Narrative:

Our company had filed us for the bibos 2G SID which was inappropriate for the runway in use. Approximately 45 mins before pushback, the PF loaded into the FMS what he 'guessed' would be the correct SID (the bibos 2E). Immediately before pushback, we got our clearance from clearance delivery as 'cleared for the bibos 2E, correction, bibos 2D SID.' the PF never went back and re-entered the correct 'bibos 2D' in the FMC. (The bibos 2E and bibos 2D sids are on the same departure page and have a similar left turn shortly after takeoff. The main difference between the two is that the turn after takeoff on the 2E begins 3.5 NM before the 2D turn and then tracks essentially parallel.) after takeoff, frankfurt departure control said that we were off course and appeared to be on the 2E SID. He also said that the 2E SID was given only to small, quiet aircraft since it tracked over noise sensitive areas. Examining the SID afterward, we could find no reference to the fact that large aircraft were not to be given this SID. Had there been some notation stating the 2E was not used for large aircraft, we probably would not have incorrectly guessed that particular SID. Additionally, there are 8 different 'bibos' departures spanning 4 different pages increasing the chance for a mix-up. I was the relief pilot, sitting on the jumpseat in the cockpit on this departure. From the jumpseat, I could see PF and PNF HSI navigation display maps, which would look similar whether the bibos 2D and 2E was selected, but I could not see the FMS screens. I did a general comparison between the printed departure procedure and the picture on the navigation display, and briefly thought that the picture looked slightly different, but dismissed the differences as a difference in scale between the printed page and the aircraft navigation display. I did not question the PF (the first officer on this leg) or captain. My mistake was assuming without question that they had loaded the correct SID without being completely convinced. Had I trusted my little voice that says, 'that looks slightly off,' and taken 2 seconds to query the PF or PNF, I could have prevented the navigation error. I would mention that the PF and PNF are both known to me to be far above the skill and competence of average pilots. This probably worked against me in this case, in that had they been average, I would have been looking much harder for errors. I would say that this effect probably also applies to both the PF and PNF in their assumptions about each other's performance. As experienced pilots, we know well that complacency is the largest factor in many errors, and flying with 'good' pilots can allow a comfortable complacency to creep in that one would not allow when flying with 'less experienced' pilots.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B763 ENTER WRONG SID IN FMS AND TURN EARLY ON DEP FROM EDDF.

Narrative: OUR COMPANY HAD FILED US FOR THE BIBOS 2G SID WHICH WAS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE RWY IN USE. APPROX 45 MINS BEFORE PUSHBACK, THE PF LOADED INTO THE FMS WHAT HE 'GUESSED' WOULD BE THE CORRECT SID (THE BIBOS 2E). IMMEDIATELY BEFORE PUSHBACK, WE GOT OUR CLRNC FROM CLRNC DELIVERY AS 'CLRED FOR THE BIBOS 2E, CORRECTION, BIBOS 2D SID.' THE PF NEVER WENT BACK AND RE-ENTERED THE CORRECT 'BIBOS 2D' IN THE FMC. (THE BIBOS 2E AND BIBOS 2D SIDS ARE ON THE SAME DEP PAGE AND HAVE A SIMILAR L TURN SHORTLY AFTER TKOF. THE MAIN DIFFERENCE BTWN THE TWO IS THAT THE TURN AFTER TKOF ON THE 2E BEGINS 3.5 NM BEFORE THE 2D TURN AND THEN TRACKS ESSENTIALLY PARALLEL.) AFTER TKOF, FRANKFURT DEP CTL SAID THAT WE WERE OFF COURSE AND APPEARED TO BE ON THE 2E SID. HE ALSO SAID THAT THE 2E SID WAS GIVEN ONLY TO SMALL, QUIET ACFT SINCE IT TRACKED OVER NOISE SENSITIVE AREAS. EXAMINING THE SID AFTERWARD, WE COULD FIND NO REF TO THE FACT THAT LARGE ACFT WERE NOT TO BE GIVEN THIS SID. HAD THERE BEEN SOME NOTATION STATING THE 2E WAS NOT USED FOR LARGE ACFT, WE PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE INCORRECTLY GUESSED THAT PARTICULAR SID. ADDITIONALLY, THERE ARE 8 DIFFERENT 'BIBOS' DEPS SPANNING 4 DIFFERENT PAGES INCREASING THE CHANCE FOR A MIX-UP. I WAS THE RELIEF PLT, SITTING ON THE JUMPSEAT IN THE COCKPIT ON THIS DEP. FROM THE JUMPSEAT, I COULD SEE PF AND PNF HSI NAV DISPLAY MAPS, WHICH WOULD LOOK SIMILAR WHETHER THE BIBOS 2D AND 2E WAS SELECTED, BUT I COULD NOT SEE THE FMS SCREENS. I DID A GENERAL COMPARISON BTWN THE PRINTED DEP PROC AND THE PICTURE ON THE NAV DISPLAY, AND BRIEFLY THOUGHT THAT THE PICTURE LOOKED SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT, BUT DISMISSED THE DIFFERENCES AS A DIFFERENCE IN SCALE BTWN THE PRINTED PAGE AND THE ACFT NAV DISPLAY. I DID NOT QUESTION THE PF (THE FO ON THIS LEG) OR CAPT. MY MISTAKE WAS ASSUMING WITHOUT QUESTION THAT THEY HAD LOADED THE CORRECT SID WITHOUT BEING COMPLETELY CONVINCED. HAD I TRUSTED MY LITTLE VOICE THAT SAYS, 'THAT LOOKS SLIGHTLY OFF,' AND TAKEN 2 SECONDS TO QUERY THE PF OR PNF, I COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE NAV ERROR. I WOULD MENTION THAT THE PF AND PNF ARE BOTH KNOWN TO ME TO BE FAR ABOVE THE SKILL AND COMPETENCE OF AVERAGE PLTS. THIS PROBABLY WORKED AGAINST ME IN THIS CASE, IN THAT HAD THEY BEEN AVERAGE, I WOULD HAVE BEEN LOOKING MUCH HARDER FOR ERRORS. I WOULD SAY THAT THIS EFFECT PROBABLY ALSO APPLIES TO BOTH THE PF AND PNF IN THEIR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT EACH OTHER'S PERFORMANCE. AS EXPERIENCED PLTS, WE KNOW WELL THAT COMPLACENCY IS THE LARGEST FACTOR IN MANY ERRORS, AND FLYING WITH 'GOOD' PLTS CAN ALLOW A COMFORTABLE COMPLACENCY TO CREEP IN THAT ONE WOULD NOT ALLOW WHEN FLYING WITH 'LESS EXPERIENCED' PLTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.