Narrative:

On takeoff, I was flying the jet. We weighed 192112 pounds at takeoff. We had total passenger load of 84 people, plus crew 2/4. Our clearance was LAXX5 trm transition maintain 3000 ft. Passing 926 ft, I failed to call flaps 1 degree VNAV. Just prior to 800 ft, tower told us to contact departure. The first officer switched to departure control but waited to call departure. I was waiting for him to check in. I passed 926 ft climbing to 3000 ft. There was someone talking to socal when we switched frequencys initially. As we approached 2000 ft, I called flaps 1 degree, VNAV. First officer retracted flaps to 1 degree as we passed 2000 ft. I called 1000 ft to go. First officer checked in with socal. Socal advised us to level off at 3000 ft and advised us that air carrier Y was crossing traffic from right to left. Air carrier Y appeared to be on the loop departure climbing just above us and had departed off runway 24. I looked to see where air carrier Y was in relation to our flight path as I started to level off for 3000 ft restr. I began our turn to 220 degree heading to comply with the LAXX5 departure. I had missed the call for flaps up at 188 KTS and we had accelerated to clean maneuvering of 206 KTS. We never leveled off at 3000 ft since socal came back with a clearance to 4000 ft. As we passed 3100 ft, I observed the first officer placing the gear handle to 'off.' he did not read the after takeoff checklist. The departure had been labor intensive. Passing 3100 ft, I noticed the speed bug moved to 240 KTS versus 250 KTS. Socal gave us another climb to 5000 ft I looked at the fast slow indicator -- it was flashing fast. My first thought was something was wrong with the FMC and somehow the correct information was not being received. Socal gave us a turn to 160 degrees, then a climb to 7000 ft and a speed restr of 280 KTS. I discussed with the first officer what was being displayed. He thought the same thing -- that something was wrong with the FMC's information that was being xferred to the instruments. We had both missed the flaps were still in position #1. I was still hand flying the departure. I should have sat back, put on the autoplt and looked around. Instead, while hand flying, I was trying to figure out the problem. As we climbed through 10000 ft, we both noticed a light buffet had begun as I began to accelerate to 280 KTS. I was still hand flying at 275 KTS. We both noticed the flaps were not up. I called for flaps up as the first officer was reaching for the flap handle. The airplane was passing 10500 ft. The flaps retracted normally, the buffet ceased immediately. After climbing through FL180, dispatch and the maintenance controller were contacted and a decision was made that it was safe to continue to our destination. A logbook write-up was made. In the nearly 20 yrs I've been with an air carrier, I have never done anything to damage one of air carrier's planes. I feel bad about what happened and I take full responsibility for missing the flaps up call at 188 KTS and the events which led to me overspding the flaps 1 degree speed. Looking back, as soon as I noticed something was not right, I should have put the autoplt on, sat back and looked around the cockpit. Had I done this early on, I could have prevented the overspd condition.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 CREW HAD A FLAP OVERSPD WHEN THEY FORGOT TO RETRACT THE FLAPS ON DEP AT LAX. THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WAS NOT DONE.

Narrative: ON TKOF, I WAS FLYING THE JET. WE WEIGHED 192112 LBS AT TKOF. WE HAD TOTAL PAX LOAD OF 84 PEOPLE, PLUS CREW 2/4. OUR CLRNC WAS LAXX5 TRM TRANSITION MAINTAIN 3000 FT. PASSING 926 FT, I FAILED TO CALL FLAPS 1 DEG VNAV. JUST PRIOR TO 800 FT, TWR TOLD US TO CONTACT DEP. THE FO SWITCHED TO DEP CTL BUT WAITED TO CALL DEP. I WAS WAITING FOR HIM TO CHK IN. I PASSED 926 FT CLBING TO 3000 FT. THERE WAS SOMEONE TALKING TO SOCAL WHEN WE SWITCHED FREQS INITIALLY. AS WE APCHED 2000 FT, I CALLED FLAPS 1 DEG, VNAV. FO RETRACTED FLAPS TO 1 DEG AS WE PASSED 2000 FT. I CALLED 1000 FT TO GO. FO CHKED IN WITH SOCAL. SOCAL ADVISED US TO LEVEL OFF AT 3000 FT AND ADVISED US THAT ACR Y WAS XING TFC FROM R TO L. ACR Y APPEARED TO BE ON THE LOOP DEP CLBING JUST ABOVE US AND HAD DEPARTED OFF RWY 24. I LOOKED TO SEE WHERE ACR Y WAS IN RELATION TO OUR FLT PATH AS I STARTED TO LEVEL OFF FOR 3000 FT RESTR. I BEGAN OUR TURN TO 220 DEG HDG TO COMPLY WITH THE LAXX5 DEP. I HAD MISSED THE CALL FOR FLAPS UP AT 188 KTS AND WE HAD ACCELERATED TO CLEAN MANEUVERING OF 206 KTS. WE NEVER LEVELED OFF AT 3000 FT SINCE SOCAL CAME BACK WITH A CLRNC TO 4000 FT. AS WE PASSED 3100 FT, I OBSERVED THE FO PLACING THE GEAR HANDLE TO 'OFF.' HE DID NOT READ THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST. THE DEP HAD BEEN LABOR INTENSIVE. PASSING 3100 FT, I NOTICED THE SPD BUG MOVED TO 240 KTS VERSUS 250 KTS. SOCAL GAVE US ANOTHER CLB TO 5000 FT I LOOKED AT THE FAST SLOW INDICATOR -- IT WAS FLASHING FAST. MY FIRST THOUGHT WAS SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THE FMC AND SOMEHOW THE CORRECT INFO WAS NOT BEING RECEIVED. SOCAL GAVE US A TURN TO 160 DEGS, THEN A CLB TO 7000 FT AND A SPD RESTR OF 280 KTS. I DISCUSSED WITH THE FO WHAT WAS BEING DISPLAYED. HE THOUGHT THE SAME THING -- THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THE FMC'S INFO THAT WAS BEING XFERRED TO THE INSTS. WE HAD BOTH MISSED THE FLAPS WERE STILL IN POS #1. I WAS STILL HAND FLYING THE DEP. I SHOULD HAVE SAT BACK, PUT ON THE AUTOPLT AND LOOKED AROUND. INSTEAD, WHILE HAND FLYING, I WAS TRYING TO FIGURE OUT THE PROB. AS WE CLBED THROUGH 10000 FT, WE BOTH NOTICED A LIGHT BUFFET HAD BEGUN AS I BEGAN TO ACCELERATE TO 280 KTS. I WAS STILL HAND FLYING AT 275 KTS. WE BOTH NOTICED THE FLAPS WERE NOT UP. I CALLED FOR FLAPS UP AS THE FO WAS REACHING FOR THE FLAP HANDLE. THE AIRPLANE WAS PASSING 10500 FT. THE FLAPS RETRACTED NORMALLY, THE BUFFET CEASED IMMEDIATELY. AFTER CLBING THROUGH FL180, DISPATCH AND THE MAINT CTLR WERE CONTACTED AND A DECISION WAS MADE THAT IT WAS SAFE TO CONTINUE TO OUR DEST. A LOGBOOK WRITE-UP WAS MADE. IN THE NEARLY 20 YRS I'VE BEEN WITH AN ACR, I HAVE NEVER DONE ANYTHING TO DAMAGE ONE OF ACR'S PLANES. I FEEL BAD ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED AND I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MISSING THE FLAPS UP CALL AT 188 KTS AND THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO ME OVERSPDING THE FLAPS 1 DEG SPD. LOOKING BACK, AS SOON AS I NOTICED SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT, I SHOULD HAVE PUT THE AUTOPLT ON, SAT BACK AND LOOKED AROUND THE COCKPIT. HAD I DONE THIS EARLY ON, I COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE OVERSPD CONDITION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.