Narrative:

After late afternoon trip, we were sent out on a second, on-demand, pop-up trip. We had to pick up the passenger as soon as possible at phl. I, the first officer, was PF. WX was IFR with rain and very turbulent. Traffic was heavy. As soon as we checked on with phl approach, they immediately began vectors and speed restrs to work us into final approach sequence for ILS runway 26. Captain briefed the approach and set the radios and instruments and then I briefly studied the approach myself. We fly into this field often and have shot this approach several times, so we were somewhat familiar with it. However, this may have made us complacent a bit on our briefing which could have affected our (and especially my) situational awareness. We had 2 approach controllers. The first vectored us onto the 'downwind.' we were at 4000 ft and were issued a speed restr of 190 KTS prior to handing us off to the final approach controller. The final approach controller took us onto the 'base' and then onto the localizer. While on the base leg, he issued us a 170 KT speed restr then descended us to 3000 ft. Captain was working radios. I was ahead of the aircraft, but working hard as we were IMC at night. The second controller again told us to 'maintain 170 KTS.' the captain responded with 'we are doing 170 KTS.' the controller then cleared us for the ILS runway 26 approach and handed us off to tower. Being high above the GS as we captured the localizer and 30 KTS fast for an ILS in our aircraft, we began configuring our aircraft for approach and slowing to 140 KTS. We continued the ILS normally, and landed normally. Tower cleared us to parking uneventfully. 10 mins later we departed phl for the rest of our trip. 2 days later, captain and I were notified that an aircraft on the approach behind us had to go around because we were slow. This was surprising because we did not hear this while we were on the approach frequency. In looking back, this problem occurred for several reasons: 1) the controller asked us to maintain 170 KTS. It was at this point the controller then cleared us for the approach and switched us to tower without reissuing the speed restr. As per the aim, 'approach controllers supersede speed restrs and pilots are expected to make their own speed adjustments as necessary to complete the approach.' we assumed that because the approach controller had been issued separately from the earlier speed restrs, we were now ok to resume normal speed and descend on the GS. We were anxious to get the airplane configured properly and to stabilize the approach because of the poor WX conditions. The controller assumed that we would maintain 170 KTS to some certain point, one that he did not specify. Had he issued the approach clearance while reissuing the speed restr, it would have been clrer in our minds that he wanted us to go fast. 2) another contributing factor was our own situational awareness. We were further from the airport than we understood ourselves to be, having confused 2 separate DME fixes while witnessing the localizer and GS come alive. If we had known we were further out, we probably would have descended at a higher airspeed. Supplemental information from acn 598159: I set up and idented the navaids, then briefed the approach to the first officer. He did a good job holding headings, altitudes and speeds while hand flying in the turbulence, as r-hand panel is raw data. During the base leg, the controller came back and reissued 170 KT speed restr. I responded '170 KTS.' immediately after the transmission I thought I should have told him we were currently indicating 170 KTS, wondering whether his radar showed us faster or slower. As frequency was busy I remained silent. I knew we were kept at altitude because we were crossing over the traffic on the parallel localizer for runway 27R. We utilize 140 KTS for approachs in our aircraft because it is 1/2 way between vle and blue line (vyse) of 125 KTS. By slowing early we allowed more time for following traffic to close with us. The busy situation had aircraft spacing already at a premium. In the future, I need to maintain better situational awareness. I did not xchk my DME indication with the approach plate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE10 FLT CREW ARE ADVISED 2 DAYS AFTER INCIDENT BY COMPANY OF PHL TRACON CONCERN OVER SPD REDUCTION ON FINAL THAT APPARENTLY CAUSED AN IN TRAIL ACFT GAR.

Narrative: AFTER LATE AFTERNOON TRIP, WE WERE SENT OUT ON A SECOND, ON-DEMAND, POP-UP TRIP. WE HAD TO PICK UP THE PAX ASAP AT PHL. I, THE FO, WAS PF. WX WAS IFR WITH RAIN AND VERY TURBULENT. TFC WAS HVY. AS SOON AS WE CHKED ON WITH PHL APCH, THEY IMMEDIATELY BEGAN VECTORS AND SPD RESTRS TO WORK US INTO FINAL APCH SEQUENCE FOR ILS RWY 26. CAPT BRIEFED THE APCH AND SET THE RADIOS AND INSTS AND THEN I BRIEFLY STUDIED THE APCH MYSELF. WE FLY INTO THIS FIELD OFTEN AND HAVE SHOT THIS APCH SEVERAL TIMES, SO WE WERE SOMEWHAT FAMILIAR WITH IT. HOWEVER, THIS MAY HAVE MADE US COMPLACENT A BIT ON OUR BRIEFING WHICH COULD HAVE AFFECTED OUR (AND ESPECIALLY MY) SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. WE HAD 2 APCH CTLRS. THE FIRST VECTORED US ONTO THE 'DOWNWIND.' WE WERE AT 4000 FT AND WERE ISSUED A SPD RESTR OF 190 KTS PRIOR TO HANDING US OFF TO THE FINAL APCH CTLR. THE FINAL APCH CTLR TOOK US ONTO THE 'BASE' AND THEN ONTO THE LOC. WHILE ON THE BASE LEG, HE ISSUED US A 170 KT SPD RESTR THEN DSNDED US TO 3000 FT. CAPT WAS WORKING RADIOS. I WAS AHEAD OF THE ACFT, BUT WORKING HARD AS WE WERE IMC AT NIGHT. THE SECOND CTLR AGAIN TOLD US TO 'MAINTAIN 170 KTS.' THE CAPT RESPONDED WITH 'WE ARE DOING 170 KTS.' THE CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR THE ILS RWY 26 APCH AND HANDED US OFF TO TWR. BEING HIGH ABOVE THE GS AS WE CAPTURED THE LOC AND 30 KTS FAST FOR AN ILS IN OUR ACFT, WE BEGAN CONFIGURING OUR ACFT FOR APCH AND SLOWING TO 140 KTS. WE CONTINUED THE ILS NORMALLY, AND LANDED NORMALLY. TWR CLRED US TO PARKING UNEVENTFULLY. 10 MINS LATER WE DEPARTED PHL FOR THE REST OF OUR TRIP. 2 DAYS LATER, CAPT AND I WERE NOTIFIED THAT AN ACFT ON THE APCH BEHIND US HAD TO GAR BECAUSE WE WERE SLOW. THIS WAS SURPRISING BECAUSE WE DID NOT HEAR THIS WHILE WE WERE ON THE APCH FREQ. IN LOOKING BACK, THIS PROB OCCURRED FOR SEVERAL REASONS: 1) THE CTLR ASKED US TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THE CTLR THEN CLRED US FOR THE APCH AND SWITCHED US TO TWR WITHOUT REISSUING THE SPD RESTR. AS PER THE AIM, 'APCH CTLRS SUPERSEDE SPD RESTRS AND PLTS ARE EXPECTED TO MAKE THEIR OWN SPD ADJUSTMENTS AS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THE APCH.' WE ASSUMED THAT BECAUSE THE APCH CTLR HAD BEEN ISSUED SEPARATELY FROM THE EARLIER SPD RESTRS, WE WERE NOW OK TO RESUME NORMAL SPD AND DSND ON THE GS. WE WERE ANXIOUS TO GET THE AIRPLANE CONFIGURED PROPERLY AND TO STABILIZE THE APCH BECAUSE OF THE POOR WX CONDITIONS. THE CTLR ASSUMED THAT WE WOULD MAINTAIN 170 KTS TO SOME CERTAIN POINT, ONE THAT HE DID NOT SPECIFY. HAD HE ISSUED THE APCH CLRNC WHILE REISSUING THE SPD RESTR, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CLRER IN OUR MINDS THAT HE WANTED US TO GO FAST. 2) ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS OUR OWN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. WE WERE FURTHER FROM THE ARPT THAN WE UNDERSTOOD OURSELVES TO BE, HAVING CONFUSED 2 SEPARATE DME FIXES WHILE WITNESSING THE LOC AND GS COME ALIVE. IF WE HAD KNOWN WE WERE FURTHER OUT, WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE DSNDED AT A HIGHER AIRSPD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 598159: I SET UP AND IDENTED THE NAVAIDS, THEN BRIEFED THE APCH TO THE FO. HE DID A GOOD JOB HOLDING HDGS, ALTS AND SPDS WHILE HAND FLYING IN THE TURB, AS R-HAND PANEL IS RAW DATA. DURING THE BASE LEG, THE CTLR CAME BACK AND REISSUED 170 KT SPD RESTR. I RESPONDED '170 KTS.' IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE XMISSION I THOUGHT I SHOULD HAVE TOLD HIM WE WERE CURRENTLY INDICATING 170 KTS, WONDERING WHETHER HIS RADAR SHOWED US FASTER OR SLOWER. AS FREQ WAS BUSY I REMAINED SILENT. I KNEW WE WERE KEPT AT ALT BECAUSE WE WERE XING OVER THE TFC ON THE PARALLEL LOC FOR RWY 27R. WE UTILIZE 140 KTS FOR APCHS IN OUR ACFT BECAUSE IT IS 1/2 WAY BTWN VLE AND BLUE LINE (VYSE) OF 125 KTS. BY SLOWING EARLY WE ALLOWED MORE TIME FOR FOLLOWING TFC TO CLOSE WITH US. THE BUSY SIT HAD ACFT SPACING ALREADY AT A PREMIUM. IN THE FUTURE, I NEED TO MAINTAIN BETTER SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. I DID NOT XCHK MY DME INDICATION WITH THE APCH PLATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.