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An A320 flight crew questioned maintenance about an MEL on the autobrake system. After the flight, the flight crew was informed by the fleet maintenance that the information they received was incorrect.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 596562 |
| Time | |
| Date | 200310 |
| Day | Sat |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | airport : den.airport |
| State Reference | CO |
| Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | A320 |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
| Qualification | pilot : atp |
| ASRS Report | 596562 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | company : air carrier |
| Function | flight crew : first officer |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | aircraft equipment problem : less severe maintenance problem : improper documentation maintenance problem : non compliance with mel non adherence : far |
| Independent Detector | other other : 3 |
| Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
| Supplementary | |
| Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance Company Aircraft |
| Primary Problem | Maintenance Human Performance |
Narrative:
Autobrake system placarded inoperative. MEL information gave no operational guidance. Airbus takeoff confign system showed autobrakes system needed to be armed. Sent ACARS message to maintenance and asked if the ECAM system needed the inoperative autobrakes to be armed. Maintenance advised that the system needed to be armed and that the rejected takeoff feature would still operate, even though listed as inoperative that the landing autobrakes was the inoperative portion. With that information, we armed the system and the takeoff confign showed everything green. Crew discussed whether we would actually have rejected takeoff brakes if we rejected and were prepared to immediately apply brakes if required. Today, I received a message from the fleet that there is a disagreement between the fleet maintenance and company maintenance on the autobrake system. It appears that the maximum position should not have been selected and that the rejected takeoff feature would not have worked. As a crew, we need better and accurate information on how to operate this aircraft with inoperative components.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: AN A320 FLT CREW QUESTIONED MAINT ABOUT AN MEL ON THE AUTOBRAKE SYS. AFTER THE FLT, THE FLT CREW WAS INFORMED BY THE FLEET MAINT THAT THE INFO THEY RECEIVED WAS INCORRECT.
Narrative: AUTOBRAKE SYS PLACARDED INOP. MEL INFO GAVE NO OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE. AIRBUS TKOF CONFIGN SYS SHOWED AUTOBRAKES SYS NEEDED TO BE ARMED. SENT ACARS MESSAGE TO MAINT AND ASKED IF THE ECAM SYS NEEDED THE INOP AUTOBRAKES TO BE ARMED. MAINT ADVISED THAT THE SYS NEEDED TO BE ARMED AND THAT THE RTO FEATURE WOULD STILL OPERATE, EVEN THOUGH LISTED AS INOP THAT THE LNDG AUTOBRAKES WAS THE INOP PORTION. WITH THAT INFO, WE ARMED THE SYS AND THE TKOF CONFIGN SHOWED EVERYTHING GREEN. CREW DISCUSSED WHETHER WE WOULD ACTUALLY HAVE RTO BRAKES IF WE REJECTED AND WERE PREPARED TO IMMEDIATELY APPLY BRAKES IF REQUIRED. TODAY, I RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM THE FLEET THAT THERE IS A DISAGREEMENT BTWN THE FLEET MAINT AND COMPANY MAINT ON THE AUTOBRAKE SYS. IT APPEARS THAT THE MAX POS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SELECTED AND THAT THE RTO FEATURE WOULD NOT HAVE WORKED. AS A CREW, WE NEED BETTER AND ACCURATE INFO ON HOW TO OPERATE THIS ACFT WITH INOP COMPONENTS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.