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Attributes | |
ACN | 592673 |
Time | |
Date | 200309 |
Day | Mon |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737-300 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 180 flight time total : 4500 flight time type : 450 |
ASRS Report | 592673 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : tkof warning horn other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : rejected takeoff |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Aircraft Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
Tower cleared the flight into position on runway 11L. Captain called 'below the line.' he pushed up the thrust lever to check takeoff warning horn. When we reached step #2, the cockpit door was not locked. He asked me to move the switch on the door to the locked position. I removed my shoulder harness to reach back and secure the lock. We continued the 'below the line' checklist. Moments after we were cleared for takeoff and upon advancing the thrust levers we got the takeoff warning horn. The rejected takeoff was accomplished with all appropriate procedures. Upon exiting the runway, we discovered that the 'leading edge flap indicator' circuit breaker was tripped. Noting its location, and me not guarding my shoulder harness when I released it to lock the door, I am certain that my shoulder harness tripped the circuit breaker. What I should have done: 1) checked the cockpit door lock before pushback from the gate. 2) knowing that the shoulder harnesses can trip circuit breakers, I should have guarded the belts better when I released them. 3) most of all, we should have started the 'below the line' checklist from the beginning once we corrected the unlocked door. This would have prompted us to advance the thrust lever and catch the problem.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B737-300 REJECTED TKOF DUE TO TKOF WARNING HORN SOUNDED. FOUND FLAP INDICATOR CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPPED. BREAKER TRIPPED BY FO'S SHOULDER HARNESS.
Narrative: TWR CLRED THE FLT INTO POS ON RWY 11L. CAPT CALLED 'BELOW THE LINE.' HE PUSHED UP THE THRUST LEVER TO CHK TKOF WARNING HORN. WHEN WE REACHED STEP #2, THE COCKPIT DOOR WAS NOT LOCKED. HE ASKED ME TO MOVE THE SWITCH ON THE DOOR TO THE LOCKED POS. I REMOVED MY SHOULDER HARNESS TO REACH BACK AND SECURE THE LOCK. WE CONTINUED THE 'BELOW THE LINE' CHKLIST. MOMENTS AFTER WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND UPON ADVANCING THE THRUST LEVERS WE GOT THE TKOF WARNING HORN. THE REJECTED TKOF WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH ALL APPROPRIATE PROCS. UPON EXITING THE RWY, WE DISCOVERED THAT THE 'LEADING EDGE FLAP INDICATOR' CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS TRIPPED. NOTING ITS LOCATION, AND ME NOT GUARDING MY SHOULDER HARNESS WHEN I RELEASED IT TO LOCK THE DOOR, I AM CERTAIN THAT MY SHOULDER HARNESS TRIPPED THE CIRCUIT BREAKER. WHAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE: 1) CHKED THE COCKPIT DOOR LOCK BEFORE PUSHBACK FROM THE GATE. 2) KNOWING THAT THE SHOULDER HARNESSES CAN TRIP CIRCUIT BREAKERS, I SHOULD HAVE GUARDED THE BELTS BETTER WHEN I RELEASED THEM. 3) MOST OF ALL, WE SHOULD HAVE STARTED THE 'BELOW THE LINE' CHKLIST FROM THE BEGINNING ONCE WE CORRECTED THE UNLOCKED DOOR. THIS WOULD HAVE PROMPTED US TO ADVANCE THE THRUST LEVER AND CATCH THE PROB.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.