Narrative:

Runway incursion. Departing pap ramp area, taxi instructions were issued by tower. The transmission was difficult to understand because of the controller's english and the radio transmission quality. As first officer, I read back what I deciphered the instructions to be 'back track and line up runway 27.' absent a correction by the controller, I concluded that my understanding of the instruction was correct. The captain then reiterated 'back track runway 27' to confirm with me our instructions. We received our route clearance which was different than the filed route, thereby creating extra last min predep work. It is a very short distance from the ramp to the runway and we were cleared to proceed into position for departure, so I was 'heads down' with the route change and was not carefully monitoring the captain's taxi progress. A right turn onto the runway for back taxi required the captain to look xcockpit to clear final. I believe my attention was drawn outside by a 'final's clear' call or something similar from the captain. Pausing briefly to complete an FMC input, I then looked right and noted a light twin engine aircraft on about a 1 mi final. The captain simultaneously idented the traffic but by the time our airplane was stopped, the nose of our aircraft was extended onto the runway. The aircraft on final had apparently entered a short final from a high VFR base leg and been out of the captain's xcockpit view. The light twin executed an uneventful go around and the 2 aircraft were never closer than at least 1 mi separation at any time. We were then instructed to back track and, once positioned, cleared for takeoff. There are a few risk factors inherent to pap and other locations from which we operate. One is the unavailability of a route clearance until taxi has been initiated. This delays and compresses the predep workload into the final moments before takeoff when both pilots' attention should be focused on avoidance of sits like this. Absent parallel txwys, there is the need to back taxi and entrance onto the runway often occurs well before the crew and aircraft are prepared for departure. On many occasions the clearance is not issued until you have entered the runway leaving final preparations and checklists to be rushed or causing the aircraft to situation on an active runway for an extended period. The corrective action I intend to take (and would recommend to others) is to recognize these risk factors and require issuance of a route clearance and completion of departure preparations prior to taxiing. This will then leave both pilots to focus their full attention on safely moving the aircraft and trying to ensure they understand the controller's instructions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A300 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION ON RWY 27 AT MTPP AFTER THE CREW WAS CLRED TO BACK TAXI TO RWY 27. A LNDG LIGHT TWIN HAD TO GO AROUND.

Narrative: RWY INCURSION. DEPARTING PAP RAMP AREA, TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED BY TWR. THE XMISSION WAS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND BECAUSE OF THE CTLR'S ENGLISH AND THE RADIO XMISSION QUALITY. AS FO, I READ BACK WHAT I DECIPHERED THE INSTRUCTIONS TO BE 'BACK TRACK AND LINE UP RWY 27.' ABSENT A CORRECTION BY THE CTLR, I CONCLUDED THAT MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE INSTRUCTION WAS CORRECT. THE CAPT THEN REITERATED 'BACK TRACK RWY 27' TO CONFIRM WITH ME OUR INSTRUCTIONS. WE RECEIVED OUR RTE CLRNC WHICH WAS DIFFERENT THAN THE FILED RTE, THEREBY CREATING EXTRA LAST MIN PREDEP WORK. IT IS A VERY SHORT DISTANCE FROM THE RAMP TO THE RWY AND WE WERE CLRED TO PROCEED INTO POS FOR DEP, SO I WAS 'HEADS DOWN' WITH THE RTE CHANGE AND WAS NOT CAREFULLY MONITORING THE CAPT'S TAXI PROGRESS. A R TURN ONTO THE RWY FOR BACK TAXI REQUIRED THE CAPT TO LOOK XCOCKPIT TO CLR FINAL. I BELIEVE MY ATTN WAS DRAWN OUTSIDE BY A 'FINAL'S CLR' CALL OR SOMETHING SIMILAR FROM THE CAPT. PAUSING BRIEFLY TO COMPLETE AN FMC INPUT, I THEN LOOKED R AND NOTED A LIGHT TWIN ENG ACFT ON ABOUT A 1 MI FINAL. THE CAPT SIMULTANEOUSLY IDENTED THE TFC BUT BY THE TIME OUR AIRPLANE WAS STOPPED, THE NOSE OF OUR ACFT WAS EXTENDED ONTO THE RWY. THE ACFT ON FINAL HAD APPARENTLY ENTERED A SHORT FINAL FROM A HIGH VFR BASE LEG AND BEEN OUT OF THE CAPT'S XCOCKPIT VIEW. THE LIGHT TWIN EXECUTED AN UNEVENTFUL GAR AND THE 2 ACFT WERE NEVER CLOSER THAN AT LEAST 1 MI SEPARATION AT ANY TIME. WE WERE THEN INSTRUCTED TO BACK TRACK AND, ONCE POSITIONED, CLRED FOR TKOF. THERE ARE A FEW RISK FACTORS INHERENT TO PAP AND OTHER LOCATIONS FROM WHICH WE OPERATE. ONE IS THE UNAVAILABILITY OF A RTE CLRNC UNTIL TAXI HAS BEEN INITIATED. THIS DELAYS AND COMPRESSES THE PREDEP WORKLOAD INTO THE FINAL MOMENTS BEFORE TKOF WHEN BOTH PLTS' ATTN SHOULD BE FOCUSED ON AVOIDANCE OF SITS LIKE THIS. ABSENT PARALLEL TXWYS, THERE IS THE NEED TO BACK TAXI AND ENTRANCE ONTO THE RWY OFTEN OCCURS WELL BEFORE THE CREW AND ACFT ARE PREPARED FOR DEP. ON MANY OCCASIONS THE CLRNC IS NOT ISSUED UNTIL YOU HAVE ENTERED THE RWY LEAVING FINAL PREPARATIONS AND CHKLISTS TO BE RUSHED OR CAUSING THE ACFT TO SIT ON AN ACTIVE RWY FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION I INTEND TO TAKE (AND WOULD RECOMMEND TO OTHERS) IS TO RECOGNIZE THESE RISK FACTORS AND REQUIRE ISSUANCE OF A RTE CLRNC AND COMPLETION OF DEP PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO TAXIING. THIS WILL THEN LEAVE BOTH PLTS TO FOCUS THEIR FULL ATTN ON SAFELY MOVING THE ACFT AND TRYING TO ENSURE THEY UNDERSTAND THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.