttle. I turned the aircraft to the GPS indicated track of 130 at the departure threshold and contacted departure passing 1700 ft climbing 7000 ft. I also activated the autoplt and selected a climb of 700 FPM, GPS navigation. The departure controller responded with 'say altitude.' I indicated passing 1800 ft. There was no acknowledgement. I knew we might not be on radar yet so I did not find that unusual. I concluded that this was odd, but not alarming. The controller came back about 1 min later with the same request, say altitude. I believe that I responded 2300 ft. Again, there was no immediate response. About 20 seconds later, the controller then responded 'diamond STAR, you are entering a mountainous region, the MVA is 3400 ft, you need to climb, sir, climb!' the anxiety in the intonation of the transmission was quite apparent. I realized then that we were not yet 'radar contact' and that he was probably not going to issue a heading since we were below MVA. My response to that was deliberately calm to avoid adding any further concern for the passenger of myself. I was focused on flying the plane and believed for many reasons that I cannot now explain that I could out-fly the terrain based upon the climb performance of the airplane. The tower controller's instruction to proceed on course served to validate a misconception that I had, believing that the terrain to the southeast was similar to that at cbe, which has a road and valley below the airport elevation to the southeast. It was at that point that I realized that I could not see the terrain very well, if at all. Thus, we were close to IMC on a moonless night in the mountains. The moonless part had just occurred to me. The stars were clearly visible in the climb pitch attitude, but the cowling was obstructing our forward terrain view. I looked left and down and could see an outdoor light that looked to be quite a distance below us. I looked right and could faintly make out a ridge with trees a couple hundred ft below and about 1/2 mi away or so, illuminated by backlighting from the other side of the ridge. I considered turning left nearer the light directly below, but knew that this would reduce climb performance. It also appeared that we were clearing the terrain. Between the urgent climb message and trying to ascertain terrain information visually, I disengaged the autoplt and pulled back slightly to 1000 FPM indicated on the vsi (even though we were close to maximum gross weight with a +18 degree C outside air temperature indication). As I saw the airplane slow to 75 KTS, I released the back pressure and continued to watch the vsi settle back toward 700 as the airspeed held constant. I elected to re-engage the autoplt and monitor the flight profile. I knew there would be a tailwind from the west pushing us, but I did not have the opportunity to see the ground speed readout. I had also been maintaining a constant egt in the climb following the departure for best engine performance. As we finally passed 3400 ft, the controller came back with 'radar contact, climb and maintain 7000 ft.' I acknowledged and there were no further xmissions until our handoff to ZDC. As the PIC, I accept that I made several errors prior to departure. I felt the conditions were VFR (sky clear and 10 mi visibility, confirmed by WX briefing). Also, we had just made a visual approach. I did not think to review the obstacle departure procedure. The obstacle departure procedure clearly states to fly a departure heading of 225 degrees until 2700 ft MSL when departing runway 18 before turning on course. I chose not to review or have close at hand (it was on board) the appropriate VFR sectional, which clearly would have shown the higher terrain and obstacles to the east and southeast with obstacles up to 2640 ft. I was also departing a twred airport, on an IFR flight plan, in what I perceived to be night VFR conditions. It turned out to be mostly IMC. In the last few days, I have reviewed a myriad of inputs and documentation. I think there are numerous misconceptions about pilot responsibility for terrain avoidance when departing a twred airport in class B/C/D airspace and/or into a radar environment. I have learned that I must always check for any departure procedure prior to departure. I will now also review the topography information in the sectional as part of the departure briefing in the checklist, confirm the terrain and obstruction information, and also think seriously about the best landing options following departure, especially at night.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DA40 PLT NEGLECTS TO REVIEW OBSTACLE DEP PROC AND HAS A NEAR CFIT WHILE DEPARTING MGW.

Narrative: AS WE STARTED UP, THE TWR ADVISED THAT OUR CLRNC WAS AVAILABLE. I HAD REFILED THE AMENDED ROUTING WE HAD RECEIVED EARLIER IN THE TRIP AND IT WAS THE SAME, DIRECT ESL, DIRECT AML, DIRECT. NO OBSTACLE DEP PROC WAS ISSUED OR MENTIONED. WE TAXIED TO THE DEP RWY 18 AND PERFORMED A NORMAL RUN-UP. WE WERE THEN CLRED FOR TKOF. THE TKOF RUN WAS NORMAL AND WE BEGAN TO GAIN ALT, ACCELERATING TO 80 KTS, FLAPS WERE RETRACTED TO ZERO FOR CRUISE CLB. BEFORE REACHING THE DEP END OF THE RWY, WE WERE INSTRUCTED BY THE TWR TO 'PROCEED ON COURSE AND CONTACT DEP.' I THEN SET THE PROP CTL TO 2500 RPM AND VERIFIED FULL THROTTLE. I TURNED THE ACFT TO THE GPS INDICATED TRACK OF 130 AT THE DEP THRESHOLD AND CONTACTED DEP PASSING 1700 FT CLBING 7000 FT. I ALSO ACTIVATED THE AUTOPLT AND SELECTED A CLB OF 700 FPM, GPS NAV. THE DEP CTLR RESPONDED WITH 'SAY ALT.' I INDICATED PASSING 1800 FT. THERE WAS NO ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. I KNEW WE MIGHT NOT BE ON RADAR YET SO I DID NOT FIND THAT UNUSUAL. I CONCLUDED THAT THIS WAS ODD, BUT NOT ALARMING. THE CTLR CAME BACK ABOUT 1 MIN LATER WITH THE SAME REQUEST, SAY ALT. I BELIEVE THAT I RESPONDED 2300 FT. AGAIN, THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE RESPONSE. ABOUT 20 SECONDS LATER, THE CTLR THEN RESPONDED 'DIAMOND STAR, YOU ARE ENTERING A MOUNTAINOUS REGION, THE MVA IS 3400 FT, YOU NEED TO CLB, SIR, CLB!' THE ANXIETY IN THE INTONATION OF THE XMISSION WAS QUITE APPARENT. I REALIZED THEN THAT WE WERE NOT YET 'RADAR CONTACT' AND THAT HE WAS PROBABLY NOT GOING TO ISSUE A HDG SINCE WE WERE BELOW MVA. MY RESPONSE TO THAT WAS DELIBERATELY CALM TO AVOID ADDING ANY FURTHER CONCERN FOR THE PAX OF MYSELF. I WAS FOCUSED ON FLYING THE PLANE AND BELIEVED FOR MANY REASONS THAT I CANNOT NOW EXPLAIN THAT I COULD OUT-FLY THE TERRAIN BASED UPON THE CLB PERFORMANCE OF THE AIRPLANE. THE TWR CTLR'S INSTRUCTION TO PROCEED ON COURSE SERVED TO VALIDATE A MISCONCEPTION THAT I HAD, BELIEVING THAT THE TERRAIN TO THE SE WAS SIMILAR TO THAT AT CBE, WHICH HAS A ROAD AND VALLEY BELOW THE ARPT ELEVATION TO THE SE. IT WAS AT THAT POINT THAT I REALIZED THAT I COULD NOT SEE THE TERRAIN VERY WELL, IF AT ALL. THUS, WE WERE CLOSE TO IMC ON A MOONLESS NIGHT IN THE MOUNTAINS. THE MOONLESS PART HAD JUST OCCURRED TO ME. THE STARS WERE CLRLY VISIBLE IN THE CLB PITCH ATTITUDE, BUT THE COWLING WAS OBSTRUCTING OUR FORWARD TERRAIN VIEW. I LOOKED L AND DOWN AND COULD SEE AN OUTDOOR LIGHT THAT LOOKED TO BE QUITE A DISTANCE BELOW US. I LOOKED R AND COULD FAINTLY MAKE OUT A RIDGE WITH TREES A COUPLE HUNDRED FT BELOW AND ABOUT 1/2 MI AWAY OR SO, ILLUMINATED BY BACKLIGHTING FROM THE OTHER SIDE OF THE RIDGE. I CONSIDERED TURNING L NEARER THE LIGHT DIRECTLY BELOW, BUT KNEW THAT THIS WOULD REDUCE CLB PERFORMANCE. IT ALSO APPEARED THAT WE WERE CLRING THE TERRAIN. BTWN THE URGENT CLB MESSAGE AND TRYING TO ASCERTAIN TERRAIN INFO VISUALLY, I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND PULLED BACK SLIGHTLY TO 1000 FPM INDICATED ON THE VSI (EVEN THOUGH WE WERE CLOSE TO MAX GROSS WT WITH A +18 DEG C OUTSIDE AIR TEMP INDICATION). AS I SAW THE AIRPLANE SLOW TO 75 KTS, I RELEASED THE BACK PRESSURE AND CONTINUED TO WATCH THE VSI SETTLE BACK TOWARD 700 AS THE AIRSPD HELD CONSTANT. I ELECTED TO RE-ENGAGE THE AUTOPLT AND MONITOR THE FLT PROFILE. I KNEW THERE WOULD BE A TAILWIND FROM THE W PUSHING US, BUT I DID NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE THE GND SPD READOUT. I HAD ALSO BEEN MAINTAINING A CONSTANT EGT IN THE CLB FOLLOWING THE DEP FOR BEST ENG PERFORMANCE. AS WE FINALLY PASSED 3400 FT, THE CTLR CAME BACK WITH 'RADAR CONTACT, CLB AND MAINTAIN 7000 FT.' I ACKNOWLEDGED AND THERE WERE NO FURTHER XMISSIONS UNTIL OUR HDOF TO ZDC. AS THE PIC, I ACCEPT THAT I MADE SEVERAL ERRORS PRIOR TO DEP. I FELT THE CONDITIONS WERE VFR (SKY CLR AND 10 MI VISIBILITY, CONFIRMED BY WX BRIEFING). ALSO, WE HAD JUST MADE A VISUAL APCH. I DID NOT THINK TO REVIEW THE OBSTACLE DEP PROC. THE OBSTACLE DEP PROC CLRLY STATES TO FLY A DEP HDG OF 225 DEGS UNTIL 2700 FT MSL WHEN DEPARTING RWY 18 BEFORE TURNING ON COURSE. I CHOSE NOT TO REVIEW OR HAVE CLOSE AT HAND (IT WAS ON BOARD) THE APPROPRIATE VFR SECTIONAL, WHICH CLRLY WOULD HAVE SHOWN THE HIGHER TERRAIN AND OBSTACLES TO THE E AND SE WITH OBSTACLES UP TO 2640 FT. I WAS ALSO DEPARTING A TWRED ARPT, ON AN IFR FLT PLAN, IN WHAT I PERCEIVED TO BE NIGHT VFR CONDITIONS. IT TURNED OUT TO BE MOSTLY IMC. IN THE LAST FEW DAYS, I HAVE REVIEWED A MYRIAD OF INPUTS AND DOCUMENTATION. I THINK THERE ARE NUMEROUS MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT PLT RESPONSIBILITY FOR TERRAIN AVOIDANCE WHEN DEPARTING A TWRED ARPT IN CLASS B/C/D AIRSPACE AND/OR INTO A RADAR ENVIRONMENT. I HAVE LEARNED THAT I MUST ALWAYS CHK FOR ANY DEP PROC PRIOR TO DEP. I WILL NOW ALSO REVIEW THE TOPOGRAPHY INFO IN THE SECTIONAL AS PART OF THE DEP BRIEFING IN THE CHKLIST, CONFIRM THE TERRAIN AND OBSTRUCTION INFO, AND ALSO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE BEST LNDG OPTIONS FOLLOWING DEP, ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.