Narrative:

On the big sur arrival to sfo, a line of WX was along the arrival at angie. First officer was PF. Captain got clearance to deviate west for WX and cross boulder at 10000 ft and 250 KTS. We were high and using full speed brakes to get down to meet the restr. Flight attendants were set down early. Approach brief was interrupted several times with distrs. First officer had the tip toe visual out and briefed a short brief (leaving out crossing restrs). I assumed the first officer was familiar. Approximately 5 mi from boulder, we were cleared to cross at or above 10000 ft then descend to 6000 ft. I pointed to the altitude window and asked if the first officer wanted 6000 ft, since it seemed obvious at the time we were high and would meet the restr. He indicated 6000 ft. The first officer was flying in navigation and I noticed that a down-the-line segment did not match the arrival that he had programmed in the box, and began to investigate. Center called and said he had still wanted boulder at 10000 ft, but we were still cleared to 6000 ft. We were at boulder at approximately 9700 ft descending. The first officer stated he thought the restr had been removed. We were then asked to call the airport or bridge. First officer called the bridge in sight and we were cleared for the tip toe visual runway 28L. First officer asked for 1900 ft in the altitude window for the bridge recommended crossing restr. I then went heads down to quickly build the appropriate fixes in the box to protect lateral navigation and verified the first officer was specifically aware of the remainder of the arrival. I then noticed we had descended below 5000 ft at menlo. This is a hard altitude and we were at 4400 ft. I put 5000 ft in the altitude window and told the first officer to correct back to 5000 ft. The remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. The first officer later stated he was not familiar with the visual approach. Due to this event, I will always set the most restrictive altitude in the altitude window even if it looks like it is made. I will also require full approach briefings including crossing restrs and not assume someone's experience level. The WX was a major contributor to ultimately being rushed. In retrospect, I should have been more firm and demanded a further deviation so we could have started down sooner, and alleviated the rushed pace. I was trying to let the first officer plan the approach on his own.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 FLT CREW MISSES 2 XING RESTRS ON CHARTED VISUAL APCH TO SFO.

Narrative: ON THE BIG SUR ARR TO SFO, A LINE OF WX WAS ALONG THE ARR AT ANGIE. FO WAS PF. CAPT GOT CLRNC TO DEVIATE W FOR WX AND CROSS BOULDER AT 10000 FT AND 250 KTS. WE WERE HIGH AND USING FULL SPD BRAKES TO GET DOWN TO MEET THE RESTR. FLT ATTENDANTS WERE SET DOWN EARLY. APCH BRIEF WAS INTERRUPTED SEVERAL TIMES WITH DISTRS. FO HAD THE TIP TOE VISUAL OUT AND BRIEFED A SHORT BRIEF (LEAVING OUT XING RESTRS). I ASSUMED THE FO WAS FAMILIAR. APPROX 5 MI FROM BOULDER, WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS AT OR ABOVE 10000 FT THEN DSND TO 6000 FT. I POINTED TO THE ALT WINDOW AND ASKED IF THE FO WANTED 6000 FT, SINCE IT SEEMED OBVIOUS AT THE TIME WE WERE HIGH AND WOULD MEET THE RESTR. HE INDICATED 6000 FT. THE FO WAS FLYING IN NAV AND I NOTICED THAT A DOWN-THE-LINE SEGMENT DID NOT MATCH THE ARR THAT HE HAD PROGRAMMED IN THE BOX, AND BEGAN TO INVESTIGATE. CTR CALLED AND SAID HE HAD STILL WANTED BOULDER AT 10000 FT, BUT WE WERE STILL CLRED TO 6000 FT. WE WERE AT BOULDER AT APPROX 9700 FT DSNDING. THE FO STATED HE THOUGHT THE RESTR HAD BEEN REMOVED. WE WERE THEN ASKED TO CALL THE ARPT OR BRIDGE. FO CALLED THE BRIDGE IN SIGHT AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE TIP TOE VISUAL RWY 28L. FO ASKED FOR 1900 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW FOR THE BRIDGE RECOMMENDED XING RESTR. I THEN WENT HEADS DOWN TO QUICKLY BUILD THE APPROPRIATE FIXES IN THE BOX TO PROTECT LATERAL NAV AND VERIFIED THE FO WAS SPECIFICALLY AWARE OF THE REMAINDER OF THE ARR. I THEN NOTICED WE HAD DSNDED BELOW 5000 FT AT MENLO. THIS IS A HARD ALT AND WE WERE AT 4400 FT. I PUT 5000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW AND TOLD THE FO TO CORRECT BACK TO 5000 FT. THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE FO LATER STATED HE WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE VISUAL APCH. DUE TO THIS EVENT, I WILL ALWAYS SET THE MOST RESTRICTIVE ALT IN THE ALT WINDOW EVEN IF IT LOOKS LIKE IT IS MADE. I WILL ALSO REQUIRE FULL APCH BRIEFINGS INCLUDING XING RESTRS AND NOT ASSUME SOMEONE'S EXPERIENCE LEVEL. THE WX WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO ULTIMATELY BEING RUSHED. IN RETROSPECT, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FIRM AND DEMANDED A FURTHER DEV SO WE COULD HAVE STARTED DOWN SOONER, AND ALLEVIATED THE RUSHED PACE. I WAS TRYING TO LET THE FO PLAN THE APCH ON HIS OWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.