Narrative:

This was a gear-up landing resulting from several distrs allowed to interfere with 3 habitual points in the traffic pattern where I normally perform landing checklists. My aircraft was down for maintenance for june and july, 2003. I next flew at the end of july to pick up the aircraft from maintenance. The rebuilt turbo-charger failed at the end of august. The turbo-charger and other repairs were completed on oct/fri/03, and the aircraft was test flown while closely monitoring engine instruments for 3 circuits of full stop lndgs in the pattern at the aircraft's home airport. On the third circuit, abeam the landing zone on downwind, while beginning the first habitual pre-landing check, tower instructed me to point out a much slower airplane (scout) entering base about 1/2-3/4 of a mi in front of me. This did not present a danger to my aircraft. My first pre-landing check was not completed because of the distraction from monitoring engine instruments and looking for this aircraft, which was entering from much higher than the traffic pattern. Downwind was extended and my aircraft was slowed to just over 10 KTS above stall for spacing. I turned base, extended second notch of flaps and kept lookout for the scout up to its turning final. As I approached final, I lost sight of the scout, turned final, extended final flaps, monitored engines instruments and was distraction from my second pre-landing check looking for the slower scout. At three quarter mi final, I re-acquired visual of the scout, which was just past flaring. After seeing it clear runway, tower ATC failed to clear me to land so I transmitted request for clearance to land, which was given just as I crossed the airport boundary where I normally look out the pilot's window for final check to confirm the gear is down. The timing of this exchange distracted me from the third and final check used as a habit to avoid a gear-up landing. Because power was carried into the flare in order to fly a soft field approach and landing, by design the gear warning horn did not go off until power was reduced at the expected point of touchdown. The gear horn went off as the propeller struck the runway, after which the aircraft settled onto the runway and slid on its belly. Because I allowed myself to become distraction throughout the end of downwind, base and final segments of the pattern, I never realized I overlooked the pre-landing check at 3 different points. My past decisions to rely upon habit in multiple places to perform the pre-landing check for gear down and other items did not save me from the usual stupid result from allowing multiple distrs to interrupt the checks. I believe this chain of events could have been avoided had I taken the effort on the ground to mentally review and positively identify all required actions for all segments of the pattern instead of relying upon long established habitual patterns used to trigger completion of pre-landing checks at specific points (in the traffic pattern, approaching the traffic pattern and approaching the final approach fix for instrument approachs). I also believe, I have placed too much emphasis upon preflight mental review of instrument procedures and became complacent about preflight review of 'much simpler' VFR flight, especially in the pattern at my home airport. In the future, I intend to mentally brief and rehearse routine as well as emergency procedures prior to all flts, both VFR and IFR.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CESSNA PVT PLT LANDS GEAR UP ON RWY AT ZZZ, US.

Narrative: THIS WAS A GEAR-UP LNDG RESULTING FROM SEVERAL DISTRS ALLOWED TO INTERFERE WITH 3 HABITUAL POINTS IN THE TFC PATTERN WHERE I NORMALLY PERFORM LNDG CHKLISTS. MY ACFT WAS DOWN FOR MAINT FOR JUNE AND JULY, 2003. I NEXT FLEW AT THE END OF JULY TO PICK UP THE ACFT FROM MAINT. THE REBUILT TURBO-CHARGER FAILED AT THE END OF AUGUST. THE TURBO-CHARGER AND OTHER REPAIRS WERE COMPLETED ON OCT/FRI/03, AND THE ACFT WAS TEST FLOWN WHILE CLOSELY MONITORING ENG INSTS FOR 3 CIRCUITS OF FULL STOP LNDGS IN THE PATTERN AT THE ACFT'S HOME ARPT. ON THE THIRD CIRCUIT, ABEAM THE LNDG ZONE ON DOWNWIND, WHILE BEGINNING THE FIRST HABITUAL PRE-LNDG CHK, TWR INSTRUCTED ME TO POINT OUT A MUCH SLOWER AIRPLANE (SCOUT) ENTERING BASE ABOUT 1/2-3/4 OF A MI IN FRONT OF ME. THIS DID NOT PRESENT A DANGER TO MY ACFT. MY FIRST PRE-LNDG CHK WAS NOT COMPLETED BECAUSE OF THE DISTR FROM MONITORING ENG INSTS AND LOOKING FOR THIS ACFT, WHICH WAS ENTERING FROM MUCH HIGHER THAN THE TFC PATTERN. DOWNWIND WAS EXTENDED AND MY ACFT WAS SLOWED TO JUST OVER 10 KTS ABOVE STALL FOR SPACING. I TURNED BASE, EXTENDED SECOND NOTCH OF FLAPS AND KEPT LOOKOUT FOR THE SCOUT UP TO ITS TURNING FINAL. AS I APCHED FINAL, I LOST SIGHT OF THE SCOUT, TURNED FINAL, EXTENDED FINAL FLAPS, MONITORED ENGS INSTS AND WAS DISTR FROM MY SECOND PRE-LNDG CHK LOOKING FOR THE SLOWER SCOUT. AT THREE QUARTER MI FINAL, I RE-ACQUIRED VISUAL OF THE SCOUT, WHICH WAS JUST PAST FLARING. AFTER SEEING IT CLR RWY, TWR ATC FAILED TO CLR ME TO LAND SO I XMITTED REQUEST FOR CLRNC TO LAND, WHICH WAS GIVEN JUST AS I CROSSED THE ARPT BOUNDARY WHERE I NORMALLY LOOK OUT THE PLT'S WINDOW FOR FINAL CHK TO CONFIRM THE GEAR IS DOWN. THE TIMING OF THIS EXCHANGE DISTRACTED ME FROM THE THIRD AND FINAL CHK USED AS A HABIT TO AVOID A GEAR-UP LNDG. BECAUSE PWR WAS CARRIED INTO THE FLARE IN ORDER TO FLY A SOFT FIELD APCH AND LNDG, BY DESIGN THE GEAR WARNING HORN DID NOT GO OFF UNTIL PWR WAS REDUCED AT THE EXPECTED POINT OF TOUCHDOWN. THE GEAR HORN WENT OFF AS THE PROP STRUCK THE RWY, AFTER WHICH THE ACFT SETTLED ONTO THE RWY AND SLID ON ITS BELLY. BECAUSE I ALLOWED MYSELF TO BECOME DISTR THROUGHOUT THE END OF DOWNWIND, BASE AND FINAL SEGMENTS OF THE PATTERN, I NEVER REALIZED I OVERLOOKED THE PRE-LNDG CHK AT 3 DIFFERENT POINTS. MY PAST DECISIONS TO RELY UPON HABIT IN MULTIPLE PLACES TO PERFORM THE PRE-LNDG CHK FOR GEAR DOWN AND OTHER ITEMS DID NOT SAVE ME FROM THE USUAL STUPID RESULT FROM ALLOWING MULTIPLE DISTRS TO INTERRUPT THE CHKS. I BELIEVE THIS CHAIN OF EVENTS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD I TAKEN THE EFFORT ON THE GND TO MENTALLY REVIEW AND POSITIVELY IDENT ALL REQUIRED ACTIONS FOR ALL SEGMENTS OF THE PATTERN INSTEAD OF RELYING UPON LONG ESTABLISHED HABITUAL PATTERNS USED TO TRIGGER COMPLETION OF PRE-LNDG CHKS AT SPECIFIC POINTS (IN THE TFC PATTERN, APCHING THE TFC PATTERN AND APCHING THE FINAL APCH FIX FOR INST APCHS). I ALSO BELIEVE, I HAVE PLACED TOO MUCH EMPHASIS UPON PREFLT MENTAL REVIEW OF INST PROCS AND BECAME COMPLACENT ABOUT PREFLT REVIEW OF 'MUCH SIMPLER' VFR FLT, ESPECIALLY IN THE PATTERN AT MY HOME ARPT. IN THE FUTURE, I INTEND TO MENTALLY BRIEF AND REHEARSE ROUTINE AS WELL AS EMER PROCS PRIOR TO ALL FLTS, BOTH VFR AND IFR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.